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Organizations routinely rely on work groups for creative solutions to the problems 
they face. This is because solving difficult problems is often assumed to require the 
talents and knowledge of multiple people working together. However, much research has 
shown over the years that groups frequently experience dysfunction when trying to 
collaborate and generate creative solutions. Organizational researchers have theorized 
that analogical reasoning may play an important role in promoting collective creativity, 
but these claims are for the most part untested in the literature. In this dissertation, I 
attempt to answer two questions. First, does analogical reasoning provide some 
functional benefits for groups solving creative problems? Second, does analogical 
reasoning give rise to synergistic effects when creative groups collaborate during ideation 
and problem-solving? I assessed these questions using a laboratory study designed to find 
the effects of analogical reasoning in interacting and non-interacting groups, and to test 
for potential synergistic effects of analogical reasoning as a group-level strategy for 
generating creative problem solutions. Findings of the study suggest that analogical 
reasoning may provide some benefits for creative group outputs, and it may also create 
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Chapter 1: Overview 
INTRODUCTION 
Ever-changing markets and technologies require many organizations to act 
creatively. New and more useful technology, equipment, and work processes are often 
needed to increase productivity, which can boost profitability and help firms compete 
against rivals. Meanwhile, consumers consistently crave new and more useful products 
and services. These internal and external demands put pressure on firms to come up with 
new, creative ideas. As a result, organizational prosperity and long-term survival 
frequently depend on creative thinking that leads to innovation (Schumpeter, 1976). 
Organizations often use work groups to generate new ideas, instead of relying on 
individuals for creative thinking (Thompson, 2013). The popular common sense about 
solving difficult problems, including creative problems, is based in part on two 
propositions. The first is a resource-based argument: Groups have an advantage over 
individuals because they possess more knowledge and experience as a collective than any 
individual can possess alone. This rationale gives groups a hypothetical advantage over 
individuals, when it comes to creative problem-solving. The second derives from the 
notion of synergy (Baruah & Paulus, 2009; Larson Jr, 2010), which assumes there is 
something special about inter-member interaction that propels group achievement beyond 
what is expected based on the “sum of its parts”. Taken together, these propositions 
suggest functional benefits for groups over individuals when it comes to creative 
problem-solving. However, one conclusion that can be drawn from decades of scholarly 
research is that groups are at risk of succumbing to dysfunctional processes that prevent 
them from effectively taking advantage of their inputs and resources (Hackman, 1987, 
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1998; Steiner, 1972). If organizations are to benefit from using creative groups, then the 
creative group processes that involve inter-member collaboration must be functional. The 
widespread use of creative groups in organizations necessitates that researchers develop 
and test theory that accounts for these processes and their impact on group creativity. 
Creative problem-solving is a challenging topic for serious study. Figuring out 
where new ideas come from has been called “an enormous question” (Smith & Ward, 
2012) and “the most daunting question in psychology” (Markman & Wood, 2009). 
Existing creativity research contains varying perspectives. For example, some early 
creativity research emphasized personality and other individual differences in creative 
ability (e.g., Guilford, 1950; Mackinnon, 1965). Newell, Shaw, and Simon (1962) 
assumed that individual creative thinking was a special class of human problem-solving, 
and theoretically modeled it as a process of goal-driven symbolic information processing. 
More recent research has approached individual creative thinking processes by applying 
concepts from cognitive science (Smith & Ward, 2012; Smith, Ward, & Finke, 1995). 
One such area of inquiry is focused on understanding how analogical reasoning can 
stimulate creative thinking processes and produce creative outcomes (Gentner et al., 
1997; Markman, Wood, Linsey, Murphy, & Laux, 2009). 
Analogical reasoning involves abstract thinking during creative problem-solving, 
which promotes variety and novelty in potential solutions. At the same time, analogical 
reasoning also requires some disciplined analysis and evaluation, which helps increase 
the chances that solutions will effectively address the creative problem. This combination 
of variety and discipline of thought makes analogical reasoning potentially well-suited as 
a creative thinking technique (Gentner et al., 1997; Hargadon, 1999). 
Some have suggested that analogical reasoning might also be beneficial for group 
creative processes and outcomes (Amabile, 1996; Hargadon, 1999; Hargadon & Bechky, 
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2006; Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2008), but theory derived from this conjecture is scant and 
associated empirical tests are missing in the literature. In fact, much evidence exists that 
ideation strategies may actually produce process losses when implemented in interacting 
groups (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Mullen, Johnson, & Salas, 1991). If analogical reasoning 
is to benefit group creative problem-solving, it must overcome or avoid the social and 
cognitive process losses that these existing ideation strategies such as brainstorming are 
subject to.  
In this dissertation I investigate the role of analogical reasoning in creative 
problem-solving groups. Specifically, I examine how analogical reasoning affects group 
information processing and how implementing an analogical reasoning strategy produces 
creative group outcomes. I argue that analogical reasoning provides group-level benefits 
for idea search and collective evaluation, each of which is critical to group processes 
leading to creative problem-solving. Further, I argue that employing an analogical 
reasoning strategy will produce synergistic benefits for interacting groups. 
This research applies to group tasks that are primarily cognitive and intellectual in 
nature. These tasks often require members to contribute and integrate their diverse 
knowledge in order to generate new solutions to organizational problems and 
opportunities. Member cognitive interdependence is a requirement for tasks like these, in 
the sense that members must usually retrieve, share, and build upon others’ knowledge to 
achieve a high level of effectiveness. Examples of teams that often engage in these types 
of tasks are new product development teams, creative advertising teams, R&D teams, 
management consulting teams, and temporary teams composed specifically to solve 
emergent crises in organizations.  
This research contributes to the group creativity literature by examining group 
creative process, a currently understudied yet important area of inquiry. Much of the 
 
 4 
existing group creativity literature treats group creative process as a “black box,” 
studying group creative outcomes as stemming from group compositional and contextual 
inputs (Shalley, 2008). This dissertation also contributes to the research on analogical 
reasoning, the bulk of which has been conducted at the individual level of analysis. 
Finally, because it explicates the theoretical mechanisms involved in creative problem-
solving, this dissertation may shed light on collective cognition more generally, and it 
may complement recent efforts to study group creativity using concepts from group 
cognition (Gino, Argote, Miron-Spektor, & Todorova, 2010). 
This research is intended to have an impact on real organizations by helping 
managers establish working conditions and practices that spur group creative outcomes 
and increase the chances that group creativity will lead to beneficial organizational 
outcomes. Managers often do not have much control over the personnel available for 
projects, but they sometimes can control the working environment and training programs 
to a greater extent and “set the conditions” for optimal group outcomes (Hackman, 1987). 
In addition, this research may ultimately lead to recommended interventions that will 
foster enhanced group creativity in the workplace.  
The remainder of this dissertation unfolds as follows: In Chapter 2, I review 
relevant literatures from organizational behavior and cognitive science that establish what 
is known about group creative processes, group creative outcomes, and analogical 
reasoning. In Chapter 3, I theorize about the nature of analogical reasoning in group 
contexts and why analogical reasoning might promote various aspects of group creativity. 
I present testable hypotheses that relate analogical reasoning to group information 
processing and creative problem-solving. In Chapter 4, I present the methods for testing 
the hypotheses. The study design is a laboratory experiment. In Chapter 5, I present the 
results of the data analyses. Finally, in Chapter 6, I discuss the empirical results, describe 
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the limitations of the study, suggest how the results apply to creative groups in theory and 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
CREATIVITY: DEFINITION AND CONCEPTS 
In the following section, I define creativity for the purposes of this dissertation 
and introduce some important concepts related to the study of group creative problem-
solving.  
Creativity Defined 
Creativity is defined as the generation of ideas that are both novel and useful 
(Amabile, 1996; George, 2007). Creativity may therefore manifest as a creative process 
(the generation of ideas) that results in creative outcomes (i.e., products that are novel 
and useful). Another specification is that the creative task itself must be one for which a 
completely straightforward path to a solution does not exist, i.e., the task must be 
heuristic and not algorithmic (Amabile, 1996). Creativity and innovation are sometimes 
thought of synonymously, but innovation includes the implementation of creative ideas, 
while creativity does not (Amabile, 1996; Hulsheger, Anderson, & Salgado, 2009; 
Woodman, Sawyer, & Griffin, 1993). In the next three sections, I describe important 
characteristics of research that addresses creativity by conceptualizing it as a creative 
process or as resulting in creative outcomes, and I discuss the different task types that are 
typically seen in creativity research. 
Creative Process 
The creative process is often theorized about, but less often tested. Several 
researchers have conceptualized creativity as a process that individuals and groups use to 
generate creative ideas (e.g., Csikszentmihalyi, 1997; Drazin, Glynn, & Kazanjian, 1999; 
Harvey & Kou, 2011; Mumford, Mobley, Reiter-Palmon, Uhlman, & Doares, 1991). This 
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process perspective has led many to postulate that creative thought is composed of 
multiple distinct modes of thinking and observable behaviors (Amabile, 1996; Baughman 
& Mumford, 1995; Drazin et al., 1999). One broad characterization of the creative 
thinking process casts it into divergent and convergent thinking (Guilford, 1950; Runco, 
1991; Torrance, 1969). Divergent thinking refers to thought that ranges across various 
domains or categories of knowledge instead of thinking in predictable ways, and often 
includes search for many varied and imaginative ideas and problem solutions (Guilford, 
1967; Runco, 1991). Convergent thinking is reasoning or problem-solving “in which 
cognitive operations are intended to converge upon the single correct answer to a 
problem” (Smith & Ward, 2012). Using this broad characterization, creative ideas are 
generated via divergent thinking, and then evaluated and selected with more convergent 
thinking (Milliken, Bartel, & Kurtzberg, 2003; Staw, 2009). 
Early creativity theorists proposed that the creative process plays out as an 
ordered sequence of these thinking behaviors, however, there is no strong empirical 
evidence that this is so (e.g., Eindhoven & Vinacke, 1952; Patrick, 1937). This lack of 
evidence prompted researchers to revise assumptions and postulate that creative thinking 
might just as plausibly involve an iterative process that may cycle back and forth between 
the different thinking modes (e.g., Brown, Tumeo, Larey, & Paulus, 1998; Nijstad & 
Stroebe, 2006; Skilton & Dooley, 2010). Montag, Maertz, and Baer (2012) recently 
summarized a collection of the most-cited creativity process models and articulated a 
general framework that captures the important similarities among them. This general 
framework contains thinking behaviors that align with the concepts of divergent and 
convergent thinking, including problem formulation/definition, preparation/information 
gathering, idea generation, and idea evaluation/validation. For example, problem 
formulation, information gathering, and idea generation are often conceptualized to entail 
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divergent aspects of thought, while idea evaluation is thought to involve convergent 
thought characteristics (Montag et al., 2012). One perspective that has developed places 
high value on divergent thinking, because divergent thinking is assumed to promote 
ideational variety and thus establishes the potential for creative output (Staw, 2009). 
Creative Outcomes 
Many creativity studies conducted within organizations have evaluated creative 
outcomes as indicators of group creativity (Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004), and this is 
true for lab-based creativity research as well, including some brainstorming studies 
(Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Mullen et al., 1991). Creative outcomes are often evaluated in 
terms of novelty, usefulness, and flexibility (Amabile, 1996). 
Novelty reflects the uniqueness or rarity of a creative product (Amabile, 1996). 
When comparing and assessing multiple creative ideas, for example, novelty can be 
computed as mathematical infrequency. Novel ideas are relatively rare ideas. Even 
though novelty and creativity may be thought of synonymously, this proves to be a 
flawed approach. Judgments of novelty cannot discriminate the creative from the simply 
bizarre (Amabile, 1996). To differentiate the creative from the outlandish, judgments of 
usefulness are also required (Simonton, 1980). 
Usefulness can be thought of as how well a creative response reflects 
appropriateness or feasibility (Amabile, 1996). There are several potential conceptual 
issues related to appropriateness and feasibility, and their relative significance may 
depend on the particulars of the creative problem or task for which responses are 
generated. For example, appropriateness judgments may depend on whether there are 
subjective but widely accepted norms involved in meeting the goals and constraints of the 
creative task. Feasibility can be interpreted as whether a solution to a creative problem 
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could realistically be accomplished from a technical or other objective standpoint (e.g., a 
solution idea that incorporates magic or extrasensory perception might garner a low 
feasibility judgment). To the extent that these goal and constraint issues seem satisfied by 
a creative idea, the subjective judgments of usefulness are established. 
A related but distinct characteristic is flexibility, the extent to which creative 
products range across multiple, diverse knowledge domains. Flexibility is often viewed 
as evidence of divergent thinking (Guilford, 1950). 
Creative Task Types 
Creative tasks are heuristic, which means there is no obvious path to a solution. In 
some cases, researchers have used intellective tasks (Laughlin & Ellis, 1986), where 
study participants must presumably use creative thinking to come up with a singular, 
demonstrably correct solution to a problem (e.g., Duncker, 1945). However, the choice of 
task in these types of tests requires that researchers use some a priori ideas about what 
constitutes the creative thinking process, and the validity of this methodology has been 
criticized on this account (Amabile, 1996). 
Creativity researchers have also used judgmental, open-ended tasks that do not 
have a singular, correct answer (e.g. Baer, Leenders, Oldham, & Vadera, 2010; Baer, 
Oldham, Jacobsohn, & Hollingshead, 2008; Goncalo & Duguid, 2012; Goncalo & Staw, 
2006; Nijstad, Stroebe, & Lodewijkx, 2002, 2003). For example, Gino, Argote, Miron-
Spektor, and Todorova (2010) used a task that required participants to construct multiple 
origami figures. Such tasks provide a suitable environment for creative thinking and 
simulate the types of problem situations common in work organizations. For this 
dissertation, I conform to this latter approach and consider creativity in open-ended tasks 
with many possible solutions. 
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Two primary literature reviews are next. First, I review and summarize creativity 
in groups. This includes the brainstorming literature, which covers idea production at the 
group level of analysis. The review also includes group level creativity studies taken 
mostly from the organizational behavior literature. Second, I review the literature on 
analogical reasoning, which is primarily composed of cognitive science studies at the 
individual level of analysis. 
GROUP CREATIVITY 
Brainstorming 
The central question in the brainstorming literature is: Does group interaction help 
or hinder the group-level production of creative ideas? Alex Osborn came up with a 
prescriptive set of group interaction rules that was intended to increase a group’s ability 
to produce creative ideas (Osborn, 1953, 1963). The rules were 1) Criticism is ruled out; 
2) “Free-wheeling” is welcomed; 3) Quantity is wanted; and 4) Combination and 
improvement are sought. The past sixty years have seen Osborn’s rules for group idea 
generation put to the empirical test. 
The primary measure of interest in brainstorming studies is fluency, the number of 
ideas produced. As a measure of idea production (or, “ideation”), fluency assesses what is 
essentially an additive task (Steiner, 1972) – that is, the number of ideas produced by a 
group’s members are summed to calculate performance. Additive tasks like this possess 
the advantageous characteristic that they can be used to examine group synergy. In order 
to assess the synergistic effects of group interaction, studies typically compare interacting 
groups with “nominal” groups, which are randomly composed of non-interacting 
individual brainstormers. Nominal group fluency is the sum of the ideas generated 
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(individually) by each of its members. Synergy is confirmed when interacting groups 
produce a greater number of ideas than do nominal groups. 
The first experiment to test the effects of brainstorming showed, surprisingly, that 
group interaction significantly decreased idea production (Taylor, Berry, & Block, 1958). 
Many replications followed, and a meta-analysis by Mullen and colleagues (1991) 
provided conclusive summarized empirical evidence of the negative effect of group 
interaction on ideation. Over the past 20 years, researchers have tried to explain this 
negative effect, and in some cases, counteract it. The four most common explanations for 
this so-called production loss in brainstorming are evaluation apprehension, social 
loafing, performance matching, and production blocking. Below, I review the evidence 
for each explanation. 
Evaluation apprehension 
Even though one rule of brainstorming instructs group members to refrain from 
criticizing the ideas of others, people may still fear a negative judgment of their ideas and 
withhold them (Diehl & Stroebe, 1987). This fear of negative evaluation can lead to a 
reduction in fluency for interacting groups compared to nominal groups, because in 
nominal groups the members produce ideas in solitary isolation, and thus no immediate 
evaluation by others is possible. 
Some evidence exists for evaluation apprehension. For example, Collaros and 
Anderson (1969) found that group brainstorming members were more unwilling to 
provide their ideas when they believed others in the group were experts in the subject 
domain at hand. In another study, Diehl and Stroebe (1987) found that when 
brainstormers were told their performance was being monitored and evaluated, their 
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ideation performance tended to decrease. These results indicate that evaluation 
apprehension does appear to reduce the production of ideas in brainstorming groups. 
Social loafing 
When it is unclear how to identify the contributions of individual group members 
in the group output, this may result in a motivation loss called social loafing (Latane, 
Williams, & Harkins, 1979). In the interactive brainstorming context, when members do 
not have a way to attach individual ideas to those who contributed them, social loafing 
may arise. Perhaps ironically, Osborn (1953) recommended that contributors’ names not 
be associated with the ideas they provide, possibly priming conditions for social loafing 
where this advice is followed. 
Empirical evidence indicates that social loafing may indeed affect brainstorming 
groups. Harkins (1987) found in an experiment that brainstorming participants whose 
output could be evaluated outperformed participants whose output could not be 
evaluated. Also, Williams and Karau (1991) found that brainstormers who expected 
individual evaluation generated more ideas than those expecting a group evaluation, and 
that these main effects were moderated by expectations of coworker performance. 
Performance matching 
Brainstormers who work together are in a position to observe their coworkers’ 
contributions. In particular, members may perceive an implicit group norm about the 
expected rate of idea production, by observing the idea contributions of other members. 
This perception may push members to converge upon a similar rate of contributions, a 
phenomenon termed performance matching. Brainstormers who work alone do not have 
this information and are therefore unaffected. This leads to a prediction that individuals in 
interacting ideation groups should each contribute about the same number of ideas during 
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a brainstorming session, while members of nominal groups will vary more in terms of the 
number of ideas they generate. This logic leaves open the possibility that performance 
matching norms might increase interacting groups’ idea production compared to nominal 
groups, rather than decrease it. 
However, Paulus and Dzindolet (1993) proposed that the initial conditions of 
interacting brainstorming groups, including negative productivity effects of turn-taking, 
social loafing, and evaluation apprehension, might reduce the rate of contributions at the 
beginning of a brainstorming session. This initial lowering of the idea contribution rate 
would then establish a group norm and allow performance matching effects to take over 
and maintain the lowered rate of production. In a series of three brainstorming 
experiments (1993), they consistently found that members of interactive groups tended to 
contribute about the same number of ideas as the other members of their group, i.e., the 
intra-group variance for member fluency was rather low. By contrast, members of 
nominal groups exhibited more intra-group variance in the number of ideas contributed 
by members. Also, average nominal group fluency was greater than average interacting 
group fluency, replicating the classic brainstorming finding. Camacho and Paulus (1995) 
replicated this result in the first of two brainstorming experiments. These studies seem to 
support the rationale behind the performance matching explanation for lower idea 
production in interactive brainstorming, versus nominal, groups. 
Production blocking 
One assumed advantage of group interaction is that hearing others’ ideas 
stimulates further creative thinking (Dugosh, Paulus, Roland, & Yang, 2000; Osborn, 
1953). This cognitive stimulation represents a fundamental mechanism by which 
interacting groups might benefit from the group context and achieve synergy in 
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producing creative responses. However, during ideation members must take turns 
contributing ideas to avoid communication problems, and waiting to take turns is the root 
cause of production blocking. Members who think of an idea, but must hold it in working 
(short-term) memory until they can contribute it, run the risk of forgetting it. Also, the 
load placed on working memory by the simultaneous requirements of remembering the 
idea, seeking an opportunity to contribute it, and actively listening to other members 
compromises the ability to continue searching long-term memory for more ideas. Search 
is temporarily put on hold, due to the load placed on working memory. Individual 
brainstormers are thus believed to run a lower risk of forgetting, and are able to conduct 
more long-term memory search, compared to members of interacting groups. This 
hypothetically leads to a fluency advantage for nominal group members compared to 
interacting groups. Production blocking may therefore tend to counteract the theoretical 
benefits of cognitive stimulation.  
Researchers have tried to establish the conditions under which either production 
blocking or cognitive stimulation dominate during group brainstorming. For example, 
Diehl and Stroebe (1987) conducted an experiment contrasting interacting groups with 
nominal groups, and their results replicated the fluency advantage of nominal groups. 
But, they also created three special nominal group conditions where individuals had to 
watch signal lights that indicated when other members of their “virtual” group were 
talking. In two of these conditions, individuals were told they had to wait until the lights 
signaled they could contribute an idea, simulating the turn taking of interacting groups. In 
the third special condition, individuals watched the lights but were told to contribute their 
ideas as soon as they thought of them. In the two special conditions where individuals 
had to wait, nominal group fluency was similar to that of interacting groups. But in the 
special condition with no waiting, nominal groups performed as well as the regular 
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nominal groups with no signal lights. These results are interesting because the study 
design separated the social factors encountered in interacting groups from the purely 
cognitive effects of production blocking. It also showed that production blocking seemed 
to account for the major portion of the negative fluency effect for interacting groups. 
These findings have led researchers to focus on production blocking as one of the more 
significant theorized mechanisms of process loss for brainstorming groups. 
A silver lining: Cognitive stimulation during brainstorming 
There is also empirical evidence that cognitive stimulation can arise in 
brainstorming groups, but certain conditions must exist. Employing a process called 
brainwriting, where group members do not speak but instead write ideas on paper and 
pass their ideas around to each other, Paulus and Yang (2000) found that four-person 
groups in a brainwriting condition produced significantly more unique ideas than did 
nominal groups. Further, when participants continued to generate ideas individually in a 
subsequent ideation period, those who had been exposed to the ideas of others in the 
brainwriting condition produced nearly twice as many unique ideas compared to those 
who had no exposure to others’ ideas. This positive effect suggests that members were 
indeed cognitively stimulated by the ideas of others. Studies of electronic brainstorming, 
which represents a high-tech variation on brainwriting by using computing equipment 
instead of paper slips, have produced similar findings (Dennis & Williams, 2003). 
Brainwriting and electronic brainstorming research is important because it shows 
that groups do have the potential for intermember cognitive stimulation that pushes 
ideation performance beyond that of individual brainstormers. A possible drawback of 
these approaches is that in order to achieve this boost in production, interaction and 
communication between members must be practically eliminated. If communication 
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processes are needed for other aspects of the group creative process, (e.g., interactive 
memory cueing or other collaborative processes), the conditions required for brainwriting 
and electronic brainstorming may restrict these potentially beneficial group processes. 
Summary: Brainstorming 
Brainstorming research reveals how group interaction can negatively affect the 
group-level production of ideas, but recent studies also suggest that under certain 
conditions, cognitive stimulation is possible. If cognitive stimulation arises as a result of 
intermember interaction, it may provide advantages for creative groups. Eliminating or 
otherwise overcoming the bad effects of interaction (e.g., evaluation apprehension) while 
preserving or enhancing its cognitive benefits seems to be a prescriptive route for 
heightened group creativity. 
Next, I review and summarize group-level creativity studies that fall outside the 
brainstorming paradigm, primarily in organizational behavior studies. 
Group creativity in organizational behavior 
 Like the brainstorming literature, the studies reviewed next examine creative 
outcomes at the group level of analysis. However, the studies are not limited to laboratory 
tests of idea production (fluency) using simple ideation tasks, and they also tend to 
examine group level compositional and emergent state variables that may affect group 
creative processes and outcomes. The number of studies devoted to examining open-
ended group creative outcomes is less than the number of brainstorming studies, so 
obvious trends and patterns in findings are more difficult to discern. The following 
review is organized broadly according to antecedent and contextual variables that have an 
impact on group creativity. 
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Member composition and leader characteristics 
Several researchers have argued that the composition of group member 
characteristics matters for group creativity (Milliken et al., 2003; Shalley, 2008; Somech 
& Drach-Zahavy, 2011), and some empirical studies support this claim. Chirumbolo and 
colleagues (2005) found that groups composed of members with a high need for closure 
produced fewer unique ideas and less creative ideas compared to groups composed of 
members with a low need for closure. They also found evidence that high need for 
closure groups spent less time in discussion and engaged in less elaboration of their initial 
solution, compared to low need for closure groups. In a study of 47 MBA student dyads 
who interacted virtually during task execution, Martins & Shalley (2011) found that 
member age difference was positively associated with group creativity when process 
conflict was low, when members participated more equally in discussion, when members 
spent more time establishing rapport, and when members had about the same experience 
with virtual communication technology (e.g., email, chat rooms, etc.). However, member 
age difference was negatively associated with group creativity when process conflict was 
high, when members participated less equally in discussion, when members spent little 
time establishing rapport, and when members had very different levels of experience with 
virtual communication technology. In another study, Hoever, van Knippenberg, van 
Ginkel, and Barkema (2012) found that perspective taking positively moderated the 
association between diversity of perspectives and team creativity. They also found that 
perspective taking moderated the association between diversity of perspectives and 
information elaboration, and that information elaboration mediated the interactive effect 
of diversity and perspective taking on team creativity. Baer, Oldham, Jacobsohn, and 
Hollingshead (2008) found that groups exhibited high creativity when they included more 
high extraversion, high openness to experience, and low conscientiousness members, and 
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when members shared a sense of creative confidence in the group. Together, the above 
studies suggest that similarities and differences in member characteristics can indeed 
affect group creativity, but they also show that group interaction and processes are 
important as well. 
Group processes were the focus of a study of sales teams by Sung and Choi 
(2012). Sung & Choi (2012) found that team knowledge utilization in insurance firm 
teams was positively associated with team creativity. This association was stronger when 
members experienced higher environmental uncertainty. Contrary to the authors’ 
predictions, leaders’ systematic cognitive style (i.e., preference for rules, procedures, etc.) 
was just as important for team creativity as was an intuitive cognitive style. This study 
suggests that in order for teams to realize the creative potential of their collective 
knowledge, a strong intuitive or a strong systematic cognitive style in team leaders may 
be beneficial.  
Culture and Norms 
Group culture and norms may affect group creativity (e.g., Flynn & Chatman, 
2001), but empirical findings hint that the relationship between these variables is not 
straightforward. Goncalo and Staw (2006) tested direct and interactive effects of group 
culture (individualistic vs. collectivistic) and the nature of task instructions on group 
creativity. They found a consistent pattern of results showing that individualistic groups 
were more creative than collectivistic groups when they were instructed to be creative, 
but not when they were instructed to be practical. In a related experiment, Goncalo and 
Duguid (2012) found that groups composed of highly creative members and those 
composed of less creative members responded to group norm conformity pressure 
differently. Groups with highly creative members were most fluent and most original 
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when norms were individualistic and conformity pressure was low. Conversely, groups 
with less creative members were most fluent and original when there was high pressure 
for individualism. This study shows that the combination of norms and conformity 
pressures that leads to group creativity depends upon individual differences in member 
creativity. This study further suggests that groups of creative “superstars” may benefit 
from a different set of working conditions compared to groups composed of less naturally 
creative members. 
Membership change 
Group membership change potentially introduces disruptions to group knowledge, 
processes, and performance (for reviews, see Argote & Kane, 2003; Levine & Choi, 
2004), but membership change can also lead to an infusion of new ideas and stimulate 
divergent thinking and reflection upon the way group members approach their tasks 
(Levine, Choi, & Moreland, 2003; Staw, 1980). Baer, Leenders, Oldham, and Vadera 
(2010) found some support for interactive effects of membership change and intergroup 
competition on group creativity. Specifically, groups that experienced membership 
change had a U-shaped relationship between intergroup competition and group creativity. 
Groups that experienced no membership change had a positive relationship between 
intergroup competition and group creativity. Choi & Thompson (2005) found that 
creativity was higher when groups experienced a membership change, compared to 
groups that did not. Further, they found evidence that the increase in group creativity was 
not purely due to the ideas that new members brought with them, but that the creativity of 
“oldtimers” was enhanced by social interaction with the new members. 
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Task and task experience effects 
Pearsall and colleagues (2008) found that when the group task activated gender 
faultlines, this negatively affected team fluency and the creativity of team ideas. They 
also found that emotional conflict partially mediated the negative effects of activated 
gender faultlines on team fluency. These findings suggest that diversity in creative teams 
may be detrimental if faultlines are present and if the team engages in a task for which 
diversity salience may activate the faultlines. Brophy (2006) found evidence that, 
compared to nominal groups, interacting groups tended to perform better on multi-part, 
complex creative tasks. Consistent with the brainstorming literature as a whole, he also 
found that nominal groups tended to outperform interacting groups when members 
engaged in a relatively simple ideation task. This study introduces a potential boundary 
condition to the brainstorming findings that consistently show an ideation advantage for 
nominal groups, i.e., as the complexity of the creative task increases beyond very simple 
ideation problems, perhaps group interaction becomes more valuable for group creativity. 
In a study where groups learned how to produce origami objects, Gino and 
colleagues (2010) found that direct experience on an initial task led to higher group 
creativity on a subsequent, similar task, compared to indirect or no task experience. 
Indirect task experience was instilled in some groups by allowing them to watch a video 
of another group performing the origami task. The researchers found that transactive 
memory systems (TMS), presumably built and strengthened during the initial shared task 
experience, mediated this effect. Also, groups that experienced a membership change 
between two trials of the task produced creative products with higher component 
divergence, an indicator of divergent thinking, compared to groups that experienced no 
membership change. These findings seem to line up with those of Choi and Thompson 
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(2005), who found that membership change stimulated increases in both group fluency 
and group flexibility. 
Interestingly, although TMS was associated with overall group creativity in this 
study, it was not associated with component divergence, an indicator of divergent 
thinking. These findings leave the role of TMS for group creativity at issue. It may be 
that the efficiencies in group coordination brought about by TMS may help in creative 
tasks where some execution or tangible product creation is required. TMS is expected to 
help groups during this execution phase, when task labor can be divided up among 
members based on what they know and what they are good at (Moreland, 1999). 
However, these findings call into question whether TMS enables divergent thinking in 
the exploratory phases of creative thinking. 
Summary: Group creativity 
This research on group creativity is smaller and relatively recent, compared to the 
previously reviewed literature on brainstorming. Though it covers a variety of concepts, 
some general themes are hinted at. First, aggregated individual characteristics (such as 
personality variables or need for closure) may be important for group creativity, but their 
effects on group creativity are often moderated by the effectiveness of group processes. 
Second, cognitive stimulation seems to be enhanced and more beneficial for group 
creativity when it involves not just mere exposure to member ideas, but rather when it 
occurs via social interaction with other group members. This stands in contrast to some 
recommendations derived from brainstorming studies that argue for the elimination of 
social interaction in order to prevent production blocking and other undesirable social 
effects like evaluation apprehension (Paulus & Yang, 2000). Also, the nature of creative 
tasks seems to matter. Different creative tasks generate variance in the extent to which 
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group members benefit from collaboration and idea sharing as they work to creatively 
solve problems. These collaborative group processes are often not required for the 
simplest of brainstorming tasks (e.g., “think of uses for a brick”), where members may 
contribute individually-generated, complete solution ideas in rapid succession without 
pausing to evaluate, assess, or build upon them (indeed, evaluation is discouraged if 
brainstorming rules are used). 
A recent meta-analysis is also relevant. Hulsheger, Anderson, and Salgado (2009) 
collected and meta-analyzed team-level predictors of innovation in organizational studies. 
They drew a couple of conclusions, as follows: 1) team processes (e.g., cohesion) seem to 
display stronger links to individual and team innovation than team compositional inputs 
(e.g., demographic diversity); 2) effect sizes in the literature are widely overestimated 
due to common-source bias in a majority of studies, generated by using self-report data 
for the criterion variables measuring individual and team innovation. They characterize 
the second conclusion as representing “a fundamental misunderstanding in our 
knowledge base.” However, the finding that team processes tend to be important 
predictors of individual and team innovation indicates that the same might be true for 
group creativity. Given that creativity is a “subprocess of innovation” (Hulsheger et al., 
2009), this meta-analysis indicates that further study of group creative processes is 
important for understanding group creativity and for understanding individual and team 
innovation in organizations. 
Next, I review the literatures on individual creative cognition and on analogical 
reasoning. There are reasons to believe that analogical reasoning may help creative 
groups, through its effects on idea generation and evaluation. Analogical reasoning 
consists of cognitive processes that may provide a complementary balance of abstract and 
systematic thought that is beneficial for group creativity. Below, I first briefly review the 
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relevant research on individual creative thinking, to introduce concepts that remain 
relevant in a group context. Next, I describe analogical reasoning and summarize the 
main findings from the analogical reasoning literature, much of which focuses on the 
individual level of analysis. 
CREATIVE THINKING AND ANALOGICAL REASONING 
A large part of what is known about creative thinking comes from individual-level 
studies in cognitive science. Below, I concisely review and summarize the applicable 
research on individual creative thinking, before moving on to a literature review of 
analogical reasoning. 
Individual creative thinking 
A few key concepts emerge from studies of individual creative thinking. The first 
is that individuals are prone to fixation on the superficial details and features of specific 
examples they think of, or are otherwise exposed to, and these features make their way 
into the ideas and potential solutions that individuals generate. For example, in two 
different design studies, individuals who were shown examples of design solutions 
tended to incorporate features of those examples into their designs, even when they were 
told the features were prohibited from inclusion (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Smith, Ward, & 
Schumacher, 1993). Similar results are found in studies of word fragment problems (e.g., 
Smith & Tindell, 1997), where subjects were often unable to complete a word fragment 
(e.g., CHAR_T_) when they are first primed with an incorrect word (CHARTER) that is 
similar to the correct answer (CHARITY). Fixation effects like these tend to block 
individuals’ thinking processes from accessing ideas from a variety of different 
knowledge domains, and this reduction in divergent thinking can decrease creativity. 
 
 24 
 The second key idea is that creativity often benefits when non-obvious elements, 
potentially from different knowledge domains, can be combined into a solution. The 
theory of remote association (Mednick, 1962) characterizes creative thinking as an 
associative cognitive process, and proposes that creativity involves retrieving a 
semantically remote associate of a stimulus. Remote association is theorized to result in 
idea combinations that would not arise when thinking of each associative element 
separately (Kunda, Miller, & Claire, 1990). The novelty of these new ideas, resulting 
from the retrieval and combination of ideas from different knowledge domains, can help 
increase creativity. 
Another insight is that complete randomness or blindness in the search for 
solutions may not be the most efficient or effective method of thinking for solving 
creative problems. Darwinian models of creativity (Campbell, 1960; Simonton, 1999) 
emphasize blind variation of ideas until, by lucky circumstance, a novel and useful idea 
emerges. This leads to the proposition that the chances for creativity can be increased by 
generating many ideas, i.e., the more ideas, the better. However, there is some lingering 
theoretical debate about the nature of blind variation and its similarity to complete 
generative randomness. The current stance among theorists is that pure randomness in the 
variation process is not always required, nor is it most effective, for creativity (Simonton, 
2011a, b; Staw, 2009; Sternberg, 1999). What seems to emerge from this literature is the 
broad notion that creative thinking may benefit from a balance between a directed, 
algorithmic process and some element of randomness in the search for ideas. 
Summary: Individual creative thinking 
The above review suggests there are at least three things that impact individuals’ 
creativity. First, fixation on irrelevant or surface-level features of a problem decreases an 
individual’s ability to develop creative solutions. Second, combining non-obvious 
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elements from different domains may increase the novelty of creative solutions. Finally, a 
balanced search strategy that combines randomness and algorithmic directed search is 
likely to be of benefit to individual creative thinking. 
In the section that follows, I review the research on analogical reasoning. 
Analogical reasoning has been proposed as potentially valuable for generating creative 
problem solutions (Markman et al., 2009; Smith & Ward, 2012). As Gentner and 
colleagues put it, analogical reasoning may be an engine of creativity “…in part because 
it provides a fair degree of structure while inviting some alteration.” (Gentner et al., 
1997). Analogical reasoning incorporates abstractness of thought that arises from 
comparing relationships between corresponding aspects of problems and potential 
solutions. It also requires some level of systematic thought and may stimulate an 
evaluative mindset that subsequently produces higher solution usefulness. As such, 
analogical reasoning may overcome barriers to creative thinking such as fixation, and at 
the same time, facilitate the consideration of different domain elements and guide the 
effective search for creative solutions. 
Analogical reasoning 
Analogical reasoning, as a strategy for solving complex problems, is based on the 
idea that one can often use previous knowledge to solve a novel problem. According to 
Gentner (2003) analogical reasoning invites new inferences based on comparisons 
between specific cases or problems, such that prior knowledge about one case or problem 
can be used to infer new information about another.  
Analogical reasoning has been widely studied as a means to solve problems with 
intellective characteristics (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Chan, Paletz, & Schunn, 
2012; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak, 2012; Kurtz & Loewenstein, 2007; Reeves & 
 
 26 
Weisberg, 1994; White & Alexander, 1986). For example, Gick and Holyoak (1980) 
found that individuals were able to transfer knowledge from one story to a problem 
situation using analogical reasoning, producing the solution the experimenters were 
looking for. Also, Bassok and Holyoak (1989) found that individuals who learned 
algebraic principles to solve arithmetic problems were able to transfer those principles to 
generate demonstrably correct solutions for analogous physics problems. In another 
study, Novick (1988) found that analogical transfer for experts and novices working on 
mathematical problems with correct solutions exhibited some differences due to 
variations in surface and structural similarities. Specifically, surface features seemed 
more problematic for novices than for experts, when trying to use analogical reasoning on 
the math problems.  
An example: Using analogical reasoning to solve a novel problem 
Some of the most popular analogies in the analogical reasoning literature are 
variations of the Duncker radiation problem (Duncker, 1945). I describe the problem here 
to help clarify terminology used in the analogical reasoning literature and to illustrate the 
key mechanisms underlying the effects of analogical reasoning for creative problem-
solving.  
For a typical study task involving the Duncker radiation problem, study 
participants (who do not have prior specific knowledge of cancer therapies) are tasked 
with solving a novel problem: destroying a cancerous tumor without damaging the 
surrounding healthy tissue. As a therapy, radiation is not only strong enough to damage a 
cancerous tumor, but also strong enough to damage healthy tissue. Using analogical 
reasoning, study participants are able to solve this novel problem (referred to as the target 
problem) by comparing the target problem to one or more other problems for which a 
solution is known (referred to as source analogs). Gick and Holyoak (1980) developed 
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several source analogs intended to aid in solving this target problem. One source analog 
was called the Attack-Dispersion story, in which a military general has a goal of 
capturing a fortress. Many roads radiate outward from the fortress, but all the roads are 
mined with explosives such that any large group of soldiers will be unable to pass. The 
general overcomes this constraint and achieves his goal by dividing his army into many 
small groups, and sends each small group up a different road. The small size of each 
group prevents the mines from exploding. In this way, the general is able to send his 
whole force toward the fortress, where they converge and succeed in capturing it.  
Comparing this source analog problem and solution to the radiation (target) 
problem, allows one to infer a solution to radiation problem. Implied in the analogical 
reasoning process is the recognition that the target and source problems are structurally 
similar. In this case, the structural similarities between the radiation (target) problem and 
the Attack-Dispersion story (the source analog) can be summarized as follows: 1) the 
tumor and the fortress are objects to be captured/destroyed; 2) the radiation and the 
soldier forces are the means of destruction; 3) the strategy of sending the whole 
destructive force against the target from one direction is not an option, due to an 
undesirable outcome it would produce. Given these structural similarities, it is likely that 
the solution to the Attack-Dispersion problem (divide up the destructive military force 
and send it at the fortress from different directions) can be applied to the target radiation 
problem. Specifically, one solution to the radiation problem is to “divide up” the 
radiation therapy (by using weaker rays) and send the radiation to the tumor from 
different directions. In that way, the tumor receives the required therapy and healthy 
tissue is preserved. It is important to note that the target problem and the source analog 
story are not similar in terms of the surface features of objects in the scenarios, i.e., one 
involves soldiers and a fortress and the other includes radiation and a tumor. But, the 
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relationships between the elements of each story are very similar. Recognizing relational 
structure similarity between target and source analogs is fundamental to analogical 
processing. 
Analogical Processing 
There are several theoretical models of analogical processing, and they share 
commonality in terms of their major component subprocesses (Gentner, 1983; Holyoak, 
1985; Holyoak & Thagard, 1989; Reeves & Weisberg, 1994). Usually, a target problem 
or situation cues an individual to retrieve a potentially beneficial source analog from 
memory. Then, a mapping can be established between the source analog and the target, 
using the similarities in relational structure to guide the mapping. The mapping enables a 
process of drawing new inferences about the target situation, based on knowledge about 
the source analog. In problem-solving, this usually involves making inferences about a 
target problem solution based on the known solution to the source analog problem. 
Individuals who think through these steps are likely to develop a generalized schema that 
represents an abstract category of problems or situations, of which the target and source 
are examples. A considerable amount of empirical research examines these analogical 
subprocesses, and in next few sections, I review this literature. 
Analogical subprocess: Source analog retrieval 
Gick and Holyoak (1980) found that individuals often do not notice source 
analogs that could be used to solve a target problem. The difficulty of noticing and 
retrieving source analogs has been documented by many others (e.g., Gentner, 
Rattermann, & Forbus, 1993; Holyoak & Koh, 1987; Spencer & Weisberg, 1986). 
Markman, Taylor, and Gentner (2007) found that people have more success retrieving 
relationally-similar source analogs when they are presented in spoken form as opposed to 
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written form. Other research has shown that when individuals are given an exemplar cue, 
they tend to retrieve source analogs that are from the same knowledge domain as the cue, 
instead of retrieving source analogs from different knowledge domains (Keane, 1987). 
This research points to the relatively large cognitive effort required to retrieve source 
analogs from memory. Retrieval of source analogs is a search process through long-term 
memory, an open-ended task that can require great sustained cognitive effort and is 
subject to the nature of the search cues used. 
Analogical subprocess: Mapping 
Analogical mapping involves comparison processes between source and target 
analogs (Gentner, 1983; Gentner & Markman, 1994; Markman & Gentner, 1993, 1996). 
Using information about how elements relate to each other in both source and target 
analogs, and using comparison processes to identify similarities in those relationships, 
people are often capable of successful mapping between analogs, even when superficial 
similarity between corresponding elements is low (Gentner & Gentner, 1983; Gick & 
Holyoak, 1983). For example, Gick and Holyoak (1980) found that when participants 
were given a hint to use a source analog, they solved the target problem with very high 
rates of success (>90%), indicating that mapping between the source and target presented 
no great difficulty for participants, once they had the source analog in mind. 
Analogical mapping is subject to limitations on working memory. Waltz and 
colleagues (2000) found that individuals asked to map objects between pictorial scenes 
while simultaneously performing another task (e.g., producing random numbers) tended 
to use more superficial object feature similarity rather than relational similarity in their 
mappings. In another study, Tohill and Holyoak (2000) found that an anxiety 
manipulation similarly affected individuals’ mappings, skewing them more toward the 
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use of perceptual similarity at the expense of relational structure similarity. These 
findings suggest that individuals must have adequate working memory available in order 
to engage in analogical mapping. 
Analogical subprocess: Solution inference 
Solution inference is often the main point of engaging in analogical reasoning 
(Holyoak, 2012). It is through the inferences drawn from analogical reasoning that 
progress toward a target problem solution is usually achieved. After source:target 
mapping is complete, inferences may be drawn to form new propositions about the target 
problem itself. These inferences involve looking for ways that the solution approach 
taken in the source analog might be translated or transferred into a similar type of 
solution approach for the target problem. People are generally proficient at analogical 
inference, once mappings are established (Gick & Holyoak, 1980). However, analogical 
inference is not guaranteed to produce good solutions. If mapping is difficult or if it 
performed inaccurately, errors in solution inference may arise (Bassok & Holyoak, 1989; 
Bassok & Olseth, 1995; Reed, 1987). 
Analogical subprocess: Generalized schema induction 
 The comparison processes involved in analogical reasoning can lead to the 
formation of an abstract schema, a generalization that serves to categorize and represent 
the relational structure shared by multiple analogs. Once formed, schemas are theorized 
to facilitate subsequent source analog retrieval, mapping, and inference (Holyoak, 2012). 
Using as few as two analogs in the comparison process, lab studies have produced 
evidence of abstract schema formation and the subsequent advantage in problem-solving 
they provide (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983). 
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Even though comparing two source analogs promotes schema formation, there is 
also evidence that comparing additional examples promotes even more effective schema 
abstraction (Brown, Kane, & Echols, 1986; Brown, Kane, & Long, 1989; Catrambone & 
Holyoak, 1989). For instance, Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner (1999) found that 
when individuals compared multiple analogous examples of negotiation techniques, they 
formed higher quality schemas and then performed better in a real negotiation, relative to 
those who did not do multiple comparisons. Interestingly, negotiation performance did 
not depend on a good a priori understanding of either of the examples used to generate 
the schema, implying that deep expertise in the subject domain of the examples may not 
be required in order to produce high quality abstract schemas. 
These studies generally suggest that when people engage in comparison processes 
between target and source analogs and think about the underlying relational structure of 
both analogs, it enhances the quality of the abstract schema formed, and subsequently 
increases the chances that knowledge can be transferred from memory to help solve 
problems effectively. Abstract schemas facilitate knowledge retrieval and the subsequent 
mapping and solution inference processes of analogical reasoning. 
Given the potential problem-solving benefits of developing an abstract schema, 
quite a bit of research has focused on the factors that make abstract schema development 
and use more likely (e.g., Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Novick 
& Holyoak, 1991; Ross & Kennedy, 1990). Some recent research has shown that an 
abstract schema does not necessarily have to be stored in memory ahead of time in order 
to facilitate the retrieval of source analogs from memory. Specifically, Gentner. 
Loewenstein, Thompson, and Forbus (2009) replicated the results of Kurtz and 
Loewenstein (2007) and showed that people who reframed a target problem in more 
abstract terms, by comparing problem examples, were more effective in retrieving useful 
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knowledge from memory, compared to people who did not form an abstract 
understanding of the target problem. This recent research is interesting because it 
suggests that abstract schemas do not need to exist in memory a priori, but rather that 
abstract schemas can be developed “on the fly,” when an individual is thinking about and 
comparing versions of the target problem. These results are particularly relevant for 
creativity, because divergent thinking, which depends vitally on search for ideas in 
memory, is a critical process for establishing creative potential (Staw, 2009). Moreover, 
developing abstract schemas in the moment is likely to be relevant for and helpful to 
interacting individuals, who may be able to build upon one another’s ideas to infer new 
abstract understandings of the problem and develop more creative problem solutions as a 
result.  
Analogical reasoning in groups 
There are few studies that examine analogical reasoning in groups. One exception 
is Lewis, Lange, and Gillis (Lewis, Lange, & Gillis, 2005), who drew from analogical 
reasoning theory to explain how knowledge transfer across different but related tasks 
might occur. They argued and found evidence that interacting groups with a developed 
TMS who performed two similar tasks gained a better abstract understanding of the task 
domain and performed better in a knowledge transfer task, compared to groups without a 
TMS. Other findings from the study indicated that groups were more likely to develop an 
abstract understanding of the task domain once they had performed two tasks together – 
performing one task was not sufficient for a collective abstract schema to develop. This 
finding is consistent with findings at the individual level, which suggest that multiple 
analogs (and associated comparison processes) help individuals develop more useful 
abstract problem schemas.  
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A few other studies from the engineering design literature take a more qualitative 
approach to analogical reasoning in collectives. For example, Christensen and Schunn 
(Christensen & Schunn, 2007) gathered five months of video data from meetings held by 
a medical plastics engineering design team. They found that the use of physical 
prototypes during meetings often coincided with analogies that stayed within knowledge 
domains closely related to the prototype, indicating that designers may have been 
suffering from fixation while their collective attention was focused on the prototypes. In 
another study, Ball and Christensen (2009) studied transcripts of engineering design 
meetings and found that analogies often coincided with expressions of design uncertainty, 
and seemed to be intended as a means to resolving uncertainty. Also, Dahl and Moreau 
(2002) analyzed verbal protocol transcripts of four professional designer dyad teams who 
worked for one hour on the design of a mobile dining device. The researchers produced 
qualitative state diagrams that mapped the flow of conversation for each dyad, and found 
a correlation between the number of analogies mentioned and the originality of the 
designs produced by the teams. 
This brief review of analogical reasoning in groups shows that little exists from 
which solid inferences can be drawn about how analogical reasoning may help groups 
with creative problem solution tasks. The study by Lewis and colleagues (2005) is a rare 
example of incorporating analogical reasoning and group cognition. Importantly, their 
study suggests that analogical reasoning can occur in a group context, and that the 
development of collective abstract schemas can improve performance on different but 
related tasks. Other, qualitative studies show that design groups do use analogical 
reasoning, but clear benefits for group creativity are difficult to discern. Group level 
comparisons of analogical reasoning with other types of reasoning strategies would seem 
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to be a valuable addition to this literature, particularly if they generate insights about the 
associated effects on group creativity. 
OVERALL SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have reviewed and summarized literatures on individual creative 
cognition, group creativity, and analogical reasoning. In the current section, I identify 
commonalities and complementary relationships that will motivate subsequent theory. 
Studies of individual cognition generally indicate that fixation is a dysfunctional 
risk for people attempting to think of new and useful ideas. Superficial (semantic) 
features of solution ideas and problems seem to strongly attract attention and prevent 
wide-ranging, divergent thought. There is also much speculation about how a blend of 
structured and random thinking might be a balanced approach for creative cognition. 
Brainstorming studies have shown time and again that social/motivational and cognitive 
factors arise when people collaborate and use the brainstorming rules. One thing that 
stands out in this literature is that many studies have been run using the original 
brainstorming rules, or slight variations on them, and there does not seem to be a great 
deal of variety in the reasoning strategies that are tested in intact and nominal groups. 
The organizational behavior literature on group creativity is relatively recent, and 
the work is spread around between examinations of individual differences, leadership, 
contextual factors (including culture and norms), task design, and very recent forays that 
use group learning and group cognition constructs to assess group creativity. This 
research is promising, and yet, the actual inter-member processes that play out when 
interacting groups attempt to produce creative outcomes are currently understudied. 
The review of analogical reasoning raises a few pertinent issues that are related to 
creative thinking. Analogical reasoning requires comparisons of multiple analogs and 
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recognition of their structural similarities. The cognitive processes involved in analogical 
reasoning can produce inferences and abstract schemas that can be quite beneficial for 
retrieving source knowledge and solving target problems. However, analogical reasoning 
is not necessarily guaranteed to produce functional results in all conditions. Challenges 
related to long-term memory search (i.e., source retrieval), the risk of fixation on 
superficial (semantic) features instead of abstract features, and the availability of 
adequate working memory can compromise the overall process of individual analogical 
reasoning. 
Nonetheless, there may be reason to believe that retrieving past problems and 
solutions from memory by using analogical reasoning is a good way to tackle creative 
problem-solving (Markman & Wood, 2009), even for groups. Analogical reasoning has 
the potential to produce abstract problem schemas, and these have been shown to be 
effective in retrieving solution knowledge and in promoting subsequent mapping and 
solution inference. In a group context, collective abstract problem schemas may serve as 
useful cues for collective recall and may help fend off collective fixation on superficial 
features of the target problem. Collective abstract problem schemas may also help to 
guide effective long term memory search, and in so doing, increase chances that retrieved 
knowledge will produce useful solutions. In sum, analogical reasoning may widen the 
range of solution search and help groups leverage members’ diverse knowledge, while 




Chapter 3: Theory and Hypotheses 
GROUPS AS ANALOGICAL INFORMATION PROCESSORS 
Collaborative creative groups possess valuable assets: the diverse knowledge held 
by members. However, unless that diverse knowledge is paired with an effective 
information processing strategy, creative groups may not effectively leverage their assets. 
Research shows that analogical reasoning can help individuals retrieve and use 
knowledge to solve intellective problems with demonstrably correct solutions (Holyoak, 
2012). Analogical reasoning might be similarly advantageous as an information 
processing strategy for groups of individuals tasked with creative problem-solving where 
there is no demonstrably correct solution. Specifically, analogical reasoning may 
facilitate creative problem-solving in groups by: 1) stimulating divergent thinking, 2) 
preventing fixation on problem surface features, 3) reducing evaluation apprehension, 
and 4) encouraging sustained attention on the problem’s goals and constraints. These 
effects combine to help groups retrieve and transform their diverse knowledge into 
creative problem solutions that exhibit heightened novelty, flexibility, usefulness, and 
overall creativity. 
 Analogical reasoning may also produce group synergy. Group synergy occurs 
when a group’s output is superior to the output produced by the same number of non-
interacting individuals (Larson Jr, 2010). When a group uses analogical reasoning as a 
problem-solving technique, it is likely to produce group synergy by 1) enabling a division 
of cognitive labor, 2) enhancing fixation avoidance, 3) supporting the retrieval and 
integration of diverse member knowledge, 4) stimulating interactive search guided by 
problem goals and constraints, and 5) enabling joint correction of reasoning errors. These 
synergistic effects tend to amplify the advantages of analogical reasoning for creative 
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group outcomes, in the presence of group interaction. Below I develop arguments about 
how analogical reasoning can enhance creative problem-solving, conceptualized in terms 
of novelty, flexibility, usefulness, and overall creativity. 
Analogical reasoning groups are likely to experience creative benefits as a result 
of the way the information processing strategy gives rise to abstract problem 
representations, and also because of its routine-like nature. As I argue below, analogical 
reasoning in creative groups is likely to stimulate divergent thinking, support fixation 
avoidance, and reduce evaluation apprehension. These effects tend to increase solution 
flexibility and novelty. 
Stimulating divergent thinking. Analogical reasoning is essentially a dynamic 
process that feeds back on itself in open-ended creative tasks where one of the overall 
task goals is to generate numerous solutions to the problem. Problem schemas produced 
by the retrieve/map/infer/abstract sequence promoted by analogical reasoning serve as 
stimulative inter-member search cues that help retrieve additional member knowledge 
(source analogs) for subsequent iterations of the sequence (Holyoak, 2012). In the 
creative group context of idea generation, this repetitive, dynamic property of analogical 
reasoning renders it amenable to variation in the abstractness of the problem schemas, as 
the sequence repeats. Variation in problem schema abstractness is likely to stimulate the 
retrieval of knowledge from diverse knowledge domains and enhance divergent thinking, 
as I argue next. 
When people compare a source analog with a target problem, one byproduct of 
this comparison process is a more abstract representation of the problem, i.e., an abstract 
problem schema (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). Increasing the number of comparisons often 
leads to increasingly abstract problem schemas (Brown et al., 1989; Catrambone & 
Holyoak, 1989). For an open-ended creativity task where one goal is to generate as many 
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solution ideas as possible, multiple comparisons are likely for those who use analogical 
reasoning, and this repetition potentially results in numerous problem schemas that range 
from low to high levels of abstractness. Variation in problem schemas may also arise due 
to member differences in the way they naturally think in abstract ways. Analogical 
comparison processes will lead to varying perceptions of schema abstractness, simply due 
to these individual differences. 
Each abstract schema serves as a memory cue for members of a group using 
analogical reasoning. The variation in cue abstractness is likely to correspond to the 
variety of knowledge domains that are stimulated in member memories (Christensen & 
Schunn, 2007; Holyoak & Thagard, 1995; Loewenstein, 2010), and also to the diversity 
of solution approaches represented in retrieved source analogs. Increased diversity in 
solution approaches leads to an increase in solution flexibility, and makes it more 
probable that unique and novel solution ideas are generated (Staw, 2009). 
By contrast, groups whose members do not use analogical reasoning are less 
likely to generate abstract problem schemas at all. This deprives them of the divergent 
thinking advantages just described for dynamic variations in the abstractness of problem 
schemas produced by analogical reasoning groups. 
Avoiding fixation.  A related benefit of generating abstract problem schemas is 
that attention is removed from superficial, concrete features of the target problem. As 
comparison processes give rise to abstract problem schemas, members using analogical 
reasoning are likely to devote attention to the more generic, structural properties of the 
problem, and give relatively less attention to the superficial details of the problem. This 
helps to prevent fixation (Smith, 1995). 
Interacting groups that do not use analogical reasoning are instead more likely to 
converge their collective attention on the superficial features of the problem. Some 
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design studies show that individuals are prone to devoting sustained attention to the 
surface features of problems and solution ideas, which tends to bind their thinking to 
closely related knowledge domains (Jansson & Smith, 1991; Smith, 2003). Brainstorming 
research has revealed similar fixation effects (Nijstad & Stroebe, 2006). 
If most or all members of a group succumb to this fixation effect, they may have 
difficulty escaping it, and this will tend to suppress divergent thinking. Research on 
collective information sharing has shown that groups tend to maintain attention on 
commonly held knowledge (Stasser & Titus, 1985), and shared perceptions of surface 
features represent such shared knowledge. Once this fixation effect has emerged, groups 
without some means of shifting the group’s attention to more abstract characteristics of 
the problem may be limited to searching in narrowed knowledge domains closely related 
to the superficial, semantic characteristics of the problem.  
Reducing evaluation apprehension: Analogical reasoning as routine. Another 
advantage of analogical reasoning for creative problem-solving groups may derive from 
the routine-like nature of the analogical reasoning process. This is likely to help groups 
avoid evaluation apprehension that is typical in brainstorming groups (Mullen et al., 
1991; Paulus, Nakui, & Putman, 2006) because the routinized nature of the analogical 
reasoning technique reduces members’ uncertainty about group processes (Gersick & 
Hackman, 1990). In particular, the analogical reasoning process may reduce member 
uncertainty about how the group will process and evaluate contributed ideas. With this 
reduced uncertainty about idea evaluation, group members may be less likely to believe 
that their own ideas will be at the mercy of other members’ variable and subjective 
preferences. This reduction in uncertainty may lead to lowered anxiety, decreased 
competition, and lowered disagreement (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). Anxiety has been 
shown to reduce creative group idea production, through decreased member participation 
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(Camacho & Paulus, 1995). These effects of analogical reasoning are likely to help 
suppress evaluation apprehension. 
An additional reduction in evaluation apprehension may be promoted by the 
collective attention to abstract problem schemas that group analogical reasoning 
promotes. In a qualitative study of cross-functional creative teams, Majchrzak, More, and 
Faraj (2011) found that members co-generated an abstract cognitive representation (the 
researchers termed this construct a “scaffold”) while working together on a novel 
problem. The joint production of this abstract representation was accompanied by a 
reduction in interpersonal confrontation and heightened psychological safety, leading to 
smoother knowledge exchange and idea sharing. The researchers speculated that by 
devoting attention to the abstract representation, members were less likely to focus 
attention on each other, and this may have suppressed intermember tensions. This study 
suggests that by facilitating the development of a collective abstract problem schema, 
analogical reasoning may help members experience lower conflict, anxiety, and 
evaluation apprehension, and thereby surface and consider a greater number of ideas.  
By contrast, groups that do not use analogical reasoning are especially prone to 
evaluation apprehension and its detrimental effects on group creativity. Brainstorming 
research has demonstrated that members of creative groups often fear the negative 
assessments of other members, and this leads to lower participation and reduced idea 
sharing (Mullen et al., 1991). 
In sum, groups using analogical reasoning should engage in more extensive 
divergent thinking, avoid fixation, and experience heightened member participation and 
idea sharing. This provides a relative advantage over groups not using analogical 
reasoning, in terms of producing a higher number of rare and unusual solution ideas from 
a wider range of solution categories. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
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H1: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 
problem solutions of higher novelty compared to interacting groups not 
using analogical reasoning. 
H2: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 
problem solutions of higher flexibility compared to interacting groups not 
using analogical reasoning. 
The creative advantages of analogical reasoning proposed so far deal with the 
divergent aspects of creative thinking that are associated with solution novelty and 
flexibility. Below, I argue that analogical reasoning techniques will also improve the 
usefulness of creative solutions because analogical reasoning techniques help members 
maintain a sustained focus on the underlying goals and constraints of the target problem. 
Focus on problem goals and constraints. Research has shown that individuals 
are proficient at deriving representative abstract relational structure from analogical 
comparison processes involving the target problem (Catrambone & Holyoak, 1989; Gick 
& Holyoak, 1983). Moreover, the comparison processes involved in analogical reasoning 
help insure that source analogs being considered meet the goals and constraints of the 
target problem. Specifically, repetitive mapping and solution inference with multiple 
source analogs may promote usefulness because these subprocesses are relatively 
intellective in nature (i.e., it is often possible to demonstrate that a mapping or solution 
inference has been performed incorrectly (e.g., Waltz et al., 2000)), and this may help to 
instill and maintain an evaluative mindset in group members. Repeated cycles of 
mapping and inference help maintain attention on the goals and constraints of the target 
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problem, promoting a focus on the evaluation of solutions. These evaluations may serve 
to identify unmet goals or constraints that can be implicitly or explicitly emphasized in a 
subsequent abstract problem schema, increasing the chances that future inferred solutions 
will meet them. In this way, analogical reasoning helps guide effective search toward 
more useful solutions. Analogical reasoning thus lends itself to solution evaluation and 
helps sustain members’ attention on the goals and constraints of the target problem, 
something that less disciplined ideation processes or rules may avoid, omit, or even 
discourage (Osborn, 1953). 
When analogical reasoning is not used, abstract problem schemas are less likely 
to develop, and members’ attention may be attracted and fixed by superficial target 
problem features. In this case, search in long-term memory is likely to depend more upon 
finding similarities with semantic features and surface details of the target problem, 
instead of upon similarities with the problem’s underlying goals and constraints. Without 
the repetitive subprocesses of mapping and solution inference, attention on the goals and 
constraints of the target problem may diminish and search may become less effective. 
Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
 
H3: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 
problem solutions of higher usefulness compared to interacting groups not 
using analogical reasoning. 
Interacting groups that use analogical reasoning techniques are expected to 
produce creative solution ideas that are higher in novelty, flexibility, and usefulness, 
when compared to interacting groups that do not use analogical reasoning. Because 
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overall creativity is a multidimensional construct comprising both solution novelty and 
solution usefulness, these relative advantages for interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning should also arise for overall creativity.  
H4: Groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative problem 
solutions of higher overall creativity compared to groups not using 
analogical reasoning. 
Analogical reasoning and its overall potential for group synergy 
Above, I argued that groups that use analogical reasoning techniques are more 
likely to develop creative solutions to problems, compared to groups not using analogical 
reasoning techniques. In this section, I argue that analogical reasoning techniques also 
allow groups to realize synergy and to produce more creative solutions than individuals 
using analogical reasoning could produce in the absence of member interaction. 
Specifically, analogical reasoning groups whose members interact can benefit by 1) 
dividing the cognitive labor for analogical processing, 2) helping others avoid fixation, 3) 
retrieving and integrating diverse member knowledge, 4) engaging in interactive search 
guided by problem goals and constraints, and 5) correcting others’ reasoning errors. 
Enabling a division of cognitive labor. Analogical reasoning has multiple, 
distinct, sequential cognitive subprocesses that can be implicitly or explicitly divided 
among group members, depending on their talents for those processing steps. In this way, 
analogical reasoning lends itself to a division of cognitive labor in groups. Past research 
has shown that a division of cognitive labor may help groups take advantage of their 
cognitive resources, and in so doing, foster heightened performance (Hutchins, 1995; 
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Moreland, 1999; Wegner, 1987). I propose the same here for groups engaged in open-
ended creative tasks. 
Analogical reasoning has been described, computationally modeled, and 
empirically tested as a retrieve/map/infer/abstract thinking sequence (Gentner, 1983; 
Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak, 2012; Markman, 1997). This order of cognitive 
operation is fairly central to the concept – that is, one cannot map without first retrieving, 
nor can one infer before mapping, etc. For a creative problem-solving task, this sequence 
may be repeated many times in order to generate multiple problem solutions. 
When thinking about the differences between individuals and interacting groups 
using an analogical reasoning strategy, these sequential and cyclical features of 
analogical reasoning become paramount. Individual cognitive differences interact with 
these structural features of analogical reasoning and affect groups and individuals 
differentially. Individuals vary in their abilities and preferences for remembering, 
comparing, recognizing similarities, and thinking abstractly, and these are some of the 
cognitive skills needed for carrying out the subprocesses of analogical reasoning. If an 
individual has a weakness or deficiency in one or more of these cognitive component 
steps, the entire analogical idea generation process is compromised. An individual must 
be proficient with all the steps in order to successfully use the reasoning sequence in a 
sustained manner. This does not mean an individual who is ineffective at one or more 
analogical sub-processes will not continue to generate problem solution ideas, it just 
means that many of the ideas they produce are probably not products of analogical 
reasoning. 
If individuals are interacting in a group context, the subprocesses involved with 
analogical reasoning can be divided among members. The variety and distribution of 
thinking skills possessed by different members of the group make it less likely that the 
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group will get stuck, or perform poorly, on any one subprocess in the analogical 
reasoning sequence. If one person is not good at a subprocess, chances are good that 
other members can make up for that deficiency. Dividing the cognitive labor for 
analogical processing may therefore help interacting groups by allowing them to engage 
in analogical reasoning in a sustained manner and gain the associated creative benefits, as 
they produce problem solutions. 
Helping group members avoid fixation. When members reason together 
analogically, by repeatedly comparing source analogs to the target problem, they are 
likely to develop a common, abstract understanding of that problem. If one or more 
members attend to superficial features of the target problem, other members can redirect 
the group’s attention back to the collective abstract problem schema. Repeated 
comparison processes that members jointly perform will tend to help correct any drifts in 
attention and avoid fixation, by returning their attention to the collective abstract schema. 
Individuals attempting to use analogical reasoning do not have this self-correcting feature 
provided by group interaction and collaborative comparison processes. 
Supporting retrieval and integration of diverse knowledge. One creative 
advantage for interacting groups using analogical reasoning is suggested by research on 
communication modality. Markman and colleagues (2007) tested whether analogical 
recall was dependent on the format of presentation, contrasting written and verbal 
modalities. They found that source retrieval (i.e., memory recall) was enhanced when 
source and target analogs were presented in spoken form, compared to written form, 
possibly due to a reduction in working memory demands. This finding for a verbal 
modality effect suggests that members who interact and verbally communicate may enjoy 
a knowledge retrieval advantage, compared to individuals using analogical reasoning. 
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Groups have an advantage over individuals in terms of the diversity of knowledge 
available for problem-solving. The diverse source analogs that members retrieve can 
serve as independent source analogs on their own, or they might be combined in ways 
that represent new knowledge (Lewis et al., 2005; Wegner, 1987). In this way, interacting 
groups may be able to integrate members’ diverse knowledge to produce source analogs 
that no individual member could come up with on their own. These integrative source 
analogs may possess properties and include solution approaches that are unique and 
qualitatively different from any of the component source analogs that went into their 
making (Wegner, 1987). By increasing the variety of solution approaches considered by 
the group, integrative source analogs are likely to generate a greater number of novel 
ideas, of greater solution flexibility (Guilford, 1950; Staw, 2009). 
In summary, members who interact in groups are able to divide the cognitive 
labor for analogical reasoning, help each other avoid fixation on superficial features, 
realize verbal modality retrieval advantages, and retrieve and integrate diverse 
knowledge. Compared to groups of members who do not interact (nominal groups), 
interacting groups should therefore generate creative solutions of higher novelty and 
flexibility, when using analogical reasoning. 
 
H5: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 




H6: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 
problem solutions of higher flexibility compared to nominal groups using 
analogical reasoning. 
The above arguments explain how interacting groups using analogical reasoning 
are more likely than nominal groups to produce problem solutions of higher novelty and 
flexibility. Next, I explain how analogical reasoning helps interacting groups produce 
problem solutions that are useful, by stimulating and guiding information search, and by 
helping members notice and correct faulty reasoning. 
 Stimulating and guiding interactive search. The greater variety of potential 
source analogs retrieved and compared during group interaction may help interacting 
groups engage in more effective search that leads to solution usefulness. As source 
analogs are retrieved, integrated, and compared to the target problem, the various 
approaches to satisfying goals and constraints are brought to the group’s awareness. This 
may improve members’ recognition of the functional and structural similarities, and 
differences, across source analogs, and lead to an enhanced shared understanding of the 
target problem at different levels of abstraction. 
An enhanced shared understanding of the goals and constraints of the target 
problem may then lead to more effective interactive search for further potential solutions, 
heightening the usefulness of generated target problem solutions. As members share their 
perspectives on how to interpret the problem abstractly, they cue others’ memories with 
their abstract problem interpretations. Because this intermember cueing depends on 
abstract problem schemas, member attention does not drift far from the underlying goals 
and constraints of the problem. These interactive cues may also stimulate members to 
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reconsider previously contributed ideas that initially seemed irrelevant. These earlier 
ideas may garner reconsideration because their potential for meeting the goals and 
constraints of the problem is now recognized, in light of later abstract problem 
interpretations (Hargadon & Bechky, 2006). The interactive nature of this joint 
construction, interpretation, and sharing of abstract problem schemas is critical in 
realizing these usefulness benefits.  
Enabling joint reasoning correction. Research in the groups as information 
processors paradigm has generated consistent findings showing that interacting groups 
tend to use information processing rules or heuristics more reliably than individuals, 
across a range of task types (Hinsz, Tindale, & Vollrath, 1997; Laughlin & Sweeney, 
1977; Schultze, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2012). This research suggests that interacting 
groups are likely to outperform individuals at analogical reasoning. This may be 
explained in part by the ability of members to divide up the cognitive labor of analogical 
reasoning, as discussed earlier. But it may also be that interacting members can perceive 
when other members may be engaging in aspects of analogical reasoning incorrectly. 
Mapping and solution inference are not foolproof operations and can be subject to errors 
(Markman & Gentner, 1993, 1996). This can jeopardize the extent to which generated 
solutions meet the goals and constraints of a target problem, even if retrieved source 
analogs have the potential to do so. Interacting groups who collaborate during analogical 
reasoning are likely to recognize when members try to perform these steps incorrectly, 
enabling a corrective function that individuals do not possess, and ensuring that potential 
solutions are transferred properly from source to target. 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning are thus likely to develop enhanced 
joint abstract problem schemas that effectively stimulate and guide interactive search 
activities toward solutions that will meet goals and constraints of the target problem. 
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Interactive analogical group members also are able to detect and correct errors that fellow 
members may commit, helping increase the chances that retrieved knowledge will be 
transformed into useful solutions. This helps interacting analogical reasoning groups 
achieve effective search processes and capitalize on retrieved knowledge, giving them a 
relative solution usefulness advantage over nominal groups attempting to use analogical 
reasoning. 
 
H7: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 
problem solutions of higher usefulness compared to nominal groups  using 
analogical reasoning. 
Because overall creativity is a multidimensional construct comprising both 
solution novelty and solution usefulness, the synergistic advantages for interacting 
analogical groups versus nominal groups described above should extend to overall 
creativity.  
 
H8: Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce creative 
problem solutions of higher overall creativity compared to nominal 




Chapter 4: Method 
I tested the hypotheses of this study with a laboratory experiment that exposed 
participants to different levels of group interaction and different creative problem-solving 
techniques. In addition to the primary experimental data for the criterion variables, survey 
data was also collected from each participant.  
STUDY DESIGN 
 The study is a 2 x 4 factorial design, with “group interaction type” (interacting 
groups vs. nominal groups) and “problem-solving technique” (analogical reasoning, 
brainstorming, problem abstraction only, and analogy only) as between-groups factors. 
Participants were randomly assigned to either the interacting condition, in which 
members interacted in collaborative groups during task performance, or to the nominal 
condition, where members performed the task individually. Assignment to one of the 
problem-solving technique conditions was also randomized. 
The second factor – problem-solving technique – describes the treatment 
condition to which participants were exposed (analogical reasoning, brainstorming, 
problem abstraction only, analogy only). Of the four treatments, one (brainstorming) is 
designed to compare against the analogical reasoning technique, and two are designed to 
isolate the effects of analogical reasoning and test alternative explanations. Specifically, 
these two conditions will allow me to test which effects are attributable to the analogical 
reasoning technique rather than to exposure to a problem-abstraction technique (problem 
 
 51 
abstraction only) or to analogy only. The fully-crossed design also allows for 
comparisons of the four techniques across interacting versus nominal groups. 
I used four different readings to create the experimental manipulations. Each of 
the readings was designed to be comparable in terms of cognitive load (each reading 
required 5 minutes to complete) and different in terms of content. All written treatment 
materials are listed in Appendix A, and I describe them in more detail below in the 
section on experimental manipulations. 
PARTICIPANTS 
In all, 463 undergraduate students from a large public university in the 
southwestern United States participated in the study, to receive extra credit for a 
Management course. Participants were randomly assigned into 153 groups of 3 persons 
each. After video review and outlier analysis, three interacting groups were removed 
from the dataset due to excessive (> 40% of task time) talking about off-task topics. This 
yielded 150 total usable groups in the dataset. 
The median participant age was 21 years old, and 61% of the participants were 
female. Participant ethnicities were distributed as follows: 47% Caucasian, 30% Asian, 
18% Hispanic, 4% African American, and 1% reported multiple ethnicities. Participants 
had many different college majors, representing a wide cross-section of schools and 
colleges within the university. 
A priori power analyses (univariate ANOVA) indicated that in order to provide 





= .05, approximately 128 total groups would be required (actual power = 0.81). For 150 
groups, the detectable effect size at statistical power 0.80 and Type I error rate of 0.05 is 
approximately 0.32. 
TASK 
Participants in all conditions were asked to solve the same creative problem-
solving task, which was generated for this study and pretested in a pilot study. The 
creative problem-solving task required participants to come up with creative solutions to 
a “fragile taco” problem and to propose ideas that would solve customers’ problems in 
eating the taco. This task is well-suited to the objectives of the study for several reasons. 
First, it is a problem for which there is no singular, demonstrably correct solution, i.e., it 
is not an intellective task (Amabile, 1996; Laughlin & Ellis, 1986). This allows for the 
continuous generation of solution ideas without limit, except for the time allotted, which 
is held constant over all participants. Second, it is a problem that many people have some 
personal experience with, which allows all participants to feel as though they are 
qualified to engage in the task. This task characteristic also reduces the difficulty of 
solution evaluation to an acceptable level, because raters feel qualified to evaluate the 
ideas. Third, the task requires no special expertise or particular set of skills in order to 
generate solutions, which similarly facilitates member participation and ease of solution 
evaluation. Finally, though this task is relatively easy to address, it is not among the 
simplest of ideation tasks (e.g., “think of uses for a brick”), and thus it possesses enough 
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complexity that idea building and integration are within the realm of possible 
collaborative outcomes. 
PROCEDURE 
After informed consent was obtained, participants were checked in and randomly 
assigned to either nominal or interacting groups in one of the four treatment conditions 
(analogical reasoning, brainstorming, problem abstraction only, analogy only). 
Interacting group members were given color name tags to wear (e.g. RED, WHITE, 
BLUE), and were seated at a table together. Nominal group members were seated alone, 
with each member seated in a separate workspace out of sight of other group members. 
All working spaces for groups and individuals were comparable in terms of physical and 
environmental characteristics (e.g., hallway noise, room temperature, table space per 
member, etc.). Participants were given reading materials appropriate to their randomly 
assigned experimental condition, and allowed 10 minutes to complete the readings. Once 
members completed the readings, a task instruction sheet was provided to each 
participant and an experimenter read the task instructions aloud, for all participants to 
hear. 
After task instructions were read, participants were provided a large supply of 
Idea Sheets (e.g., the stack of Idea Sheets typically contained 50 – 100 sheets; most 
interacting groups and nominal group participants used between 4 and 10 sheets). 
Participants were then instructed to spend the next 30 minutes describing (in written form 
or in drawings/sketches) their solution ideas. Participants were allowed to use as many 
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Idea Sheets as they needed. They were also told to indicate the sources of their solution 
ideas at the bottom of the Idea Sheets. Interacting groups were told that they did not need 
to provide 3 sets of Idea Sheets with duplicated ideas, i.e., they did not need to have all 
members write down every idea. The Idea Sheets give evidence that they followed this 
instruction. Idea Sheets and video footage indicate that many groups delegated the 
writing activity to one member, although some groups also utilized multiple writers. All 
participants, regardless of experimental condition, were verbally advised to try to 
generate as many ideas as they could in the 30-minute time period allowed, and to make 
sure to describe all their ideas.  
After fifteen minutes, a “halfway” notice was given by the experimenter to the 
participants, and when 5 minutes remained, participants were instructed to rank order 
what they believed were their best 3 ideas. No further guidance or criteria were given on 
which to judge their ideas. Idea Sheets were collected when 30 minutes had elapsed, and 
the post-task surveys were then given to the participants. When participants had 
completed the post-task surveys, they were debriefed and dismissed. The task instructions 
and the Idea Sheets are presented in Appendix A.  
MANIPULATION MATERIALS AND CHECK 
I established experimental treatment conditions by combining four different 5-
minute readings in various ways. While the content of the readings in each condition 
differed, the materials are comparable in that they all describe group problem-solving 
techniques and all offer prescriptive advice for executing those techniques.  
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Participants in the brainstorming condition read two different blog posts about 
brainstorming1. These blog posts include tips and advice for how to run generic 
brainstorming meetings in real organizations, and this advice is derived from the blog 
authors’ lay beliefs about and actual experience with brainstorming activities in their own 
companies. No empirical research or scholarly authority is cited in either blog post.  
Participants in the problem abstraction only condition read one reading about 
problem abstraction and one of the blog posts on brainstorming2. This condition was 
meant to help isolate effects attributable to the analogical reasoning technique from those 
attributable to the problem abstraction technique alone, which is also theorized to 
facilitate creative problem-solving (Runco, 1994). The problem abstraction materials, 
adapted from materials used by Henderson and Trope (2009), present an example 
problem that illustrates the problem abstraction technique. The example problem, related 
to grocery bags, was presented in concrete terms, and then it was presented again in two 
further interpretations that stated it in successively more abstract terms. After reading the 
example, participants were asked to complete a similar abstraction exercise with a 
different creative problem. Specifically, they were asked to write two successively more 
abstract interpretations of a problem involving a garden hose. At the end of this reading, 
participants were advised to use this problem abstraction technique to help them generate 
problem solutions for the creative thinking task they were about to be given.  
                                                
1 Blog posts were copied from: 1) http://designinstruct.com/articles/project-management/tips-productive-brainstorming-sessions/; and, 
from 2) http://www.innovationexcellence.com/blog/2012/03/23/brainstorming-fast-fun/ - sthash.9PsYwipp.dpuf/ 
 
2 The blog posts were randomly chosen/counterbalanced such that each one was used equivalently across participants in the problem 
abstraction only condition. For participants in this condition (who read one of the brainstorming blog posts), the particular blog post 
chosen was randomly determined and counterbalanced across participants in the condition. This is true for participants in the analogy 
only condition as well. 
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Participants in the analogy only condition read one reading on analogical 
processing and one blog post on brainstorming. This condition was meant to help isolate 
effects attributable to analogical processing alone (i.e., without stimulating problem 
abstraction). The analogical processing materials were adapted from a study executed by 
Loewenstein, Thompson, and Gentner (1999). In these materials, a creative problem 
example is given, and the steps for analogical processing are described. In order to 
preserve some commonality between experimental conditions, one of the creative 
problem examples used in the problem abstraction reading materials (the grocery bag 
problem) was used. Following this example, the reading describes a source analog 
problem/solution pair, drawn from the ornithology subject matter domain, and it 
highlights the analogical relationship between the grocery bag problem and the 
ornithology example. Participants were then asked to complete an analogical mapping 
exercise, in which objects from the ornithology example are mapped to objects in the 
grocery bag problem. The exercise includes the production of an inferred solution to the 
grocery bag problem. At the end of this reading, participants were advised to use 
analogical processing to perform the creative thinking task they were about to be given. 
Participants in the analogical reasoning condition read one reading about 
analogical processing and one reading about problem abstraction. Together, these 
readings describe the problem-solving technique of analogical reasoning, which has as a 
theorized by-product, problem abstraction (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). I elected to stimulate 
problem abstraction in this condition rather than to let it emerge naturally because there is 
some evidence suggesting that individuals may be more apt to develop and utilize 
 
 57 
abstract problem schema during analogical reasoning when given cues meant to stimulate 
abstract thinking (Beveridge & Parkins, 1987; Gick & Holyoak, 1983; Holyoak, 2012; 
Linsey, Laux, Clauss, Wood, & Markman, 2007). All the reading materials used in the 
study are presented in Appendix A. 
Manipulation check. In a post-task survey, members responded to a single item 
that was posed as a multiple choice question, asking them what they had read before the 
task. Consistent with the manipulations, I found significant differences between member 
responses in the 4 different problem-solving technique conditions (analogical reasoning, 
brainstorming, problem abstraction alone, analogy alone). A chi-square test of 
independence was performed on the relationship between experimental condition and the 
nominal response to the survey item. The chi-square was statistically significant 𝜒!(9, N 
= 457) = 1287, p < .001, indicating that the frequency with which participants chose the 
different item responses corresponded well to experimental condition. Results of this test 
are shown in Table 1. 
MEASURES 
Dependent Variables 
Consistent with past work on creativity (Amabile, 1996; Zhou & Shalley, 2003), 
group creativity is defined here as the novelty and usefulness of a group’s output. I used 
four measures to assess the solution ideas generated by participants: novelty, flexibility, 
usefulness, and overall creativity. 
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Solution ideas were taken from the Idea Sheets and transcribed into electronic 
files for subsequent rating. Due to the great number of ideas (over 3,600 ideas were 
generated by participants in this study), the ratings were performed in a multi-step 
procedure, similar to past creativity studies that evaluated large numbers of outputs (for 
an example, see Rietzschel, Nijstad, & Stroebe, 2006). The procedure involved first 
calibrating the raters to each other to establish interrater similarity (“pre-ratings 
calibration”), then distributing different sets of ideas among raters for assessment, and 
then checking interrater similarity again with a post-ratings calibration. Thus, there are 
two sets of interrater agreement and reliability estimates: one set for the pre-ratings 
calibration, and one for the post-ratings calibration. The full details of this rater 
calibration procedure are presented in Appendix B. 
Nominal groups were composed randomly. For each nominal group, ideas from 
the three individuals’ Idea Sheets were combined. Ideas were rated and marked for 
redundancy (i.e., some ideas were generated by more than one member of a nominal 
group), and redundant ideas were not included in the group level averages computed for 
all the dependent variables described below. This is consistent with past studies that have 
used randomly composed nominal groups for comparisons with interacting groups (e.g., 
Taylor et al., 1958). Next, I describe how the dependent variables were operationalized, 
and then I include information on inter-rater agreement (IRA) and inter-rater reliability 
(IRR). 
Novelty. Solution ideas were judged for novelty by three raters, blind to 
hypotheses and experimental conditions. I met together with all the raters and we 
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reviewed selected text passages taken from Amabile (Amabile, 1996) that helped 
establish the definition of novelty3. Afterwards, the raters independently evaluated the 
novelty of solution ideas using a 7 point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not novel at 
all) to 7 (extremely novel). A group-level novelty variable was computed as the average 
of novelty ratings of all the ideas generated by the group. 
Usefulness. Solution ideas were judged for usefulness by three raters, blind to 
hypotheses and experimental conditions. They independently rated the usefulness of 
solution ideas using a 7 point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not useful at all) to 7 
(extremely useful). A group-level usefulness variable for each group was calculated by 
averaging the usefulness ratings of all the ideas generated by the group. 
Flexibility. Flexibility was scored for each group using flexibility scoring 
methods similar to past ideation studies (Baruah & Paulus, 2008; Goncalo & Staw, 2006; 
Kohn & Smith, 2010; Nijstad et al., 2002, 2003) in which flexibility is measured as a 
function of the number of categories of ideas generated. Two undergraduate raters, blind 
to this study’s hypotheses, looked through approximately half of all solution ideas and 
generated two lists of independent problem solution category dimensions: solution means 
and solution goals (to review an earlier example of this methodology, see Nijstad et al., 
2002). For example, a goal of many of the problem solutions was to prevent the taco shell 
from breaking; a common means that many solutions implemented was to add an extra 
taco shell. After two rounds of collaborative meetings, the raters and I came up with a list 
                                                
3 We did the same for usefulness and overall creativity during the meeting. The excerpts we used are shown in Appendix B in the 
section on rater calibration procedures. 
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of 24 means and 8 goals, which covered the ideas we had looked through. Tables 2 and 3 
list the goals and means. 
Using this approach, an idea category is a combination of a solution means and a 
solution goal (Nijstad et al., 2002). For 24 solution means and 8 solution goals, there are 
192 unique idea categories that can be generated. Four undergraduate raters then were 
each randomly assigned about a quarter of the ideas in the dataset, and they categorized 
them. I calculated flexibility for each group by taking the number of non-redundant 
categories represented by the ideas the group generated, and dividing by the total number 
of ideas generated by the group. The flexibility measure represents the average number of 
non-redundant categories contributed per idea generated (Goncalo & Staw, 2006). 
Overall group creativity. Three raters independently judged the overall 
creativity of solution ideas with a 7 point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not creative 
at all) to 7 (extremely creative). Overall creativity for each group was calculated by 
averaging the overall creativity ratings of all the ideas generated by that group. 
Interrater reliability and agreement 
Interrater reliability (IRR) and agreement (IRA) were assessed using rwg and ICC 
indices for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity. The full description of the pre-
ratings and post-ratings calibration process is described in Appendix B. Next, I give the 
results for the IRR and IRA analyses for the dependent variables.  
Group idea novelty. Three undergraduate raters independently rated ideas for 
novelty. Using a rectangular uniform null distribution as the comparison variance 
 
 61 
condition, the mean and median values for rwg were 0.81 and 0.92, respectively, for the 
raters’ novelty ratings of ideas in the pre-ratings calibration dataset. These IRA parameter 
values indicate that the raters were in strong agreement, according to guidance by 
LeBreton and Senter (2008). With ideas treated as the random effect and raters treated as 
the fixed effect, the ICC(A,1) value for the pre-ratings calibration dataset novelty ratings 
was 0.75, which reflects good interrater agreement and reliability. 
Again using a rectangular uniform null distribution as the comparison variance 
condition, the mean and median values for rwg were 0.76 and 0.75, respectively, for the 
raters’ ratings of the 50 ideas in the post-ratings calibration dataset. These IRA parameter 
values indicate that the raters were still in reasonably good agreement on the novelty 
ratings. The ICC(A,1) was 0.70, which reflects acceptable interrater agreement and 
reliability. The test-retest reliabilities between the pre-ratings and post-ratings came out 
to 0.93, 0.92, and 0.94 for each raters’ novelty ratings. 
Usefulness. Three undergraduate raters independently rated ideas for usefulness. 
Using a rectangular uniform null distribution as the comparison variance condition, the 
mean and median values for rwg were 0.82 and 0.92, respectively, for the pre-ratings 
calibration dataset. These IRA parameter values indicate strong agreement on the 
usefulness ratings. With ideas treated as the random effect and raters treated as the fixed 
effect, the ICC(A,1) value for the pre-ratings calibration dataset usefulness ratings was 
0.64, which reflects acceptable interrater agreement and reliability. 
For the post-ratings calibration dataset, the mean and median values for rwg were 
0.75 and 0.75, respectively. These IRA parameter values indicate that the raters were still 
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in good agreement on the usefulness ratings. The ICC(A,1) was 0.64, and this reflects 
acceptable interrater agreement and reliability. The test-retest reliability values came out 
to 0.91, 0.94, and 0.83 for each raters’ usefulness scores.  
Overall group creativity. Three undergraduate raters independently rated ideas 
for overall creativity. Using a rectangular uniform null distribution as the comparison 
variance condition, the mean and median values for rwg were 0.88 and 0.92, respectively, 
for the pre-ratings calibration dataset. These IRA parameter values indicate strong 
agreement on the overall creativity ratings. With ideas treated as the random effect and 
raters treated as the fixed effect, the ICC(A,1) value was 0.53, which reflects nominally 
acceptable interrater agreement and reliability.  
For the post-ratings calibration dataset, the mean and median values for rwg were 
0.75 and 0.75, respectively. These IRA parameter values indicate that the raters were still 
in good agreement on the overall creativity ratings. The ICC(A,1) was 0.40, which 
indicates marginal interrater agreement and reliability. The test-retest reliability values 
came out to 0.92, 0.81, and 0.91 for each raters’ overall creativity scores. 
Group Idea flexibility. Interrater agreement for the pre-ratings categorizations 
was assessed with a generalized version of Cohen’s kappa which is suited to more than 
two raters (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss, 1971)4. The generalized kappa parameter was 0.53 (p < 
.001), 95% CI (0.51, 0.54) for the pre-ratings categorization calibration dataset, and this 
indicates moderate agreement between raters (Landis & Koch, 1977).  
                                                
4 See  https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/files/app/folder/bbe88aaf-f3cd-466a-83fb-592d48eecb1c for a 
list of IBM developer software tools for SPSS, including the Fleiss kappa module used in this study. 
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The generalized kappa parameter was 0.58 (p < .001), 95% CI (0.56, 0.60) for the 
post-ratings categorization calibration dataset, and this again indicates moderate 
agreement between raters (Landis & Koch, 1977). 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Prior research indicates there may be some meaningful relationships between 
creativity and certain characteristics of individuals and groups. In order to account for 
alternative explanations for group creativity, I include the following control variables, 
and I cite relevant research in each section that provides evidence that they might be 
important for this study. 
Personality. Theory and empirical findings suggest personality may be important 
for individual and group creativity (e.g., Amabile, 1996; Baer et al., 2008). Survey items 
for personality, taken from the short 10-item scale developed by Gosling, Rentfrow, and 
Swann Jr (2003) were administered. The scale includes 2 items for each of the Big Five 
personality dimensions. Cronbach’s alpha [Pearson r] for each of the 5 dimensions were: 
Extraversion: 0.82 [0.70]; Agreeableness: 0.45 [0.30]; Conscientiousness: 0.51 [0.36]; 
Emotional Stability: 0.67 [0.51]; and Openness to Experience: 0.48 [0.33]. All 
participants, regardless of experimental treatment condition, completed these items.  
Transactive memory systems. Recently, some researchers have theorized and 
found evidence of an association between TMS and group creativity (e.g., Gino et al., 
2010; Gino, Todorova, Miron-Spektor, & Argote, 2009). I measured TMS in interacting 
groups to account for this potential association, using the 15-item multidimensional TMS 
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scale developed by Lewis (2003), with some minor wording changes and using a 7 point 
Likert-type scale. To assess internal consistency, I used the 15 items at the individual 
level, and I also averaged responses across members for each item to generate group item 
averages. Cronbach’s alpha for the individual-level scale was 0.78, and for group item 
averages it was 0.82. 
I averaged responses across the 15 items to form a TMS composite score for each 
group member. Because the TMS measure is intended to represent a group level 
construct, I evaluated the statistical appropriateness of aggregating the composite scores 
to the group level using rwg(j) indices for interrater agreement. The mean [median] rwg(j) 
value was 0.94 [0.95], indicating very strong agreement among members of each group. 
TMS at the group level was calculated as the unweighted average of the 3 composite 
scores within each group. 
Cohesion. Some have theorized that group cohesion will facilitate the serious 
exchange of diverse perspectives and ideas (Van Der Zee & Paulus, 2008), which may 
help creative groups. Members of interacting groups completed a 4-item measure of 
group cohesion adapted from Seashore (1954). Cronbach’s alpha for the individual level 
scale was 0.80, and for group item averages it was 0.84. For composite scores averaged 
across each member’s responses to the 4 items, the mean [median] rwg(j) value was 0.93 
[0.96], indicating very strong agreement among members. Group cohesion was calculated 
as the average of the 3 composite scores within each group. 
Individualism/Collectivism. Theory and empirical findings suggest that 
individualistic and collectivistic values can have differential effects on creativity 
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(Goncalo & Staw, 2006). To account for this potential alternative explanation, 
individualism/collectivism was measured for all participants in the study, using 3 items 
from Wagner (1995), with higher scores indicating higher levels of individualism. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the individual level scale was 0.76. For composite scores averaged 
across each member’s responses to the 3 items, the mean [median] rwg(j) value was 0.55 
[0.63]. These IRA parameter values indicate moderate agreement. Group level 
individualism/collectivism was calculated as the average of the 3 composite scores within 
each group in the interacting condition. 
Psychological Safety. Studies of group learning and performance indicate that 
when members share a belief that the group is safe for risk-taking, they are more willing 
to seek and exchange information (Edmondson, 1999). In a group creative context, 
psychological safety may be relevant to helping members overcome a fear of negative 
evaluation, one of the theorized mechanisms of production loss in creative groups (Paulus 
& Dzindolet, 1993; Paulus et al., 2006). Psychological safety was measured in interacting 
groups to assess potential effects, using a 3-item scale adapted for this laboratory task 
from Edmondson’s (1999) field measure. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the individual level scale was 0.60, and for group item 
averages it was 0.65. For composite scores averaged across each member’s responses to 
the 3 items, the mean [median] rwg(j) value was 0.89 [0.94]. These IRA parameter values 
indicate very strong agreement. Group psychological safety was calculated as the average 
of the 3 composite scores within each group. 
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Task conflict. Task conflict has been theorized as an important collective process 
that affects the extent to which group members exchange potentially diverse and valuable 
information (Jehn, 1995; Jehn, Northcraft, & Neale, 1999), but whether the effects are 
functional is a topic of debate in the literature, and one that requires a closer examination 
of task and contextual factors (De Dreu & Weingart, 2003; de Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). 
Due to the potential for task conflict to affect group interaction during creative 
collaboration, interacting group members completed a 3-item measure of task conflict 
under development by Weingart (2011). 
Cronbach’s alpha for the individual level scale was 0.81, and for group item 
averages it was 0.88. For composite scores averaged across each member’s responses to 
the 3 items, the mean [median] rwg(j) value was 0.65 [0.81], indicating moderate to strong 
agreement. Group task conflict was calculated as the average of the 3 composite scores 
within each group. 
Positive and negative affect. Positive affect has been linked to creativity in the 
literature, and it has been theorized to improve individuals’ abilities to think divergently 
and come up with new ideas (Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005; Isen, Daubman, 
& Nowicki, 1987). However, some other studies have found that negative affect 
improves creativity under certain conditions (George & Zhou, 2002, 2007). Similar to the 
latter 2 studies, positive and negative affect were measured with the Positive and 
Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), which uses 10 items 
each for positive and negative affect. All participants, whether assigned to interacting or 
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nominal conditions, completed the PANAS items. For internal consistency, Cronbach’s 
alpha was 0.89 for the positive affect scale, and it was 0.75 for the negative affect scale.  
Affect is, according to past theorizing and empirical work (Barsade & Gibson, 
1998; Bartel & Saavedra, 2000), “sufficiently collective to merit consideration as a group 
level construct” (Kelly & Barsade, 2001). For composite scores averaged across each 
interacting group member’s responses to the 10 positive affect items, the mean [median] 
rwg(j) value was 0.96 [0.97]. The corresponding IRA estimate for the negative affect 
composite scores was 0.99 [1.00]. These IRA parameter values indicate very strong 
agreement. Group level positive and negative affect were calculated as the average of the 
3 corresponding composite scores within each group. 
Demographic variables. Additional variables including age, gender, school 
major, work experience, native language, and familiarity with other members (for 
interacting groups) were collected in a post-task survey. All participants completed these 
items, regardless of experimental treatment condition, to examine potential associations 
with the criterion variables. Diversity of gender, ethnicity, and native language was 
calculated using Blau’s index (Blau, 1977). 




Chapter 5: Results 
SURVEY DATA AND CORRELATIONS 
This study is an experiment, but post-task survey data were also collected along 
with the dependent variables and video data. The survey data differ based on the 
interacting/nominal status of the groups. Some of the interacting groups’ survey questions 
asked about group interaction (e.g., cohesion, TMS, etc.), and these questions could not 
be given to the nominal group members, because they did not experience any group 
interaction. Thus, the sample size for some data collected from interacting groups is 
N=88. The means, standard deviations, alpha reliabilities, and correlations for the entire 
dataset are shown in Table 4 (sample sizes are noted in the table). 
Notable correlations 
Some of the control variables are significantly correlated with one or more of the 
dependent variables: novelty, flexibility, usefulness, and overall creativity. Individualism 
is positively associated with novelty and negatively associated with flexibility. Recall that 
the flexibility variable is operationalized as the number of solution categories generated 
divided by the total number of ideas. Thus, flexibility is low if the number of ideas is 
large relative to the number of categories generated. A negative correlation between 
flexibility and individualism could therefore result if individualism were positively 
related to the number of ideas generated5.  
Group averages for some personality variables are significantly associated with 
creative outcomes. Group average agreeableness is negatively associated with novelty, 
although the effect is small. The group average for openness to experience, which has 
been theorized to promote flexible thinking (Amabile, 1996) is negatively associated with 
                                                
5 Individualism and number of ideas produced (fluency) are correlated 0.22**, p < .01. 
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both overall creativity and solution novelty, although again, these effects are small. These 
results should be interpreted with caution, however, because the reliabilities of these two 
personality variables in this study are below the commonly-accepted cutoff of α = 0.70. 
The group average for extraversion is positively associated with usefulness, and group 
emotional stability is positively associated with flexibility. 
There is a positive overall association between task conflict and solution 
usefulness. This may indicate that interacting groups who experienced task conflict used 
these debates in a functional way to assess potential solution ideas as to their usefulness 
or feasibility. 
The relationships between the criterion variables for the entire dataset are also of 
interest. Overall creativity is positively associated with both novelty and usefulness, 
which aligns with the conceptual definition of overall creativity as a multidimensional 
construct reflecting both novelty and usefulness. Novelty and usefulness exhibit no 
significant association with each other, and this is consistent with some other studies that 
have measured both dimensions (Amabile, 1983, 1996; Montag et al., 2012).  
Based on these data and on past theorizing about the effects of some of these 
variables on creativity, I performed supplemental tests of hypotheses (described later), 
controlling for individualism, the personality variables, and task conflict.  
CELL MEANS AND OVERALL PATTERN OF RESULTS 
Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the dependent variable cell means and standard 
deviations for novelty, flexibility, usefulness, and overall creativity, respectively. I 
analyzed the overall pattern of results for each dependent variable using one-way 
ANOVA and post-hoc pairwise comparisons. The single between-groups factor was a 
general experimental condition factor; it distinguished between each of the eight test cell 
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conditions. To preserve statistical power, I used the Fisher’s LSD pairwise procedure to 
report the significant differences between means in the overall pattern of results, even 
though this procedure is somewhat liberal in protecting the overall Type I error rate 
(Stevens, 2007). The analyses were focused on two main sets of comparisons. The first 
comparison set involved looking at differences between interacting and nominal groups 
in each problem-solving condition. The second set of comparisons involved looking 
exclusively at interacting groups to better understand the relative differences in effects of 
analogical reasoning, analogy only, and problem abstraction only. In addition to 
analyzing the dependent variables this way, I also analyzed fluency (group idea 
production) using the same procedures. I describe the results next. 
Overall pattern: Solution novelty 
Figure 1 shows the solution novelty group means across the eight experimental 
conditions. The pattern of results shows that the analogical reasoning condition was the 
only problem-solving condition in which interacting groups seemed to outperform 
nominal groups on solution novelty. The one-way ANOVA using novelty as the 
dependent variable and experimental condition as between-groups factor was significant, 
F(7, 142) = 4.67, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.19. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD 
procedure revealed that interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions 
of significantly higher novelty compared to nominal groups using analogical reasoning 
(ΔM = 0.39, 95% CI [0.08, 0.70], p < .05). Conversely, interacting groups using analogy 
only produced solutions of significantly lower novelty compared to nominal groups using 
analogy only (ΔM = 0.44, 95% CI [0.14, 0.75], p < .01). The pattern of results for the 
brainstorming and problem abstraction only conditions was similar to that of the analogy 
only condition, i.e., nominal groups appeared to outperform interacting groups, but the 
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pairwise comparisons did not reach statistical significance (ΔM = 0.27, 95% CI [-0.07, 
0.60], p = .12, ns; and ΔM = 0.16, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.50], p = .36, ns, respectively). 
Interacting groups comparisons: Solution novelty 
 Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD procedure revealed a significant 
difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and interacting 
groups that used analogy only. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced 
solutions of higher novelty compared to interacting groups using analogy only (ΔM = 
0.77, 95% CI [0.48, 1.06], p < .01). Also, interacting groups using analogical reasoning 
produced solutions of higher novelty compared to interacting groups using problem 
abstraction only (ΔM = 0.32, 95% CI [0.02, 0.61], p < .05), and also compared to 
interacting groups using brainstorming (ΔM = 0.35, 95% CI [0.06, 0.64], p < .05). 
Inspection of the overall pattern also suggests that interacting groups in the 
analogy only condition may have performed significantly worse on solution novelty 
compared to interacting groups in the brainstorming and in the problem abstraction only 
conditions. This was true. Interacting groups in the analogy only condition produced 
solutions of lower novelty compared to interacting groups in both the brainstorming and 
the problem abstraction only conditions (ΔM = 0.42, 95% CI [0.13, 0.71], p < .01; and 
ΔM = 0.45, 95% CI [0.16, 0.75], p < .01, respectively). In short, interacting groups in the 
analogy only condition produced significantly less novel solutions compared to 
interacting groups in any of the other problem-solving conditions. 
Overall pattern: Solution flexibility 
Figure 2 shows the solution flexibility group means across the eight experimental 
conditions. The overall pattern of results shows that for flexibility, interacting groups 
seemed to have an advantage over nominal groups, and this advantage held across all 
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four problem-solving conditions. The one-way ANOVA using flexibility as the 
dependent variable and experimental condition as between-groups factor was significant, 
F(7, 142) = 5.61, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.22. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD 
procedure revealed that interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions 
of significantly higher flexibility compared to nominal groups using analogical reasoning 
(ΔM = 0.10, 95% CI [0.03, 0.18], p < .01). Similarly, interacting groups produced 
solutions of higher flexibility compared to nominal groups for both the brainstorming and 
the problem abstraction only conditions (ΔM = 0.13, 95% CI [0.05, 0.21], p < .01; and 
ΔM = 0.14, 95% CI [0.06, 0.22], p < .01, respectively). Conversely, no significant 
flexibility difference was found between solutions produced by interacting groups using 
analogy only and nominal groups using analogy only (ΔM = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.13], 
p = .10, ns). 
Interacting groups comparisons: Solution flexibility 
An LSD post-hoc test revealed no significant flexibility difference between 
interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and interacting groups that used 
analogy only, (ΔM = 0.05, 95% CI [-0.02, 0.12], p = .17, ns). Similarly, there were no 
significant solution flexibility differences between interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning and interacting groups using problem abstraction only (ΔM = 0.03, 95% CI [-
0.04, 0.10], p = .34, ns), nor between interacting groups using analogical reasoning and 
interacting groups using brainstorming (ΔM = 0.06, 95% CI [-0.01, 0.13], p = .08, ns). 
Overall pattern: Solution usefulness 
Figure 3 shows the solution usefulness group means across the eight experimental 
conditions. Like the novelty results, the pattern of usefulness results shows that the 
analogical reasoning condition was the only problem-solving condition in which 
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interacting groups seemed to outperform nominal groups. The one-way ANOVA using 
usefulness as the dependent variable and experimental condition as between-groups 
factor was significant, F(7, 142) = 17.65, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.47. Post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons using the LSD procedure revealed that interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning produced solutions of significantly higher usefulness compared to nominal 
groups using analogical reasoning (ΔM = 1.13, 95% CI [0.86, 1.41], p < .001). 
Conversely, interacting groups using analogy only produced solutions of lower 
usefulness compared to nominal groups using analogy only (ΔM = 0.31, 95% CI [0.04, 
0.59], p < .05). The pattern of usefulness results for the brainstorming and problem 
abstraction only conditions was similar to that of the analogy only condition, but the 
pairwise comparisons did not reach statistical significance (ΔM = 0.26, 95% CI [-0.04, 
0.56], p = .09, ns; and ΔM = 0.03, 95% CI [-0.27, 0.33], p = .84, ns, respectively). 
Interacting groups comparisons: Solution usefulness 
 Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD procedure revealed a significant 
difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and interacting 
groups that used analogy only. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced 
solutions of higher usefulness compared to interacting groups using analogy only, (ΔM = 
1.25, 95% CI [0.99, 1.51], p < .001). The LSD post-hoc procedure also revealed 
significant differences between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and 
interacting groups that used either brainstorming or problem abstraction only. Interacting 
groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher usefulness compared to 
interacting groups using problem abstraction only, (ΔM = 1.07, 95% CI [0.81, 1.32], p < 
.001), and they also produced solutions of higher usefulness compared to interacting 
groups using brainstorming (ΔM = 1.11, 95% CI [0.85, 1.37], p < .001). 
 
 74 
Overall pattern: Solution overall creativity 
Figure 4 shows the solution overall creativity group means across the eight 
experimental conditions. The pattern of overall creativity results shows that the 
analogical reasoning condition was the only problem-solving condition in which 
interacting groups appeared to significantly outperform nominal groups. The data also 
suggest that nominal groups may have outperformed interacting groups in the 
brainstorming and problem abstraction only conditions, which is the reverse pattern 
compared to the analogical reasoning groups. The one-way ANOVA using overall 
creativity as the dependent variable and experimental condition as between-groups factor 
was significant, F(7, 142) = 3.64, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.15. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
using the LSD procedure revealed a significant overall creativity difference between 
interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and nominal groups that used analogical 
reasoning (ΔM = 0.33, 95% CI [0.13, 0.52], p < .01). Conversely, interacting groups 
using brainstorming produced solutions of lower overall creativity compared to nominal 
groups using brainstorming (ΔM = 0.32, 95% CI [0.11, 0.54], p < .01). Also, interacting 
groups using problem abstraction only produced solutions of lower overall creativity 
compared to nominal groups using problem abstraction only (ΔM = 0.22, 95% CI [0.005, 
0.44], p < .05). No significant overall creativity difference was found between solutions 
produced by interacting groups using analogy only and nominal groups using analogy 
only (ΔM = 0.02, 95% CI [-0.18, 0.22], p = .84, ns). 
Interacting groups comparisons: Solution overall creativity 
 Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD procedure revealed a significant 
solution creativity difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning 
and interacting groups that used analogy only. Interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning produced solutions of higher overall creativity compared to interacting groups 
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using analogy only, (ΔM = 0.22, 95% CI [0.03, 0.40], p < .05). The LSD post-hoc 
procedure also revealed that interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced 
solutions of higher overall creativity compared to interacting groups using problem 
abstraction only, (ΔM = 0.31, 95% CI [0.13, 0.50], p < .01), and they also produced 
solutions of higher overall creativity compared to interacting groups using brainstorming 
(ΔM = 0.30, 95% CI [0.11, 0.48], p < .01). 
Overall pattern: Fluency 
Figure 5 shows the fluency group means across the eight experimental conditions. 
The overall pattern of results shows that for fluency, nominal groups seemed to have an 
advantage over interacting groups consistently across the four problem-solving 
conditions. The one-way ANOVA using fluency as the dependent variable and 
experimental condition as between-groups factor was significant, F(7, 142) = 7.87, p < 
.001, 𝜂!= 0.28. Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD procedure revealed a 
significant fluency difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning 
and nominal groups that used analogical reasoning, with nominal groups outperforming 
interacting groups (ΔM = 7.96, 95% CI [1.84, 14.08], p < .05). Similarly, interacting 
groups produced fewer solutions compared to nominal groups for both the brainstorming 
and the problem abstraction only conditions (ΔM = 10.14, 95% CI [3.41, 16.88], p < .01; 
and ΔM = 13.49, 95% CI [6.75, 20.22], p < .01, respectively). Conversely, no significant 
fluency difference was found between solutions produced by interacting groups using 
analogy only and nominal groups using analogy only (ΔM = 4.19, 95% CI [-1.93, 10.31], 
p = .18, ns). 
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Interacting groups comparisons: Fluency 
 Post-hoc pairwise comparisons using the LSD procedure revealed a significant 
fluency difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and 
interacting groups that used analogy only. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning 
produced fewer solutions compared to interacting groups using analogy only, (ΔM = 
6.55, 95% CI [0.74, 12.35], p < .05). The LSD post-hoc procedure also revealed that 
interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced fewer solutions compared to 
interacting groups using problem abstraction only, (ΔM = 6.77, 95% CI [0.97, 12.58], p < 
.05), and they also produced fewer solutions compared to interacting groups using 
brainstorming (ΔM = 9.50, 95% CI [3.69, 15,31], p < .01). In fact, interacting groups 
using analogical reasoning produced fewer ideas than any of the seven other experimental 
conditions in the study6. 
TESTS OF HYPOTHESES 
Hypotheses were tested using analysis of variance and planned comparisons. The 
first four hypotheses were tests between interacting groups using analogical reasoning 
and groups not using analogical reasoning. As stated in Chapter 4, groups not using 
analogical reasoning were exposed to blog posts describing brainstorming as an idea-
generating technique, and these are the groups against which analogical reasoning groups 
were compared. Hypotheses 5-8 tested for group synergy by comparing interacting and 
nominal groups using analogical reasoning.  
The study was designed and executed as a 2 x 4 factorial design7, with “group 
interaction type” (interacting groups vs. nominal groups) and “problem-solving type” 
                                                
6 LSD analyses showed this to be true; this finding can also be deduced from the results given here. 
7 I used the Type III sum of squares method in SPSS for all ANOVA analyses, to address correlated effects issues related to unequal 
cell sizes for factorial designs (Stevens, 2007: 142).  
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(brainstorming, problem abstraction only, analogy only, analogical reasoning) as 
between-groups factors. Results of the hypotheses tests without control variables are 
presented in the next section, and they are followed by subsequent analyses incorporating 
control variables. 
Tests between interacting groups 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that interacting groups using analogical reasoning would 
produce creative problem solutions of higher novelty compared to interacting groups not 
using analogical reasoning. A 2 x 4 factorial ANOVA using novelty as the dependent 
variable and between-group factors for group interaction and problem-solving technique 
was significant, F(7, 142) = 4.67, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.19. A planned contrast assessing the 
novelty difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and 
interacting groups that did not use analogical reasoning (i.e., that used brainstorming) 
was significant. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of 
higher novelty compared to interacting groups that did not use analogical reasoning, (M = 
4.51, SD = 0.40 vs. M = 4.16, SD = 0.34, t[142] = 2.36, p < .05). These results lend 
support to Hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that interacting groups using analogical reasoning would 
produce creative problem solutions of higher flexibility compared to interacting groups 
not using analogical reasoning. A 2 x 4 factorial ANOVA with flexibility as the 
dependent variable and between-group factors for group interaction and problem-solving 
technique was significant, F(7, 142) = 5.61, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.22. A planned contrast 
assessing the difference in flexibility between interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning and those that did not use analogical reasoning revealed no significant 
difference. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of 
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marginally higher flexibility compared to interacting groups using brainstorming, (M = 
0.74, SD = 0.12 vs. M = 0.68, SD = 0.08, t[142] = 1.74, p = .084, ns)8. Thus, Hypothesis 
2 was not supported. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that interacting analogical reasoning groups would 
produce creative problem solutions of higher usefulness compared to interacting groups 
not using analogical reasoning. A 2 x 4 factorial ANOVA with usefulness as the 
dependent variable and between-group factors for group interaction and problem-solving 
technique was significant, F(7, 142) = 17.65, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.47. A planned contrast 
assessing the difference between interacting groups that used analogical reasoning and 
those that did not use analogical reasoning revealed a significant difference. Interacting 
groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher usefulness compared to 
interacting groups that did not use analogical reasoning, (M = 5.18, SD = 0.40 vs. M = 
4.07, SD = 0.34, t[142] = 8.49, p < .001). These results support Hypothesis 3. 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that interacting groups using analogical reasoning would 
produce ideas higher in overall creativity compared to interacting groups not using 
analogical reasoning. A 2 x 4 factorial ANOVA using the measure for overall creativity 
as the dependent variable and between-group factors for group interaction and problem-
solving technique was significant, F(7, 142) = 3.64, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.15. A planned 
contrast assessing the difference in overall creativity between interacting groups that used 
analogical reasoning and interacting groups that did not revealed a significant difference. 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher overall 
creativity compared to interacting groups that did not use analogical reasoning, (M = 
                                                
8 The flexibility data rendered a significant Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, indicating population variances may have 
been heterogeneous. Conversely, a Hartley’s Fmax test indicated no problem with the homogeneity of variance assumption. With 
Welch's adjustment for heterogeneous variances, the Hypothesis 2 planned contrast t statistic was t[36.215] = 1.96, p = .058. 
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3.83, SD = 0.36 vs. M = 3.54, SD = 0.17, t[142] = 3.14, p < .01)9. These results support 
Hypothesis 4. 
Tests between interacting groups and nominal groups 
Hypotheses 5-8 examine the extent to which group interaction produces synergies 
with respect to novelty, flexibility, usefulness, and overall creativity. Hypothesis 5 
predicted that interacting groups using analogical reasoning would produce ideas higher 
in novelty compared to nominal groups using analogical reasoning. The 2 x 4 factorial 
ANOVA using the measure for novelty as the dependent variable and between-group 
factors for group interaction and problem-solving technique was significant, F(7, 142) = 
4.67, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.19. A planned contrast assessing the novelty difference between 
interacting and nominal groups that used analogical reasoning revealed a significant 
difference. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher 
novelty compared to nominal groups using analogical reasoning, (M = 4.51, SD = 0.40 
vs. M = 4.12, SD = 0.56, t[142] = 2.51, p < .05). These results lend support to Hypothesis 
5 and indicate that group interaction produces synergistic effects for analogical reasoning 
on solution novelty. 
Hypothesis 6 predicted interacting groups that used analogical reasoning would 
produce ideas higher in flexibility compared to nominal analogical groups. The 2 x 4 
factorial ANOVA using the measure for flexibility as the dependent variable and 
between-group factors for group interaction and problem-solving technique was 
significant, F(7, 142) = 5.61, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.22. A planned contrast assessing the 
difference in flexibility between interacting and nominal groups using analogical 
                                                
9 The overall creativity data rendered a significant Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances, and a value for Hartley’s Fmax that 
exceeded the critical value, indicating population variances may have been heterogeneous. With Welch's adjustment for heterogeneous 




reasoning revealed a significant effect. Solution flexibility was higher for groups using 
analogical reasoning in the interacting condition than for groups using analogical 
reasoning in the nominal group condition (M = 0.74, SD = 0.12 vs. M = 0.63, SD = 0.13, 
t[142] = 2.85, p < .05)10. Hypothesis 6 is therefore supported, suggesting that group 
interaction produces synergistic effects for analogical reasoning on solution flexibility. 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that interacting groups using analogical reasoning would 
produce creative problem solutions of higher usefulness compared to nominal groups 
using analogical reasoning. The 2 x 4 factorial ANOVA using the measure for usefulness 
as the dependent variable and between-group factors for group interaction and problem-
solving technique was significant, F(7, 142) = 17.65, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.47. A planned 
contrast assessing the solution usefulness difference between interacting and nominal 
groups that used analogical reasoning revealed a significant difference. Interacting groups 
using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher usefulness compared to nominal 
groups using analogical reasoning, (M = 5.18, SD = 0.40 vs. M = 4.05, SD = 0.61, t[142] 
= 8.20, p < .001). These results support Hypothesis 7 and suggest that group interaction 
produces synergistic effects for analogical reasoning on solution usefulness. 
Hypothesis 8 predicted that interacting groups using analogical reasoning would 
produce ideas higher in overall creativity compared to nominal groups using analogical 
reasoning. The 2 x 4 factorial ANOVA using the measure for overall creativity as the 
dependent variable and between-group factors for group interaction and problem-solving 
technique was significant, F(7, 142) = 3.64, p < .001, 𝜂!= 0.15. A planned contrast 
assessing the difference between interacting groups and nominal groups that used 
analogical reasoning revealed a significant difference. Interacting groups using analogical 
                                                




reasoning produced solutions of higher overall creativity compared to nominal groups 
using analogical reasoning, (M = 3.83, SD = 0.36 vs. M = 3.51, SD = 0.33, t[142] = 3.28, 
p < .01)11. These results lend support to Hypothesis 8 and suggest that group interaction 
produces synergistic effects for analogical reasoning on overall creativity. 
Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
Table 9 shows the summary of findings for the hypotheses tests. The p values for 
the hypotheses tests are shown in the table. 
SUPPLEMENTAL ANALYSES 
I performed additional analyses to examine the pattern of test results when 
controlling for individualism, personality variables, and task conflict. I tested each of the 
hypothesized relationships controlling for variables that have been theorized to affect 
creativity, and that showed significant associations with dependent variables as indicated 
by the Pearson correlation data. I examined results from ANCOVA and used planned 
contrasts to assess whether hypotheses are supported when these variables are included. I 
used the methodology described in Jaccard (1998) for assessing planned contrasts; this 
method incorporates the covariate-adjusted means and the covariate-adjusted mean 
square error in each planned contrast analysis. 
Table 10 shows the results of the covariate analyses. For each of H1-H4, I ran 
three different ANCOVA models: 1) adding individualism only, 2) adding task conflict 
only, and 3) adding all Big Five personality variables. For each of H5-H8, I ran the same 
models, except the task conflict models. Including task conflict as a covariate eliminates 
all the nominal groups from the analyses, and precludes assessment of H5-H8, which 
require nominal group data. Table 10 shows the overall F statistic for each ANCOVA 
                                                
11 With Welch's adjustment for heterogeneous variances, the Hypothesis 8 planned contrast t statistic was t[37.587] = 3.00, p = .005. 
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model, the F statistic for each covariate, and also whether the support status of each 
hypothesis changed due to inclusion of the covariates in the different models. 
Individualism is significant in the first ANCOVA model for novelty, and 
openness to experience is significant in the third models for novelty and for overall 
creativity. However, the pattern of results obtained from the planned contrasts with 
covariates included is consistent with the results obtained from the original hypotheses 
tests. Thus, when controlling for individualism, personality variables, and task conflict, 
Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 are still supported. These results show that including the 
covariates in the analyses does not change any of the substantive results of the study. 
SUMMARY 
The results of hypotheses tests, post-hoc analyses, and supplemental covariate 
analyses give support to the claims made earlier in this study related to the natural 
suitability of analogical reasoning as a distributed cognitive strategy that can be used by 
groups for functional creative outcomes. Interacting groups using analogical reasoning 
produced creative solutions of greater novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity 
compared to groups not using analogical reasoning. Also, interacting groups using 
analogical reasoning generated solutions higher in novelty, flexibility, usefulness, and 
overall creativity, compared to nominal groups composed of individuals using analogical 
reasoning. These findings for synergistic effects held across all dependent variables in the 
study. The overall pattern of results suggests that groups using analogical reasoning 
realized creative advantages over interacting groups not using analogical reasoning, and 
over nominal groups who used analogical reasoning. The substantive results of the study 
were not changed by including control variables for individualism, the Big Five 
personality dimensions, and task conflict. 
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Much of the theory put forward earlier explained the benefits of analogical 
reasoning in interacting groups by describing how analogical reasoning would help 
groups take advantage of their diverse knowledge and skills, stimulating divergent 
thinking and producing diverse knowledge contributions that lead to increased flexibility 
and novelty of products. The novelty data support this conjecture, while the flexibility 
data is mixed. On the other hand, the robust findings for solution usefulness indicate a 
relatively larger effect of analogical reasoning on usefulness, compared to the effects on 
novelty or flexibility. 
The post-hoc analyses that compared interacting groups in different problem-
solving conditions produced some interesting results. Interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning produced solutions of higher novelty compared to interacting groups who used 
analogy only, compared to interacting groups who used problem abstraction only, and 
compared to interacting groups who used brainstorming. Interacting groups using 
analogical reasoning also enjoyed a usefulness advantage over interacting groups in all 
three other problem-solving conditions. These findings held for overall creativity as well. 
The overall pattern of findings for fluency in this study revealed that group 
interaction had the same production loss effect as has been replicated in many 
brainstorming studies (Mullen et al., 1991). In terms of idea production, nominal groups 
outperformed interacting groups in every problem-solving experimental condition, except 
for the analogy only condition, where the trend was consistent but the difference failed to 
reach statistical significance. It is likely that this production loss effect also influenced the 
flexibility data, because fluency is used in the denominator of the flexibility variable to 
adjust it for the number of ideas produced. 
Finally, with the exception of the flexibility data, which displayed a nearly 
uniform advantage of group interaction across all problem-solving conditions, there was 
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no evidence of synergistic effects for interacting groups in any problem-solving condition 
except for analogical reasoning. Analogical reasoning groups showed evidence of 




Chapter 6: Discussion 
APPROACH, RESULTS, AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
In this dissertation, I investigated group creativity by asking two basic questions. 
The first was a question about whether analogical reasoning is a relatively functional 
thinking approach for creative problem-solving performed by groups. The results of this 
study suggest that analogical reasoning may give interacting groups a creative advantage 
over other thinking strategies they might use, like following the rules of brainstorming 
(Osborn, 1953). 
The second research question was a query about synergy in creative groups, and 
whether analogical reasoning in the context of group interaction might give rise to  
synergistic effects. This seems like a higher hurdle, based on other groups research 
(Larson Jr, 2010). Research in the brainstorming literature has sought the holy grail of 
group creative synergy for decades (Baruah & Paulus, 2009), but it has been a mostly 
fruitless search. The approaches that have been found to counteract production loss 
effects in brainstorming studies require a great reduction in group interaction, which 
theoretically cannot involve intermember synergistic effects (Dennis & Williams, 2003; 
Paulus & Yang, 2000). 
My approach deviated from these types of studies in important ways. I rejected 
the notion that the brainstorming rules (Osborn, 1953) must be the primary cognitive 
strategy assessed, in part because brainstorming rules “are not rooted in any theory of the 
way the mind works” (Markman & Wood, 2009). I looked for a thinking technique that 
was not only functional for individual creative thinking, but that was also potentially 
well-suited to group collaboration, such that the combination of the cognitive strategy 
with group interaction might enable group members to leverage their diverse knowledge 
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and information processing abilities. And finally, I looked for multiple indicators of 
group creativity instead of only examining ideational fluency, because fluency may not 
tell the whole story when it comes to interacting creative groups (Montag et al., 2012; 
Sutton & Hargadon, 1996). Results of the study suggest that some synergistic effects may 
be in play when interacting groups use analogical reasoning as a distributed cognitive 
strategy for solving creative problems. 
An interesting overall result of the study was the strong experimental effects of 
group analogical reasoning on the usefulness of solution ideas. Much of the group 
creativity literature, as summarized in my own literature review in this study, draws on 
the basic assumption of the evolutionary model, which states that random variation plays 
a key antecedent role in the production of truly creative outputs. Variety of inputs leads to 
an increased chance of creative outputs (Staw, 2009). The results of this study suggest an 
interesting complementary possibility. Usefulness seemed to be just as critical as solution 
novelty, as a dimension of creative outputs, and analogical reasoning in interacting 
groups helped strongly promote it. These findings suggest that analytic and evaluative 
processes may not be as detrimental to group creativity as many have claimed (Amabile, 
1996; Osborn, 1953), particularly if they arise in the context of group analogical 
reasoning. 
The supplementary analyses that attempted to isolate the separate effects of the 
analogy only and problem abstraction only conditions and compare them to analogical 
reasoning produced some interesting results worthy of discussion. Interacting groups 
using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher novelty compared to interacting 
groups in all three other problem-solving conditions. Interestingly, interacting groups in 
the analogy only condition produce solutions of significantly lower novelty compared to 
interacting groups in the other problem-solving conditions. This may indicate that 
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interacting groups using analogy only were unable to achieve the same levels of abstract 
thinking related to the problem, compared to groups using analogical reasoning. Groups 
using problem abstraction only may not have had as much trouble in thinking about the 
problem abstractly, and this may have contributed to the novelty of their solution ideas, 
relative to interacting groups using analogy only. These results may point to the 
importance of an abstract problem schema for thinking divergently and generating novel 
solution ideas, particularly when groups try to use analogical thinking processes. The 
findings also suggest that the production of an abstract problem schema may not 
necessarily be an easy or guaranteed outcome, even if people have been exposed to 
analogical thinking techniques. Past research has shown that people are capable of 
generating an abstract problem schema solely from the comparison processes inherent in 
analogical mapping and solution inference (Gick & Holyoak, 1983). However, perhaps 
giving people independent advice on how to think abstractly about creative problems 
provides them an accelerated “head start” on the production of an abstract problem 
schema when combined with analogical thinking techniques. In other words, exposure to 
abstract thinking techniques may serve as a catalyst for engagement in analogical 
thinking processes. Participants in this study that were in the analogy only condition 
would not have experienced this catalytic, “head start” effect. 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning also enjoyed a usefulness advantage 
over both other types of interacting groups in the supplementary comparisons. The 
usefulness advantage over the groups using problem abstraction only might be a result of 
increased attention on goals and constraints produced by repetitive comparison processes 
inherent to mapping and solution inference. This explanation would predict that 
interacting groups using analogy only might also experience heightened attention to goals 
and constraints, and yet, they produced solutions that were also significantly lower in 
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usefulness compared to groups using analogical reasoning. It could be that groups using 
analogy only were handicapped somewhat because they weren’t exposed to techniques 
for thinking about problems abstractly, and again, perhaps this delayed or otherwise 
suppressed their ability to start using analogical processes in a functional, cyclical 
fashion. This would perhaps also explain why interacting groups using analogical 
reasoning produced solutions that were significantly higher on both novelty and 
usefulness, compared to interacting groups using analogy only. 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning produced solutions of higher overall 
creativity compared to interacting groups in all three of the other problem-solving 
conditions. An inspection of the overall pattern reveals that the effect size for overall 
creativity appears smaller than for usefulness or novelty. If creativity is a 
multidimensional construct that includes novelty and usefulness, then it is not readily 
apparent why the effect for overall creativity should be much smaller than the effects for 
its component dimensions. 
This result may be due to the way that raters generated their overall creativity 
ratings in the study. As described in Appendix B, no guidance was given to the raters 
about how the combination of novelty and usefulness (for which they also generated 
ratings) should lead to an overall creativity rating. This lack of guidance follows the 
advice of some scholars in the creativity literature who claim independent raters must be 
free to use their own subjective evaluations for ratings of creativity (Amabile, 1982). 
An examination of the cell means for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity 
for interacting groups using analogical reasoning, interacting groups using problem 
abstraction only, and interacting groups using analogy only reveals that for all three 
conditions, raters discounted the overall creativity ratings compared to the average of the 
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novelty and usefulness ratings12. This discounting appears to be greater for interacting 
groups using analogical reasoning than for the other two conditions. This difference in 
discounting brings overall creativity for analogical reasoning groups closer in value to the 
other two groups’ overall creativity, and lessens the chances that post-hoc analyses will 
reveal differences. The point is that, in lieu of any compelling theoretical reasons to 
expect a difference in these comparisons for overall creativity, the answer may lie in 
methodological reasons, and it may have to do with how raters generated overall 
creativity ratings in parallel with novelty and usefulness ratings. Perhaps having raters do 
all three ratings in parallel changed the overall creativity ratings in some way, compared 
to some different method of collecting ratings where the overall creativity rating is 
performed in a more independent manner (e.g., using different raters, introducing a time 
lag after novelty and usefulness are rated, etc.). 
The lack of findings for synergy among interacting groups using analogy only and 
problem abstraction only stand in stark contrast to the synergy findings for interacting 
groups using analogical reasoning. For novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity, 
interacting groups using analogical reasoning seemed to enjoy significant synergistic 
benefits over their nominal group counterparts. This synergy was completely absent 
across these dependent variables for interacting groups using either analogy only or 
problem abstraction only (or brainstorming). This may be the most significant overall 
finding of the study, because it suggests that there is something highly functional about 
the combination of analogical reasoning and group interaction that helps propel group 
                                                
12 During the meeting in which the definitions for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity were discussed, one rater asked if they 
should average the ratings for novelty and usefulness to come up with the overall creativity rating for each solution idea. I told the 
raters that averaging novelty and usefulness was not required in order to generate their overall creativity ratings, and how they 
combined their perceptions of novelty and usefulness to generate an overall creativity ratings was up to them. 
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creative performance beyond what is possible with an aggregate of non-interacting 
individuals, even if they also attempt to use analogical reasoning. 
The fluency results are typical of the many past studies in the brainstorming 
literature (Mullen et al., 1991). It is commonplace to find that group interaction produces 
process loss, and fluency is usually significantly lower for interacting groups compared to 
nominal groups. However, in this study these findings become interesting when 
combined with the findings for the other dependent variables. Interacting groups using 
analogical reasoning produced significantly fewer ideas than groups in any of the other 
seven experimental conditions. Yet, they also produced solution ideas that were 
significantly more novel, significantly more useful, and significantly more creative 
overall, compared to interacting groups in the other conditions. In some sense, interacting 
groups using analogical reasoning realized an efficiency advantage in this study, because 
their ideas were of relatively high quality even though there weren’t as many of them, 
compared to those of interacting groups in the other experimental conditions. Even when 
comparing interacting groups using analogical reasoning with nominal groups across all 
other conditions, the data trends show that none of the nominal groups have a clearly 
significant advantage for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity. Past brainstorming 
studies have typically found that a fluency advantage is associated with an idea quality 
advantage (Larson Jr, 2010), and that as a result, interacting groups have a difficult time 
competing with nominal groups when it comes to creative outcomes. This study makes an 
important contribution by revealing that a fluency advantage does not necessarily result 
in an idea quality advantage, when interacting groups use analogical reasoning. 
The pattern of results for adjusted flexibility is better understood when taking the 
fluency results into account. Because adjusted flexibility is calculated with fluency in the 
denominator, part of the apparently uniform flexibility advantage for interacting groups 
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over nominal groups may be due to the fact that nominal groups generally produced more 
ideas compared to interacting groups in this study. This means that at least part of the 
adjusted flexibility advantage observed for interacting groups may be due to an arithmetic 
artifact. The assumption that accompanies this possibility is that solution categories are 
exhausted relatively early on, and later ideas tend to represent solution categories that 
have already been elicited. This assumption is independent of the thinking strategy 
employed. Whether alternative thinking strategies like analogical reasoning may refute 
this assumption is still an unanswered question, although a re-analysis of the ordering of 
generated ideas in this study may potentially suggest an answer.  
This study makes a contribution to the literature on group creativity by 
incorporating analogical reasoning into the theoretical approach and actually testing the 
theory with a suitable study design that can assess causal effects. Analogical reasoning 
has been well-studied in cognitive science at the individual level (Holyoak, 2012), and it 
is often invoked as a key cognitive process by theorists when discussing important 
collective creativity processes (Amabile, 1996; Hargadon, 1999; Hargadon & Bechky, 
2006; Harvey, 2014; Shalley & Perry-Smith, 2008), but it is rarely operationalized and 
tested in organizational or small group research. Attempts at establishing analogical 
reasoning as a true group level, distributed cognitive processing system are also missing 
in the literature on group creativity. This study helps to rectify that. 
Other points of possible connection and contribution 
As I mentioned in the introduction, this study bears some theoretical similarities 
to the large literature on group cognition (Lewis & Herndon, 2011; Mohammed, 
Ferzandi, & Hamilton, 2010; Salas & Fiore, 2004; Wilson, Goodman, & Cronin, 2007). 
In particular, because creative problem-solving is primarily a thinking task, one could 
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construe a deliberate strategy to use analogical reasoning in a group context as a type of 
shared mental model. In this case, it might be considered a meta-cognitive task mental 
model because it concerns what members know and how they think about their cognitive 
processing plan. Theorizing and conceptualizing the way people think about their 
cognitive processes has not been the focal point of much group cognition research (Hinsz, 
2004). One might theorize, and the results of this study suggest, that to the extent all 
members of a group hold a similar meta-cognitive mental model of a group analogical 
reasoning approach, their interaction would be functional toward creative outcomes. 
There is also an important distinction between the theoretical gist of shared 
mental model theory and analogical reasoning as a group thinking strategy. Shared 
mental model theory came about as a potential explanation for the highly effective 
coordination observed in action teams. What stunned researchers about these action 
teams was their ability to coordinate in fast-changing situations without the need for 
explicit verbal or other communication (Cannon-Bowers, Salas, & Converse, 1993). In 
fact, shared mental model researchers have argued that under conditions that allow free 
communication between members, shared mental models will not be that important 
(Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000). Clearly, there is a 
potential difference between traditional notions of shared mental models and the 
environments in which they are effective, and the conception of distributed analogical 
processing as a group creative thinking strategy. In the latter, free communication is a 
vital component of the meta-cognitive mental model. So while some obvious conceptual 
similarities exist between group analogical thinking and shared mental model theory, 
taking a shared mental model perspective with group analogical reasoning would 
probably serve to generate additional insights that arise due to the meta-cognitive quality 
of the analogical mental model and the differences between creative tasks and typical 
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action team endeavors. This may serve to refine theoretical explanations, or in the case of 
shared mental model theory, produce some new ones. 
Transactive memory represents another widely studied group cognitive construct 
that has some similarities with the notion of distributed group analogical reasoning 
(Wegner, 1987). Wegner promoted his transactive memory paradigm as a modern take on 
the “group mind” concept13, a notion that was abandoned decades ago after failed efforts 
to effectively establish testable theory of the construct (Wegner, Giuliano, & Hertel, 
1985). Unlike shared mental model theory, which eschews group communication as an 
important element of the construct’s effects, TMS depends crucially upon it. Transactive 
memory processes include encoding, storage, and retrieval of critical task knowledge via 
intermember communications. Member cueing that stimulates knowledge retrieval from 
the memories of other members is a key part of the theory, and has strong similarities to 
my arguments about distributed analogical cognition in groups, and the way that 
members cue each other to stimulate the contribution of source analogs. But there are 
also some differences. 
For one, TMSs typically arise and strengthen as a result of member experiences 
with each other. In fact, this is how TMSs are often manipulated or otherwise allowed to 
develop in experimental and correlational study designs in the small groups and 
management literatures (Lewis, 2004; Moreland, 1999). As members gain experience 
with one another on a task, they learn about the knowledge and skills of others, and this 
strengthens the TMS and naturally gives rise to the TMS processes. By contrast, shared 
experience is not a requirement for creative groups to successfully employ analogical 
reasoning as a distributed thinking strategy. A key difference involves the type of cueing 
                                                




that happens in each framework. Members of a transactive memory system intentionally 
seek out specific knowledge from other members based on what they know about them 
and their past experiences. The cueing I theorize about in a distributed analogical 
reasoning system is not dependent on a shared history or targeted at retrieving particular 
knowledge from specific group members. There is no focused intent to the cueing, i.e., it 
arises naturally as a result of the problem abstraction process that accompanies analogical 
reasoning. 
Still, one can make connections between TMS and distributed analogical 
reasoning and foresee some potential fruitful outcomes. While it is true that groups of 
strangers should be able to collaborate creatively using distributed analogical reasoning, 
one might theorize that members could come to gain a shared knowledge about each 
other that could heighten their performance. As I argued earlier, a group is likely to 
possess diversity of cognitive skills associated with the subprocesses of analogical 
reasoning. If members come to understand which other members have high proficiency 
with the various analogical subprocesses, even at an intuitive level, this could enhance 
their ability to collaborate using analogy and increase the collective’s skill at producing 
novel and useful solution ideas. In this way, the group cognition characterizing the 
collective might change over time from a primarily isomorphic compositional construct 
(shared meta-cognitive mental model) to later include a more compilational model of the 
team and its complementary member abilities with reasoning analogically (Kozlowski & 
Klein, 2000). The concepts of transactive memory might thus be applied to the meta-
cognitive aspects of collaborative analogical reasoning, and produce new theory that 





One possible limitation of the study is the use of subjectively rated criterion 
variables, specifically, the ratings of novelty, usefulness, overall creativity, and solution 
categorizations. Great care was taken to ensure interrater agreement and consistency, and 
for most of these data the typical thresholds were met (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). In 
many creativity studies similar to this one, raters are considered to be “in agreement” if 
they give ratings within 1 scale number of each other, typically on a 5-point scale (among 
the many, some examples are Diehl & Stroebe, 1987; Rietzschel et al., 2006). I chose not 
to adopt this practice and instead spend extra time and effort with the raters to try and 
calibrate them to each other so they would use the ratings scales in a consistent manner. 
Still, the typical thresholds should be considered minimums. This limitation is not 
specific to this particular study, rather, it is inherent in many creativity studies that 
attempt to assess creativity with measures that go beyond simply looking at fluency. Still, 
it could be considered a limitation, and it applies to this study all the same. 
It is rare to see group creativity studies in which novelty, usefulness, and overall 
creativity of outputs are reported. Other scholars have recently cited this as a weakness in 
the literature and called for this methodological practice in future studies of creativity 
(Montag et al., 2012). The intent in gathering data for all three variables in this study was 
meant to make a contribution on this issue. So, while the relationship between novelty, 
usefulness, and overall creativity in this study is perhaps slightly curious, as discussed 
earlier, reporting all three may make a contribution. Again, although recent guidance 
suggests this practice (Montag et al., 2012), this study may help future researchers think 
more about the methodological issues of having raters assign creative output scores for 
all three variables. 
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Another limitation concerns how effective the manipulations were in producing 
the desired cognitive strategies for analogical reasoning and abstract problem definition. 
Participants were encouraged via the written materials to use these strategies, and 
qualitative data gathered during the pilot study indicated that the analogical reasoning 
manipulation did work for many of the pilot study groups. However, the nature of the 
creative task and participants’ familiarity with the topic of the problem (messy eating) 
seemed to instill in some interacting groups an instinct to try to solve the problem directly 
without resorting to the primed problem-solving strategies. This was observed by 
examining multiple video recordings. Many groups did ultimately use the strategies once 
the direct solution tactic was exhausted and idea production slowed, but it would perhaps 
have been a better test of the theory if a more effective way to instill the reasoning 
strategies could have been used. This limitation arose mostly due to the need to use a 
creative task that most people would have some familiarity with, so that special expertise 
would not be a necessity and creative idea production would not be hampered.  
Another thorny methodological issue involved the coarseness of solution 
knowledge domain categorization and the slippage between solution categories and the 
source analog knowledge domains that gave rise to them. The knowledge domains from 
which source analogs are retrieved are the real intended targets of operationalized 
measures of divergent thinking. I foresaw this slippage and encouraged all participants to 
write down “where their ideas came from” on the Idea Sheets and with verbal task 
instructions. But compliance with this request was not uniform. Some groups and 
individuals wrote down many sources of inspiration while others wrote nothing down. It 
seems reasonable that some of the non-compliance was probably not purposive, because 
in some instances (perhaps many instances) it is difficult for a person to know precisely 
where an idea came from. This attempted additional measure of source analog knowledge 
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domains did not work out, even though it may conceptually be a good indication of 
divergent thinking. The solution categorization method is one that has been used in 
multiple published brainstorming studies (Baruah & Paulus, 2008; Kohn & Smith, 2010; 
Nijstad et al., 2002, 2003), but in this study it may not quite have captured the 
phenomena for which it was intended. 
Another obvious methodological limitation is one common to all laboratory 
studies that use undergraduate students. Ecological validity and generalizability to other 
populations is often at issue. Given the subject matter of this study, however, and the 
focus on cognitive operations of individuals and interacting groups, a laboratory study is 
not a bad design with which to start. The counterpart to this weakness is a strength of the 
study that all lab designs share: the ability to make causal claims based on randomized 
assignment to conditions (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002). Certainly any research 
program that hopes to make a contribution to organization science must at some point 
diversify its study designs so that plausible generalizability is within reach. On the other 
hand, a “proof of concept” for the basic cognitive effects is a valuable contribution as 
well. 
A related limitation is that the role of expertise could not be assessed with this 
study design and sample (Markman & Wood, 2009). Expertise is clearly an important 
and variable factor for many organizational teams attempting to produce creative output 
and address specific problems grounded in a knowledge domain. Again, this is likely to 
be a goal of future studies in this research program, and longitudinal qualitative or 
survey-based designs are better research vehicles with which to assess the effects of 
expertise in creative organizational teams. 
The focus on “cold cognition” is also somewhat limiting (Newell & Simon, 
1972). Mood and emotion are important phenomena in groups (Kelly & Barsade, 2001), 
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and they have implications for creativity according to theory and empirical findings 
(Amabile et al., 2005; George & Zhou, 2002, 2007; Isen et al., 1987). Group affect was 
validly captured in this study, but its post-task acquisition means it could only serve as a 
correlate of the criterion variables, and not a causal agent. Correlational data such as 
these can suggest measures and future study designs that incorporate latent construct 
measures as indicators of group process and emergent states, particularly for studies of 
organizational teams. Observations gleaned from these correlational data on positive and 
negative affect (among others) may also stimulate theory that leads to future lab studies 
that attempt to manipulate the variables of interest. Given the theoretical importance of 
emotion for creativity, a theoretical integration of affective constructs and group 
analogical distributed cognition is a viable possibility for the future, and one that has little 
precedent in studies of group creativity. 
More generally, all the survey data in this study were captured at the end of the 
task activity, and as mentioned above for positive and negative affect, this introduces the 
possibility that responses to the survey items were influenced in some way by the 
completion of the task itself and by the experimental conditions to which participants 
were assigned, for both interacting group members and for individuals that completed the 
study. These data are more useful for theorizing additional dependent variables and 
process effects of the different experimental conditions, rather than being interpreted as 
additional causal factors that drove creative outcomes in this study. 
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
In addition to making contributions to the group creativity literature, this study 
may suggest some insights for real organizations and managers of creative groups. 
Managers of interacting creative teams are tasked with establishing the team composition 
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and the working context that will enhance creative outcomes and successful innovation. 
Popular wisdom expounds the value of non-evaluative contexts within which individuals 
can feel free to contribute diverse and unconventional ideas (Amabile, 1996, 1998; 
Osborn, 1953). The current study suggests a more nuanced view, and recent theory on 
collaborative creativity also questions the value of suppressing or eliminating an 
evaluative mindset in creative collectives (Harvey, 2014). It may be that managers should 
focus not only on composing teams with diverse knowledge and expertise about the 
subject matter of the task at hand, but should also consider more seriously the 
collaborative processes that creative group members use to generate, integrate, and 
evaluate their diverse inputs. This study suggests that the distributed thinking processes 
employed by creative groups may be just as important as the knowledge inputs they 
possess, in determining how effective they are at extracting and leveraging their 





Table 1: Manipulation check frequency data 
 
Experimental condition key: BRS = Brainstorming; PAO = Problem abstraction only; AO = Analogy only; AR = Analogical 
reasoning. 
Note: 2 participants failed to complete the manipulation check item in the post-task survey.  
 
  
Exp. condition Response to manipulation check item 
 Brainstorming Problem abstraction 
only 
Analogy only Analogical 
reasoning 
 
 Number % Number % Number % Number %  
          
BRS 104 100 0 0 0 0 0 0  
PAO 0 0 105 100 0 0 0 0  
AO 0 0 0 0 111 93 8 7  
AR 0 0 0 0 4 3 125 97  




Table 2: Goals used for categorizing solution ideas 
Goal Code Goal 
G01 prevent shell breakage 
G02 contain/prevent/lessen the chances of a spill 
G03 prevent liquid spills 
G04 protect clothes 
G05 change customer perceptions 
G06 change customer behavior/choice 
G07 acquire solution from outside the creative team 





Table 3: Means used for categorizing solution ideas 
Means code Means 
M01 change design of shell 
M02 use inedible external packaging or wrap 
M03 change internal (not shell) ingredients 
M04 protect clothes with barrier 
M05 use edible outer "wrap" 
M06 use holding device (not a wrap) 
M07 use utensils to eat (no holding) 
M08 change shell ingredients 
M09 change dining furniture 
M10 change overall taco size 
M11 reinterpret the problem as "not a problem" 
M12 shift responsibility or blame to customer 
M13 advertising tactic/promotion 
M14 generic taco design change 
M15 change cooking process 
M16 use customers as solution sources 
M17 add a shell 
M18 provide clothes that are "okay" to spill on 
M19 provide cleaning materials 
M20 "nudist" approach - remove clothes 
M21 research to develop better shell or overall design 
M22 competitive analysis 
M23 give clothes a treatment that makes them stain proof 




Table 4. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
 
 
Variables Mean SD α‡ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9† 10† 11†
1 Individualism 3.07 0.84 0.76
2 Positive affect 3.15 0.45 0.89 -.09
3 Negative affect 1.22 0.18 0.75  .12 -.13
4 Extraversion 4.72 0.88 0.82  .07  .12 -.16
5 Agreeableness 4.98 0.68 0.45   -.31**  .15 -.09 -.11
6 Conscientiousness 5.74 0.58 0.51  .06  .04   -.21**  -.17*  .13
7 Emotional Stability 5.21 0.73 0.67 -.16  .07   -.28** -.03    .24**  .11
8 Openness to Experience 5.13 0.70 0.48  .06    .34** -.09    .27**  .12  .01  .01
9 Cohesion† 6.01 0.49 0.80   .04    .55**  -.14  .13  .06  .04 -.06 .20
10 Task conflict† 4.13 1.08 0.81  -.08   .24*  -.18   .25*  -.22* -.18  .05 .00 .06
11 Psychological Safety† 6.09 0.48 0.60  -.02    .55**  -.19  .08  .07  .04 -.21  .26*   .76** .15
12 TMS† 5.08 0.44 0.78  -.10    .50**  -.11  .17  .19 -.08  .05   .32**   .64** .12 .55**
N = 150, except variables noted with † , which indicates N = 88 (interacting groups).
** p < .01; * p < .05 (2-tailed).
‡Alpha reliabilities for item level data, where applicable.
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Variables Mean SD α‡ 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9† 10† 11†
13 SD_Age 1.02 1.40 -.05 -.15 -.03  .10  .00  .10  .13 .10  -.21 -.11  -.22*
14 Blau_Gender 0.31 0.21  .07  -.18*  .20* -.08  .04 -.07  .03 .05    -.31**  .03 -.14
15 Blau_Ethnicity 0.45 0.20  .09  .01  .20* -.01 -.11 -.04 -.04 .15  .03  .16 -.02
16 Blau_First Language 0.22 0.26  .06  .03  .03  .03 -.10 -.15 -.08 .06  .12  .16  .11
17 Fluency 23.9 11.2    .22** -.05 .06 -.01 -.08 -.08   -.22** -.01 -.10  -.22*  .01
18 Flexibility 0.70 0.11  -.18*  .12 -.08  .04  .03  .12    .24** .02  .14  .06  .00
19 Novelty 4.15 0.53   .17* -.05 -.03  .06  -.17* -.13 -.03 -.20* -.09 -.04 -.01
20 Usefulness 4.33 0.62 -.14  .09 -.02   .19*  .04 -.04  .08 .05 -.07    .24* -.13
21 Overall Creativity 3.63 0.31 -.03 -.10  .03  .05 -.01 -.10  .05 -.18* -.09  .02 -.10
N = 150, except variables noted with † , which indicates N = 88 (interacting groups).
** p < .01; * p < .05 (2-tailed).
‡Alpha reliabilities for item level data, where applicable.
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Variables Mean SD α‡ 12† 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
13 SD_Age 1.02 1.40 -.00
14 Blau_Gender 0.31 0.21 -.05  .11
15 Blau_Ethnicity 0.45 0.20  .08 -.01  .15
16 Blau_First Language 0.22 0.26  .12 -.08  .04    .22**
17 Fluency 23.9 11.2 -.07 .00 .01 -.04 -.04
18 Flexibility 0.70 0.11 -.05  .06 -.12 -.03 .00   -.71**
19 Novelty 4.15 0.53 -.04 -.07 -.04 -.11 .07    .31** -.20*
20 Usefulness 4.33 0.62 -.08 -.08 -.10 -.01 .02   -.36**    .31** .12
21 Overall Creativity 3.63 0.31 -.04 -.06 -.11  .04 -.02 -.06 -.06    .27** .44**
N = 150, except variables noted with † , which indicates N = 88 (interacting groups).
** p < .01; * p < .05 (2-tailed).
‡Alpha reliabilities for item level data, where applicable.
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0.40 22 4.19 0.51 22 3.74 0.57 22
Nominal-groups 4.42 0.38 13 4.12
b
0.56 18 4.35 0.64 13 4.18 0.50 18
Means-that-share-a-superscript-are-significantly-different,-p-<-.025-(2Htailed),-and-the-difference-was-hypothesized.
Hypotheses-tests-conditions Conditions-for-supplemental-analyses
Brainstorming Analogical-Reasoning Problem-abstraction-only Analogy-only
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Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n Mean SD n
Interacting-groups 0.68 0.08 22 0.74a 0.12 22 0.71 0.13 22 0.69 0.10 22
Nominal-groups 0.55 0.08 13 0.63a 0.13 18 0.56 0.14 13 0.63 0.12 18
Means-that-share-a-superscript-are-significantly-different,-p-<-.025-(2Gtailed),-and-the-difference-was-hypothesized.
Hypotheses-tests-conditions Conditions-for-supplemental-analyses
Brainstorming Analogical-Reasoning Problem-abstraction-only Analogy-only
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0.40 22 4.12 0.37 22 3.93 0.38 22
Nominal-groups 4.33 0.33 13 4.05
b
0.61 18 4.15 0.50 13 4.24 0.53 18
Means-that-share-a-superscript-are-significantly-different,-p-<-.025-(2Htailed),-and-the-difference-was-hypothesized.
Hypotheses-tests-conditions Conditions-for-supplemental-analyses
Brainstorming Analogical-Reasoning Problem-abstraction-only Analogy-only
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0.36 22 3.52 0.26 22 3.62 0.33 22
Nominal-groups 3.86 0.46 13 3.51
b
0.33 18 3.74 0.29 13 3.60 0.31 18
Means-that-share-a-superscript-are-significantly-different,-p-<-.025-(2Htailed),-and-the-difference-was-hypothesized.
Hypotheses-tests-conditions Conditions-for-supplemental-analyses























































































































Table 9: Summary of Findings for Hypotheses 
  
  
Summary of Findings for Hypotheses 
No. Hypothesis   p (2-tailed) Support? 
      
1 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher novelty compared to 
interacting groups not using analogical reasoning. 
.020 Y 
    
2 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher flexibility compared to 
interacting groups not using analogical reasoning. 
.084 N 
    
3 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher usefulness compared to 





    
4 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher overall creativity 





    
5 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher novelty compared to 
nominal groups using analogical reasoning. 
.013 Y 
    
6 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher flexibility compared to 
nominal groups using analogical reasoning.  
.014 Y 
    
    
7 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher usefulness compared to 
nominal groups using analogical reasoning.  
.000 Y 
    
8 
Interacting groups using analogical reasoning will produce 
creative problem solutions of higher overall creativity 
compared to nominal groups using analogical reasoning.  
.001 Y 
    




Table 10: Summary of Findings for Hypotheses Tests with Covariates 
 
 
†Hypothesis 2 is unsupported in the original analyses without control variables. 
††Task conflict data were only available for interacting groups. Therefore, the H1-H4 ANCOVA models that included task conflict 
utilized the covariate-adjusted means from interacting groups, and also used the mean square error term from the ANOVA with all eight 
experimental groups included in computing the mean square error terms. 




Hypothesis DV Covariate(s) df t p
1 Novelty (8, 141) 4.87** Individualism 5.27* 141 2.66 .009 Y
(4, 83) 8.56** Task Conflict†† 2.78 83 2.78 .007 Y




Openness to Exp. 5.43*
2† Flexibility (8, 141) 4.89** Individualism 0.12 141 1.78 .077 N
(4, 83) 0.93 Task Conflict†† 0.00 83 1.76 .082 N




Openness to Exp. 0.01
3 Usefulness (8, 141) 15.38** Individualism 0.18 141 8.42 .000 Y
(4, 83) 39.29** Task Conflict†† 0.01 83 8.50 .000 Y




Openness to Exp. 0.01
4 Overall Creativity (8, 141) 3.24** Individualism 0.48 141 3.06 .003 Y
(4, 83) 4.46** Task Conflict†† 1.38 83 3.43 .001 Y















Table 10 (cont’d): Summary of Findings for Hypotheses Tests with Covariates 
 
F statistics: *p < .05; **p < .01 
 
  
Hypothesis DV Covariate(s) df t p
5 Novelty (8, 141) 4.87** Individualism 5.27* 141 3.04 .003 Y




Openness to Exp. 5.43*
6 Flexibility (8, 141) 4.89** Individualism 0.12 141 2.91 .004 Y




Openness to Exp. 0.01
7 Usefulness (8, 141) 15.38** Individualism 0.18 141 8.09 .000 Y




Openness to Exp. 0.01
8 Overall Creativity (8, 141) 3.24** Individualism 0.48 141 3.12 .002 Y
















APPENDIX A: MATERIALS 
Materials are presented in the following order, and each set of materials in the Appendix 
is referenced by its outline number/letter combination below, e.g., 1.a, 3.a.i, etc. 
 
1. Task Instruction Sheet 
a. Experimental condition: Interacting Groups 
b. Experimental condition: Nominal Groups 
2. Idea Sheet 
a. Experimental condition: Interacting Groups 
b. Experimental condition: Nominal Groups 
3. Experimental manipulation materials 
a. Experimental condition: Interacting Groups 
i. Experimental condition: Brainstorming 
ii. Experimental condition: Problem abstraction only 
iii. Experimental condition: Analogy only 
iv. Experimental condition: Analogical reasoning 
b. Experimental condition: Nominal Groups 
i. Experimental condition: Brainstorming 
ii. Experimental condition: Problem abstraction only 
iii. Experimental condition: Analogy only 

















Figure A1. Outline numbering guide to experimental manipulation conditions and 
materials presented in Appendix A. 
  
3.a.i 3.a.ii 3.a.iii 3.a.iv 
















TASK INSTRUCTIONS [1.a: INTERACTING GROUPS] 
 
A popular Mexican fast food restaurant has hired your team to help them solve an 
important problem. They’ve recently introduced a new, different hard shell taco that is 
very popular with their customers, but they’ve gotten a lot of feedback from customers 
that indicates a problem. 
 
Customers are complaining that, even though the tacos are delicious, they fall apart too 
easily when the customers eat them, AND – this tends to mess up their clothes. 




YOUR CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING TASK 
 
Work together as a team to think of as many ideas as you can that might solve this 
“fragile taco/messy clothes” problem. The goal is to help customers keep their clothes 






GENERAL TIPS FOR CREATIVE THINKING 
 
We want you to be as creative as you can be. Creative ideas usually have some element 
of NOVELTY to them, i.e., they are unique and unusual in some way. 
 
 
The following tips usually help for creative thinking: 
 
1. Try to generate as many ideas as you can 
2. Try to think broadly, i.e., “think outside the box” 
3. Write ALL your ideas down, and  
4. Indicate where the ideas came from 
5. It’s okay to provide a sketch or basic drawing if you want (but don’t spend too much 
time on this) 
 
FINALLY – A REMINDER: please remember to WRITE EVERY IDEA DOWN, even 
if you later decide it doesn’t seem like a good solution because it’s too crazy or weird. 
And, make sure to WRITE DOWN WHERE YOU GOT THE IDEA FROM, e.g., if you 
remembered something else that led you to the idea. 
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TASK INSTRUCTIONS [1.b: NOMINAL GROUPS] 
 
A popular Mexican fast food restaurant has hired you to help them solve an important 
problem. They’ve recently introduced a new, different hard shell taco that is very popular 
with their customers, but they’ve gotten a lot of feedback from customers that indicates a 
problem. 
 
Customers are complaining that, even though the tacos are delicious, they fall apart too 
easily when the customers eat them, AND – this tends to mess up their clothes. 




YOUR CREATIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING TASK 
 
Try to think of as many ideas as you can that might solve this “fragile taco/messy 
clothes” problem. The goal is to help customers keep their clothes from getting messed 





GENERAL TIPS FOR CREATIVE THINKING 
 
We want you to be as creative as you can be. Creative ideas usually have some element 
of NOVELTY to them, i.e., they are unique and unusual in some way. 
 
 
The following tips usually help for creative thinking: 
 
1. Try to generate as many ideas as you can 
2. Try to think broadly, i.e., “think outside the box” 
3. Write ALL your ideas down, and  
4. Indicate where the ideas came from 
5. It’s okay to provide a sketch or basic drawing if you want (but don’t spend too much 
time on this) 
 
FINALLY – A REMINDER: please remember to WRITE EVERY IDEA DOWN, even 
if you later decide it doesn’t seem like a good solution because it’s too crazy or weird. 
And, make sure to WRITE DOWN WHERE YOU GOT THE IDEA FROM, e.g., if you 
remembered something else that led you to the idea. 
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IDEA SHEET [2.a: INTERACTING GROUPS] 
 








































IDEA SHEET [2.b: NOMINAL GROUPS] 
 




































(MANIPULATION: 3.a.i: INTERACTING 
GROUP/BRAINSTORMING CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you and your teammates are going to work together to think of creative 
solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want you to read a couple of internet blog 
entries that discuss brainstorming – a technique for generating ideas. 
 
 
[BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER ONE] 
Brainstorming…Fast and Fun! 
How many times have you come out of a brainstorming session feeling unsatisfied with 
the results?  The team never felt like it got into a rhythm.  The idea flow felt like a drizzle 
versus a storm.  None of the ideas that the team spent much time on seemed especially 
good (BTW, you should never spend a lot of time on any one idea in a brainstorming 
session).  There was one or two people that insisted on dominating the conversation and 
ended up speaking way too much.  This to the frustration of the rest of the group.  The 
good news is that there are just a handful of things you need to do to run a productive and 
fun brainstorming session. 
The overall goal of any brainstorming is to generate a high quantity of ideas.  This is 
really important … it’s all about quantity, NOT quality.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity after brainstorming to evaluate the quality of the ideas generated and select a 
winner. 
So if our goal is quantity, what strategies can we employ to accomplish this?  Well, we 
want to eliminate as many barriers to idea flow as we can.  The two main barriers to 
idea flow are stress/tension and the left-brain’s need to constantly evaluate 
things. When you are stressed, it is very difficult to think about anything else other than 
that feeling of stress and maybe what is causing it.  Therefore, our strategy is to be 
relaxed and to conduct the brainstorming at such a fast pace, that the left-brain doesn’t 
have time to interrupt our flow. 
When brainstorming, the process is broken up into three parts: 
• Setting the Stage 
• Idea Generation 





SETTING THE STAGE 
This is when you communicate the objectives, set the tone for the brainstorming, and 
instruct everyone on how it will be run. 
Make the objective Clear 
Ensure that everyone in the room clearly understands what the purpose of the 
brainstorming is.  What is the issue that you are all generating ideas for?  Write it down 
as a title at the top of the whiteboard or computer screen. 
Setting the Tone 
Like I mentioned before, you want the meeting to be relaxed and light-hearted, but at 
the same time its purpose should be very clear. 
It’s your facial expressions, body language, and tone that will have the biggest effect over 
how relaxed the team will be going into the brainstorming session. 
Prior to the meeting, do those things that relax you and put you into a great mood.  It 
could be avoiding that extra cup of coffee, waiting until later to read that upset email 
from a customer, or reading Dilbert.  Figure out what works for you and do it.  You 
should also anticipate that the session will be fun and productive.  This “positive 
visualization” technique used by athletes is very applicable here. 
Smile.  If you are already relaxed this won’t be hard, and you certainly don’t want to 
force one.  If you smile when explaining how this session will be run, everyone will be 
more relaxed about it. 
This may or may not work for you, but I used to keep a box of toys which I would bring 
with me to every brainstorming session.  It would contain colorful and simple physical 
puzzles.  The idea was that toys automatically set a more light-hearted tone in the 
room.  They also gave people something to fiddle with and didn’t require any of their real 
mental capacity, which I wanted them to save for idea generation. 
Brainstorming Instructions 
No matter if this is the first, second, tenth, or hundredth session you have had with this 
group, always start by reviewing the ground rules for the session.  It helps to establish the 
pace you are after, and it minimizes the chances of anyone being offended by any actions 
during the session. 
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These are the instructions you should provide the team before brainstorming begins. 
• Our goal is to fill this [screen | whiteboard | paper] with as many ideas as possible. 
• The faster we can generate ideas, the better.  Let them flow! 
• Any and every idea is welcome, including the crazy ones 
• Don’t provide any negative or positive critique of any idea. 
• Mis-spelled words are ok.  Don’t break our rhythm to provide spelling corrections. 
• The wrong organization of ideas is ok.  When the ideas are captured in an outline or 
mind map, it is ok if ideas go in the wrong place.  That can be fixed later. 
• No one idea will be discussed longer than 10 seconds.  Anything that requires more 
will be listed on the “Discussion List”.  The team will return to items on this list 
when idea generation is done.  We do this because we want to maintain 
momentum. 
• Interruptions are ok, and even encouraged, so speak up. 
• And HAVE FUN! 
 
RUNNING THE ACTUAL BRAINSTORMING SESSION 
Plan to capture the ideas in a way that is comfortable and fast for you, and visible to the 
entire team.  You could use the whiteboard, a large pad of paper, or in Word or Excel 
(Pages or Numbers for us Mac folks). Whichever you use is fine, just make sure you are 
totally fast and comfortable.  The last thing you want to do is slow down the team 
because you are struggling with the tool. 
Say the first few ideas and capture them quickly.  Prior to the meeting, try to have some 
ideas in your hip pocket.  You will use them to prime the pump. 
If no one else offers up any ideas right away, turn to the team with the best look of 
anticipation you can muster.  If still nothing, quickly adding some additional ideas of 
your own.  Do this a couple of times and the ideas should start coming. 
You should be quickly writing or typing the ideas.  This will convey the fast pace you 
wish to achieve in the brainstorming. 
If anyone breaks a rule such as criticizing ideas or correcting spelling, just provide a 
quick and gentle reminder that it isn’t necessary and move on. 
If anyone begins to settle into a long description of an idea, just say “that’s good stuff, 
but we need to keep our momentum going. Let’s come back to that“. Then make note of 




If you find yourself struggling to capture all the ideas because they are coming so 
fast … Congratulations, you are running a fantastic brainstorming session!  Let 
yourself smile in a big way and let the team see that.  It’s great positive 
reinforcement for everyone in the room. 
WRAPPING UP THE SESSION 
A really productive brainstorming session usually runs no more than 30 minutes.  I 
wouldn’t put a time constraint on it though.  Just let it run out on its own.  Once the team 
has decided that idea generation is done, return to those items that were put on the 
Discussion List.  Let people finish expressing the thoughts that they had earlier.  This 
could lead to a few more ideas being captured.  Depending on the amount of time 
remaining, the team may want to identify which of the ideas are the best.  You can do it 
together as a group or individually after the meeting is done. 
But remember, that long list of ideas was the deliverable you were going after.  Having it 
means that your brainstorming session was a success. 
SUMMARY 
The best way to run a productive brainstorming session is to make it fast and fun.  You 
make it fun by getting yourself and the team into a relaxed state.  And you make it fast so 
that your left-brain doesn’t have time to stifle your right-brain’s creativity. 
And remember, to come up with a few high-quality ideas, you must first produce a high-
quantity of ideas.  So play the numbers game and generate lots of ideas during your 
brainstorming sessions. 
 
Good luck, and have fun! 





[BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER TWO] 
6 Tips for More Productive Brainstorming Sessions 
 
You’re sitting down with people throwing ideas around. You’re writing stuff down more 
than usual. You’re keeping an eye out for a standout idea that you can roll with. You’re 
storming that brain. You’re brainstorming. 
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The generation of ideas, to any team, is no doubt important. For example, at Design 
Instruct, we meet and talk about future projects, we throw around ideas about artists we 
like and the work they do, we attempt to come up with fresh content ideas and new site 
features, and so on. Brainstorming is an important part of what we do. 
Throughout the course of working closely together, we’ve discovered a few tips and 
tricks that often lead to great ideas after a brainstorming session. We thought we’d share 
some of them with you. 
1. Create a Positive Atmosphere for Your Brainstorming Session 
It’s easy to think of meetings as boring, dreadful, painful and anxiety-inducing periods of 
time. Oftentimes, as a meeting participant or facilitator, you wish you could be doing 
something else. Sometimes people get called out, put on the spot, and fingers get pointed. 
Meetings are frequently perceived to be boring because they’re repetitive and drudgingly 
systematic. 
If you want to conduct an effective brainstorming session, it’s important that the 
atmosphere is fun, positive, welcoming and judgment-free. This way, the meeting 
participants won’t hesitate to share their ideas for fear of ridicule or reprimand from their 
peers. 
2. Lay Out the Ground Rules 
Clarity. It’s sort of become a buzzword around the office for us. Clarity is a virtue. It’s 
the starting point for most of what we do. 
It’s often said that there are no bad ideas in brainstorming. This is true. But there are 
ideas that just waste time and produce no actionable outcomes at all. These are the 
"ideas" that people throw out there to be funny or to add levity with no real substance. 
Remember this: Respect the process of generating ideas. Otherwise, you’re just wasting 
everyone’s time. 
You have to keep brainstorming focused. Do this by clarifying the objectives and the 
goals of a new project, and have everyone start from that point of clarity. 
If what we’re trying to achieve is clear, then every idea born out of a brainstorming 
session also inherits that same clarity. 
At the end of your brainstorming session, you’ll be left with a few really good ideas, and 
the only decision you need to make is to pick out the best ones to move forward with. 
3. Don’t Overlook Ideas that Aren’t Everyone’s Favorite 
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As long as an idea adheres to the objectives and the goals of the project, it should be 
considered as a viable option. 
At the very least, you should look at an idea as a jumping-off point for other ideas. Or 
you can take all these not-so-good ideas and synthesize them into one really good one; a 
sort of Frankenstein’s monster of an idea. 
4. Throw Away Ideas that Just Won’t Work 
Sometimes we get attached to ideas we come up with just by the mere fact that we came 
up with it. I do it all the time. I fall in love with an idea because I think it’s clever or cool 
or I think it will be a hit, even if all indications point to the contrary. 
However, again, be clear about what you need from the idea. 
Not every idea you come up with will be a hit. That’s impossible. In fact, I think most of 
you will agree that most ideas you come up with aren’t going to be good. Therefore, you 
have to get rid of all of them. Throw them out there, put these ideas on the table and let 
them go. Let them float into the ether and be done with it. Those ideas were never yours 
to begin with. They’re just vague abstractions: Notions that may have seemed good in 
your head, but with no real substance or no real chance of being successful. 
The only time you can claim an idea as yours is when it’s good enough for you to put it 
into action. That’s the only time an idea actually starts to exist. It only becomes tangible 
and concrete when there’s a chance of it being successful. 
5. Don’t Tune Out When Things Don’t Go Your Way 
Sometimes you won’t agree with the direction the idea-generation process is taking. And 
if you’re like me, your stubbornness and hardheadedness will tell you to just tune out, 
stop listening and stop contributing. 
Fight the urge to shut off from the brainstorming session! 
No good can come from shutting down. By not participating, you’ve just cut the team’s 
efficacy by one person. That’s one less brain, one less idea, and one less thoughtful 
insight. 
Tuning out is not good for the brainstorming atmosphere. It isn’t good for morale. 
Try this instead: Voice out what’s bothering you about the brainstorming session. It 
won’t matter if you get angry or too impassioned with what bothers you. In fact, it might 
help the group better understand the pitfalls of the direction they’re headed. 
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Think about it this way: If someone disagrees, it means that the idea in question isn’t 
completely solid. There are still holes to be filled. The fact that you disagree is ultimately 
good for the outcome of the project. 
6. Pragmatism First, Vision (Immediately) Second 
Let’s face it: You need to achieve something with your ideas. That’s what brainstorming 
is for. You address some issues and you formulate solutions. It’s immediate. Your project 
is the task at hand. Therefore, you have to treat it as such. 
Don’t let your idea get bigger than it needs to be right now. 
Most creative people have great vision. Ideas will sometimes get out of hand, and they 
become these big, world-changing, life-defining things that get cumbersome and 
unwieldy when you do try to move them into action. 
Some of the biggest ideas today started out very small and simple. However, if you study 
these ideas (e.g. Google’s search, Apple’s products, etc.) you’ll see that they started out 
from a place of clarity. They addressed specific needs and objectives. They were simple. 
Start there with your idea and let it grow. 
Vision is important, but it can’t be the driving force behind the actual work and the time 
that needs to be put into getting an idea off the ground. 
Vision is limitless for many people, and that’s never helpful when you have real, 
immediate objectives and needs for a project. 
Vision merely guides an idea. Pragmatism is the thing that pushes it forward. 
Share Your Own Brainstorming Session Tips! 
• How does your company produce ideas in teams? 
• In your experience, what strategies and techniques yield better and more productive 
brainstorming sessions? 
Did you apply any of the tips mentioned above in your last brainstorming session? 
 
 





We would like you to use these ideas about brainstorming today to help solve the 
creative problem we give you.  
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(MANIPULATION: 3.a.ii: INTERACTING GROUP/PROBLEM 
ABSTRACTION ONLY CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you and your teammates are going to work together to think of creative 
solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want to teach you some thinking techniques that 
we would like your group to use. They involve using brainstorming techniques 
and thinking about problems in an abstract way. 
 
 
Brainstorming…Fast and Fun! 
How many times have you come out of a brainstorming session feeling unsatisfied with 
the results?  The team never felt like it got into a rhythm.  The idea flow felt like a drizzle 
versus a storm.  None of the ideas that the team spent much time on seemed especially 
good (BTW, you should never spend a lot of time on any one idea in a brainstorming 
session).  There was one or two people that insisted on dominating the conversation and 
ended up speaking way too much.  This to the frustration of the rest of the group.  The 
good news is that there are just a handful of things you need to do to run a productive and 
fun brainstorming session. 
The overall goal of any brainstorming is to generate a high quantity of ideas.  This is 
really important … it’s all about quantity, NOT quality.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity after brainstorming to evaluate the quality of the ideas generated and select a 
winner. 
So if our goal is quantity, what strategies can we employ to accomplish this?  Well, we 
want to eliminate as many barriers to idea flow as we can.  The two main barriers to 
idea flow are stress/tension and the left-brain’s need to constantly evaluate 
things. When you are stressed, it is very difficult to think about anything else other than 
that feeling of stress and maybe what is causing it.  Therefore, our strategy is to be 
relaxed and to conduct the brainstorming at such a fast pace, that the left-brain doesn’t 
have time to interrupt our flow. 
When brainstorming, the process is broken up into three parts: 
• Setting the Stage 
• Idea Generation 





SETTING THE STAGE 
This is when you communicate the objectives, set the tone for the brainstorming, and 
instruct everyone on how it will be run. 
Make the objective Clear 
Ensure that everyone in the room clearly understands what the purpose of the 
brainstorming is.  What is the issue that you are all generating ideas for?  Write it down 
as a title at the top of the whiteboard or computer screen. 
Setting the Tone 
Like I mentioned before, you want the meeting to be relaxed and light-hearted, but at 
the same time its purpose should be very clear. 
It’s your facial expressions, body language, and tone that will have the biggest effect over 
how relaxed the team will be going into the brainstorming session. 
Prior to the meeting, do those things that relax you and put you into a great mood.  It 
could be avoiding that extra cup of coffee, waiting until later to read that upset email 
from a customer, or reading Dilbert.  Figure out what works for you and do it.  You 
should also anticipate that the session will be fun and productive.  This”positive 
visualization” technique used by athletes is very applicable here. 
Smile.  If you are already relaxed this won’t be hard, and you certainly don’t want to 
force one.  If you smile when explaining how this session will be run, everyone will be 
more relaxed about it. 
This may or may not work for you, but I used to keep a box of toys which I would bring 
with me to every brainstorming session.  It would contain colorful and simple physical 
puzzles.  The idea was that toys automatically set a more light-hearted tone in the 
room.  They also gave people something to fiddle with and didn’t require any of their real 
mental capacity, which I wanted them to save for idea generation. 
Brainstorming Instructions 
No matter if this is the first, second, tenth, or hundredth session you have had with this 
group, always start by reviewing the ground rules for the session.  It helps to establish the 
pace you are after, and it minimizes the chances of anyone being offended by any actions 
during the session. 
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These are the instructions you should provide the team before brainstorming begins. 
• Our goal is to fill this [screen | whiteboard | paper] with as many ideas as possible. 
• The faster we can generate ideas, the better.  Let them flow! 
• Any and every idea is welcome, including the crazy ones 
• Don’t provide any negative or positive critique of any idea. 
• Mis-spelled words are ok.  Don’t break our rhythm to provide spelling corrections. 
• The wrong organization of ideas is ok.  When the ideas are captured in an outline or 
mind map, it is ok if ideas go in the wrong place.  That can be fixed later. 
• No one idea will be discussed longer than 10 seconds.  Anything that requires more 
will be listed on the “Discussion List”.  The team will return to items on this list 
when idea generation is done.  We do this because we want to maintain 
momentum. 
• Interruptions are ok, and even encouraged, so speak up. 
• And HAVE FUN! 
 
RUNNING THE ACTUAL BRAINSTORMING SESSION 
Plan to capture the ideas in a way that is comfortable and fast for you, and visible to the 
entire team.  You could use the whiteboard, a large pad of paper, or in Word or Excel 
(Pages or Numbers for us Mac folks). Whichever you use is fine, just make sure you are 
totally fast and comfortable.  The last thing you want to do is slow down the team 
because you are struggling with the tool. 
Say the first few ideas and capture them quickly.  Prior to the meeting, try to have some 
ideas in your hip pocket.  You will use them to prime the pump. 
If no one else offers up any ideas right away, turn to the team with the best look of 
anticipation you can muster.  If still nothing, quickly adding some additional ideas of 
your own.  Do this a couple of times and the ideas should start coming. 
You should be quickly writing or typing the ideas.  This will convey the fast pace you 
wish to achieve in the brainstorming. 
If anyone breaks a rule such as criticizing ideas or correcting spelling, just provide a 
quick and gentle reminder that it isn’t necessary and move on. 
If anyone begins to settle into a long description of an idea, just say “that’s good stuff, 
but we need to keep our momentum going. Let’s come back to that“. Then make note of 
it on the “Discussion List”, and then encourage the team to start generating ideas again. 
If you find yourself struggling to capture all the ideas because they are coming so fast … 
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Congratulations, you are running a fantastic brainstorming session!  Let yourself smile in 
a big way and let the team see that.  It’s great positive reinforcement for everyone in the 
room. 
WRAPPING UP THE SESSION 
A really productive brainstorming session usually runs no more than 30 minutes.  I 
wouldn’t put a time constraint on it though.  Just let it run out on its own.  Once the team 
has decided that idea generation is done, return to those items that were put on the 
Discussion List.  Let people finish expressing the thoughts that they had earlier.  This 
could lead to a few more ideas being captured.  Depending on the amount of time 
remaining, the team may want to identify which of the ideas are the best.  You can do it 
together as a group or individually after the meeting is done. 
But remember, that long list of ideas was the deliverable you were going after.  Having it 
means that your brainstorming session was a success. 
SUMMARY 
The best way to run a productive brainstorming session is to make it fast and fun.  You 
make it fun by getting yourself and the team into a relaxed state.  And you make it fast so 
that your left-brain doesn’t have time to stifle your right-brain’s creativity. 
And remember, to come up with a few high-quality ideas, you must first produce a high-
quantity of ideas.  So play the numbers game and generate lots of ideas during your 
brainstorming sessions. 
 
Good luck, and have fun! 








Thinking about problems in an abstract way 
 
In creative problem solving, it is often important to consider how you define the 
problem itself. Thinking of the problem in an abstract way can often help your 
group be creative. By abstract, we mean that you think very generally about the 
underlying problem situation, without focusing on specific details that are part of 
the problem. 
 
For example, suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that 
grocery shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than 
they can fit in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this 
situation, you are given the following specific design problem: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of reusable 
grocery bag that will stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, to think of this more abstractly, we can restate the problem by replacing 
specific words with more general words: 
 
(More abstract!): You need to design a new kind of shopping 
bag that will expand to fit more shopping items inside it. 
 
Now, even more abstractly, we can write: 
 
(Even more abstract!): You need to design a new kind of 
container that can change to fit more items inside it. 
 
 
Now, here’s why this thinking technique helps: abstract problem statements 
sometimes remind you of other specific examples that fit the abstract statements. 
Those specific examples might give you some creative ideas about how to solve 






We’d like you to practice this abstract technique so that we know you understand 
how to do it. Take the following specific problem and write it in an abstract form, 
and then in an even more abstract form: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of outdoor 
urban garden hose that stretches out and gets long when the cold 
water supply is turned on, but that also shortens and takes up very 
little space when the cold water supply is turned off. 
 
 














We would like you to use abstract problem definition techniques and these ideas 





[NOTICE: THIS MANIPULATION EXAMPLE PAIRS THE 
PROBLEM ABSTRACTION ONLY READING WITH 
BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER ONE. BRAINSTORMING 
BLOG NUMBER TWO WAS ALSO USED WITH THE PROBLEM 
ABSTRACTION ONLY READING, BUT THAT COMBINATION 
IS OMITTED HERE TO SAVE SPACE]
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(MANIPULATION: 3.a.iii: INTERACTING GROUP/ANALOGY 
ONLY CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you and your teammates are going to work together to think of creative 
solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want to teach you some thinking techniques that 
we would like your group to use. They involve using brainstorming techniques 
and using analogical thinking. 
 
 
Brainstorming…Fast and Fun! 
How many times have you come out of a brainstorming session feeling unsatisfied with 
the results?  The team never felt like it got into a rhythm.  The idea flow felt like a drizzle 
versus a storm.  None of the ideas that the team spent much time on seemed especially 
good (BTW, you should never spend a lot of time on any one idea in a brainstorming 
session).  There was one or two people that insisted on dominating the conversation and 
ended up speaking way too much.  This to the frustration of the rest of the group.  The 
good news is that there are just a handful of things you need to do to run a productive and 
fun brainstorming session. 
The overall goal of any brainstorming is to generate a high quantity of ideas.  This is 
really important … it’s all about quantity, NOT quality.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity after brainstorming to evaluate the quality of the ideas generated and select a 
winner. 
So if our goal is quantity, what strategies can we employ to accomplish this?  Well, we 
want to eliminate as many barriers to idea flow as we can.  The two main barriers to 
idea flow are stress/tension and the left-brain’s need to constantly evaluate 
things. When you are stressed, it is very difficult to think about anything else other than 
that feeling of stress and maybe what is causing it.  Therefore, our strategy is to be 
relaxed and to conduct the brainstorming at such a fast pace, that the left-brain doesn’t 
have time to interrupt our flow. 
When brainstorming, the process is broken up into three parts: 
• Setting the Stage 
• Idea Generation 





SETTING THE STAGE 
This is when you communicate the objectives, set the tone for the brainstorming, and 
instruct everyone on how it will be run. 
Make the objective Clear 
Ensure that everyone in the room clearly understands what the purpose of the 
brainstorming is.  What is the issue that you are all generating ideas for?  Write it down 
as a title at the top of the whiteboard or computer screen. 
Setting the Tone 
Like I mentioned before, you want the meeting to be relaxed and light-hearted, but at 
the same time its purpose should be very clear. 
It’s your facial expressions, body language, and tone that will have the biggest effect over 
how relaxed the team will be going into the brainstorming session. 
Prior to the meeting, do those things that relax you and put you into a great mood.  It 
could be avoiding that extra cup of coffee, waiting until later to read that upset email 
from a customer, or reading Dilbert.  Figure out what works for you and do it.  You 
should also anticipate that the session will be fun and productive.  This”positive 
visualization” technique used by athletes is very applicable here. 
Smile.  If you are already relaxed this won’t be hard, and you certainly don’t want to 
force one.  If you smile when explaining how this session will be run, everyone will be 
more relaxed about it. 
This may or may not work for you, but I used to keep a box of toys which I would bring 
with me to every brainstorming session.  It would contain colorful and simple physical 
puzzles.  The idea was that toys automatically set a more light-hearted tone in the 
room.  They also gave people something to fiddle with and didn’t require any of their real 





No matter if this is the first, second, tenth, or hundredth session you have had with this 
group, always start by reviewing the ground rules for the session.  It helps to establish the 
pace you are after, and it minimizes the chances of anyone being offended by any actions 
during the session. 
These are the instructions you should provide the team before brainstorming begins. 
• Our goal is to fill this [screen | whiteboard | paper] with as many ideas as possible. 
• The faster we can generate ideas, the better.  Let them flow! 
• Any and every idea is welcome, including the crazy ones 
• Don’t provide any negative or positive critique of any idea. 
• Mis-spelled words are ok.  Don’t break our rhythm to provide spelling corrections. 
• The wrong organization of ideas is ok.  When the ideas are captured in an outline or 
mind map, it is ok if ideas go in the wrong place.  That can be fixed later. 
• No one idea will be discussed longer than 10 seconds.  Anything that requires more 
will be listed on the “Discussion List”.  The team will return to items on this list 
when idea generation is done.  We do this because we want to maintain 
momentum. 
• Interruptions are ok, and even encouraged, so speak up. 
• And HAVE FUN! 
 
RUNNING THE ACTUAL BRAINSTORMING SESSION 
Plan to capture the ideas in a way that is comfortable and fast for you, and visible to the 
entire team.  You could use the whiteboard, a large pad of paper, or in Word or Excel 
(Pages or Numbers for us Mac folks). Whichever you use is fine, just make sure you are 
totally fast and comfortable.  The last thing you want to do is slow down the team 
because you are struggling with the tool. 
Say the first few ideas and capture them quickly.  Prior to the meeting, try to have some 
ideas in your hip pocket.  You will use them to prime the pump. 
If no one else offers up any ideas right away, turn to the team with the best look of 
anticipation you can muster.  If still nothing, quickly adding some additional ideas of 
your own.  Do this a couple of times and the ideas should start coming. 
You should be quickly writing or typing the ideas.  This will convey the fast pace you 
wish to achieve in the brainstorming. 
If anyone breaks a rule such as criticizing ideas or correcting spelling, just provide a 
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quick and gentle reminder that it isn’t necessary and move on. 
If anyone begins to settle into a long description of an idea, just say “that’s good stuff, 
but we need to keep our momentum going. Let’s come back to that“. Then make note of 
it on the “Discussion List”, and then encourage the team to start generating ideas again. 
If you find yourself struggling to capture all the ideas because they are coming so fast … 
Congratulations, you are running a fantastic brainstorming session!  Let yourself smile in 
a big way and let the team see that.  It’s great positive reinforcement for everyone in the 
room. 
WRAPPING UP THE SESSION 
A really productive brainstorming session usually runs no more than 30 minutes.  I 
wouldn’t put a time constraint on it though.  Just let it run out on its own.  Once the team 
has decided that idea generation is done, return to those items that were put on the 
Discussion List.  Let people finish expressing the thoughts that they had earlier.  This 
could lead to a few more ideas being captured.  Depending on the amount of time 
remaining, the team may want to identify which of the ideas are the best.  You can do it 
together as a group or individually after the meeting is done. 
But remember, that long list of ideas was the deliverable you were going after.  Having it 
means that your brainstorming session was a success. 
SUMMARY 
The best way to run a productive brainstorming session is to make it fast and fun.  You 
make it fun by getting yourself and the team into a relaxed state.  And you make it fast so 
that your left-brain doesn’t have time to stifle your right-brain’s creativity. 
And remember, to come up with a few high-quality ideas, you must first produce a high-
quantity of ideas.  So play the numbers game and generate lots of ideas during your 
brainstorming sessions. 
 
Good luck, and have fun! 












Analogical thinking can help you find a creative solution to a problem you’re 
facing, by using knowledge you already have about similar problems and their 
solutions. 
 
There are three basic steps that help you use analogical thinking. Here’s an 
example to teach you the three steps: 
 
Suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that grocery 
shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than they can fit 
in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this situation, you 
are given the following specific design problem: 
 
You need to design a new kind of reusable grocery bag that will 
stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, here are the three basic steps for analogical thinking that will help you 
solve the problem: 
 
STEP 1) Define the problem in general (abstract) terms. 
 
A more general statement of this problem might be something like this: 
 
You need to design a new kind of container that can change to fit 
more items inside it.  
 
STEP 2) Search your memory to find other problems that fit this general 
description 
For instance, you might remember an example like this: 
You once saw a TV show about a certain bird that carries seeds around in its 
mouth. But sometimes, the bird wants to carry more seeds than it can fit in its 
mouth. This kind of bird has an extendable pouch in its mouth that allows it to 
store many more seeds than its mouth could hold otherwise. The pouch wall is 
thin, wrinkled, and elastic, and stretches as seeds are added. This example fits the 
general problem description, because the bird’s extendable pouch is a “container 





STEP 3) See if you can use the solution to this other problem to generate 
ideas for solving your current problem, by drawing an analogy. 
 
So, if we compare the grocery bag design situation to the bird example, we can 
make a diagram to help us draw an analogy between the two. See if you can draw 
the analogy by filling in the blank rectangle spaces on the right side of the 
diagram below (the first rectangle is filled in for you). Also, see if drawing this 
analogy helps you think of a solution for the grocery bag problem: 
 
Bird Example Grocery bag problem 
 
 
Birds      carry      seeds          in Shoppers      carry          in 
     
their          mouths their    
      
     
 
But sometimes,      birds         want to carry  But sometimes,                        want to carry 
 
more      seeds       than their      mouths  more   than their  
 
will hold. will hold. 
 
The solution is an         extendable pouch One solution is an                  
  
 
built into the      bird’s             mouth built into the  
 
 
After drawing this analogy, you could try to think of another example that fits the 
general problem definition, and draw another analogy between it and the grocery 




We would like you to use these ideas about brainstorming and about 






[NOTICE: THIS MANIPULATION EXAMPLE PAIRS THE ANALOGICAL 
REASONING READING WITH BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER ONE. 
BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER TWO WAS ALSO USED WITH THE 
ANALOGICAL REASONING READING, BUT THAT COMBINATION IS 





(MANIPULATION: 3.a.iv: INTERACTING GROUP/ANALOGICAL 
REASONING CONDITION) 
 
Today, you and your teammates are going to work together to think of creative 
solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want to teach you some thinking techniques that 
we would like your group to use. They involve thinking about problems in an 
abstract way and using analogical thinking. 
 
 
Thinking about problems in an abstract way 
 
In creative problem solving, it is often important to consider how you define the 
problem itself. Thinking of the problem in an abstract way can often help your 
group be creative. By abstract, we mean that you think very generally about the 
underlying problem situation, without focusing on specific details that are part of 
the problem. 
 
For example, suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that 
grocery shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than 
they can fit in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this 
situation, you are given the following specific design problem: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of reusable 
grocery bag that will stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, to think of this more abstractly, we can restate the problem by replacing 
specific words with more general words: 
 
(More abstract!): You need to design a new kind of shopping 
bag that will expand to fit more shopping items inside it. 
 
Now, even more abstractly, we can write: 
 
(Even more abstract!): You need to design a new kind of 
container that can change to fit more items inside it. 
 
 
Now, here’s why this thinking technique helps: abstract problem statements 
sometimes remind you of other specific examples that fit the abstract statements. 
Those specific examples might give you some creative ideas about how to solve 
the actual problem you’re working on. 
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We’d like you to practice this abstract technique so that we know you understand how to 
do it. Take the following specific problem and write it in an abstract form, and then in an 
even more abstract form: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of outdoor 
urban garden hose that stretches out and gets long when the cold 
water supply is turned on, but that also shortens and takes up very 
little space when the cold water supply is turned off. 
 
 




















Analogical thinking can help you find a creative solution to a problem you’re 
facing, by using knowledge you already have about similar problems and their 
solutions. 
 
There are three basic steps that help you use analogical thinking. Here’s an 
example to teach you the three steps: 
 
Suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that grocery 
shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than they can fit 
in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this situation, you 
are given the following specific design problem: 
 
You need to design a new kind of reusable grocery bag that will 
stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, here are the three basic steps for analogical thinking that will help you 
solve the problem: 
 
STEP 1) Define the problem in general (abstract) terms. 
 
A more general statement of this problem might be something like this: 
 
You need to design a new kind of container that can change to fit 
more items inside it.  
 
STEP 2) Search your memory to find other problems that fit this general 
description 
For instance, you might remember an example like this: 
You once saw a TV show about a certain bird that carries seeds around in its 
mouth. But sometimes, the bird wants to carry more seeds than it can fit in its 
mouth. This kind of bird has an extendable pouch in its mouth that allows it to 
store many more seeds than its mouth could hold otherwise. The pouch wall is 
thin, wrinkled, and elastic, and stretches as seeds are added. This example fits the 
general problem description, because the bird’s extendable pouch is a “container 





STEP 3) See if you can use the solution to this other problem to generate 
ideas for solving your current problem, by drawing an analogy. 
 
So, if we compare the grocery bag design situation to the bird example, we can 
make a diagram to help us draw an analogy between the two. See if you can draw 
the analogy by filling in the blank rectangle spaces on the right side of the 
diagram below (the first rectangle is filled in for you). Also, see if drawing this 
analogy helps you think of a solution for the grocery bag problem: 
 
Bird Example Grocery bag problem 
 
 
Birds      carry      seeds          in Shoppers      carry          in 
     
their          mouths their    
      
     
 
But sometimes,      birds         want to carry  But sometimes,                        want to carry 
 
more      seeds       than their      mouths  more   than their  
 
will hold. will hold. 
 
The solution is an         extendable pouch One solution is an                  
  
 
built into the      bird’s             mouth built into the  
 
 
After drawing this analogy, you could try to think of another example that fits the 
general problem definition, and draw another analogy between it and the grocery 




We would like you to use these ideas about thinking of problems abstractly 








(MANIPULATION: 3.b.i: NOMINAL GROUP/BRAINSTORMING 
CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you are going to think of creative solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want you to read a couple of internet blog 
entries that discuss brainstorming – a technique for generating ideas. 
 
 
[BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER ONE] 
Brainstorming…Fast and Fun!  
How many times have you come out of a brainstorming session feeling unsatisfied with 
the results?  The team never felt like it got into a rhythm.  The idea flow felt like a drizzle 
versus a storm.  None of the ideas that the team spent much time on seemed especially 
good (BTW, you should never spend a lot of time on any one idea in a brainstorming 
session).  There was one or two people that insisted on dominating the conversation and 
ended up speaking way too much.  This to the frustration of the rest of the group.  The 
good news is that there are just a handful of things you need to do to run a productive and 
fun brainstorming session. 
The overall goal of any brainstorming is to generate a high quantity of ideas.  This is 
really important … it’s all about quantity, NOT quality.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity after brainstorming to evaluate the quality of the ideas generated and select a 
winner. 
So if our goal is quantity, what strategies can we employ to accomplish this?  Well, we 
want to eliminate as many barriers to idea flow as we can.  The two main barriers to 
idea flow are stress/tension and the left-brain’s need to constantly evaluate 
things. When you are stressed, it is very difficult to think about anything else other than 
that feeling of stress and maybe what is causing it.  Therefore, our strategy is to be 
relaxed and to conduct the brainstorming at such a fast pace, that the left-brain doesn’t 
have time to interrupt our flow. 
When brainstorming, the process is broken up into three parts: 
• Setting the Stage 
• Idea Generation 





SETTING THE STAGE 
This is when you communicate the objectives, set the tone for the brainstorming, and 
instruct everyone on how it will be run. 
Make the objective Clear 
Ensure that everyone in the room clearly understands what the purpose of the 
brainstorming is.  What is the issue that you are all generating ideas for?  Write it down 
as a title at the top of the whiteboard or computer screen. 
Setting the Tone 
Like I mentioned before, you want the meeting to be relaxed and light-hearted, but at 
the same time its purpose should be very clear. 
It’s your facial expressions, body language, and tone that will have the biggest effect over 
how relaxed the team will be going into the brainstorming session. 
Prior to the meeting, do those things that relax you and put you into a great mood.  It 
could be avoiding that extra cup of coffee, waiting until later to read that upset email 
from a customer, or reading Dilbert.  Figure out what works for you and do it.  You 
should also anticipate that the session will be fun and productive.  This “positive 
visualization” technique used by athletes is very applicable here. 
Smile.  If you are already relaxed this won’t be hard, and you certainly don’t want to 
force one.  If you smile when explaining how this session will be run, everyone will be 
more relaxed about it. 
This may or may not work for you, but I used to keep a box of toys which I would bring 
with me to every brainstorming session.  It would contain colorful and simple physical 
puzzles.  The idea was that toys automatically set a more light-hearted tone in the 
room.  They also gave people something to fiddle with and didn’t require any of their real 
mental capacity, which I wanted them to save for idea generation. 
Brainstorming Instructions 
No matter if this is the first, second, tenth, or hundredth session you have had with this 
group, always start by reviewing the ground rules for the session.  It helps to establish the 
pace you are after, and it minimizes the chances of anyone being offended by any actions 
during the session. 
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These are the instructions you should provide the team before brainstorming begins. 
• Our goal is to fill this [screen | whiteboard | paper] with as many ideas as possible. 
• The faster we can generate ideas, the better.  Let them flow! 
• Any and every idea is welcome, including the crazy ones 
• Don’t provide any negative or positive critique of any idea. 
• Mis-spelled words are ok.  Don’t break our rhythm to provide spelling corrections. 
• The wrong organization of ideas is ok.  When the ideas are captured in an outline or 
mind map, it is ok if ideas go in the wrong place.  That can be fixed later. 
• No one idea will be discussed longer than 10 seconds.  Anything that requires more 
will be listed on the “Discussion List”.  The team will return to items on this list 
when idea generation is done.  We do this because we want to maintain 
momentum. 
• Interruptions are ok, and even encouraged, so speak up. 
• And HAVE FUN! 
 
RUNNING THE ACTUAL BRAINSTORMING SESSION 
Plan to capture the ideas in a way that is comfortable and fast for you, and visible to the 
entire team.  You could use the whiteboard, a large pad of paper, or in Word or Excel 
(Pages or Numbers for us Mac folks). Whichever you use is fine, just make sure you are 
totally fast and comfortable.  The last thing you want to do is slow down the team 
because you are struggling with the tool. 
Say the first few ideas and capture them quickly.  Prior to the meeting, try to have some 
ideas in your hip pocket.  You will use them to prime the pump. 
If no one else offers up any ideas right away, turn to the team with the best look of 
anticipation you can muster.  If still nothing, quickly adding some additional ideas of 
your own.  Do this a couple of times and the ideas should start coming. 
You should be quickly writing or typing the ideas.  This will convey the fast pace you 
wish to achieve in the brainstorming. 
If anyone breaks a rule such as criticizing ideas or correcting spelling, just provide a 
quick and gentle reminder that it isn’t necessary and move on. 
If anyone begins to settle into a long description of an idea, just say “that’s good stuff, 
but we need to keep our momentum going. Let’s come back to that“. Then make note of 
it on the “Discussion List”, and then encourage the team to start generating ideas again. 
If you find yourself struggling to capture all the ideas because they are coming so fast … 
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Congratulations, you are running a fantastic brainstorming session!  Let yourself smile in 
a big way and let the team see that.  It’s great positive reinforcement for everyone in the 
room. 
WRAPPING UP THE SESSION 
A really productive brainstorming session usually runs no more than 30 minutes.  I 
wouldn’t put a time constraint on it though.  Just let it run out on its own.  Once the team 
has decided that idea generation is done, return to those items that were put on the 
Discussion List.  Let people finish expressing the thoughts that they had earlier.  This 
could lead to a few more ideas being captured.  Depending on the amount of time 
remaining, the team may want to identify which of the ideas are the best.  You can do it 
together as a group or individually after the meeting is done. 
But remember, that long list of ideas was the deliverable you were going after.  Having it 
means that your brainstorming session was a success. 
SUMMARY 
The best way to run a productive brainstorming session is to make it fast and fun.  You 
make it fun by getting yourself and the team into a relaxed state.  And you make it fast so 
that your left-brain doesn’t have time to stifle your right-brain’s creativity. 
And remember, to come up with a few high-quality ideas, you must first produce a high-
quantity of ideas.  So play the numbers game and generate lots of ideas during your 
brainstorming sessions. 
 
Good luck, and have fun! 





[BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER TWO] 
6 Tips for More Productive Brainstorming Sessions 
 
You’re sitting down with people throwing ideas around. You’re writing stuff down more 
than usual. You’re keeping an eye out for a standout idea that you can roll with. You’re 
storming that brain. You’re brainstorming. 
The generation of ideas, to any team, is no doubt important. For example, at Design 
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Instruct, we meet and talk about future projects, we throw around ideas about artists we 
like and the work they do, we attempt to come up with fresh content ideas and new site 
features, and so on. Brainstorming is an important part of what we do. 
Throughout the course of working closely together, we’ve discovered a few tips and 
tricks that often lead to great ideas after a brainstorming session. We thought we’d share 
some of them with you. 
1. Create a Positive Atmosphere for Your Brainstorming Session 
It’s easy to think of meetings as boring, dreadful, painful and anxiety-inducing periods of 
time. Oftentimes, as a meeting participant or facilitator, you wish you could be doing 
something else. Sometimes people get called out, put on the spot, and fingers get pointed. 
Meetings are frequently perceived to be boring because they’re repetitive and drudgingly 
systematic. 
If you want to conduct an effective brainstorming session, it’s important that the 
atmosphere is fun, positive, welcoming and judgment-free. This way, the meeting 
participants won’t hesitate to share their ideas for fear of ridicule or reprimand from their 
peers. 
2. Lay Out the Ground Rules 
Clarity. It’s sort of become a buzzword around the office for us. Clarity is a virtue. It’s 
the starting point for most of what we do. 
It’s often said that there are no bad ideas in brainstorming. This is true. But there are 
ideas that just waste time and produce no actionable outcomes at all. These are the 
"ideas" that people throw out there to be funny or to add levity with no real substance. 
Remember this: Respect the process of generating ideas. Otherwise, you’re just wasting 
everyone’s time. 
You have to keep brainstorming focused. Do this by clarifying the objectives and the 
goals of a new project, and have everyone start from that point of clarity. 
If what we’re trying to achieve is clear, then every idea born out of a brainstorming 
session also inherits that same clarity. 
At the end of your brainstorming session, you’ll be left with a few really good ideas, and 
the only decision you need to make is to pick out the best ones to move forward with. 
3. Don’t Overlook Ideas that Aren’t Everyone’s Favorite 
As long as an idea adheres to the objectives and the goals of the project, it should be 
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considered as a viable option. 
At the very least, you should look at an idea as a jumping-off point for other ideas. Or 
you can take all these not-so-good ideas and synthesize them into one really good one; a 
sort of Frankenstein’s monster of an idea. 
4. Throw Away Ideas that Just Won’t Work 
Sometimes we get attached to ideas we come up with just by the mere fact that we came 
up with it. I do it all the time. I fall in love with an idea because I think it’s clever or cool 
or I think it will be a hit, even if all indications point to the contrary. 
However, again, be clear about what you need from the idea. 
Not every idea you come up with will be a hit. That’s impossible. In fact, I think most of 
you will agree that most ideas you come up with aren’t going to be good. Therefore, you 
have to get rid of all of them. Throw them out there, put these ideas on the table and let 
them go. Let them float into the ether and be done with it. Those ideas were never yours 
to begin with. They’re just vague abstractions: Notions that may have seemed good in 
your head, but with no real substance or no real chance of being successful. 
The only time you can claim an idea as yours is when it’s good enough for you to put it 
into action. That’s the only time an idea actually starts to exist. It only becomes tangible 
and concrete when there’s a chance of it being successful. 
5. Don’t Tune Out When Things Don’t Go Your Way 
Sometimes you won’t agree with the direction the idea-generation process is taking. And 
if you’re like me, your stubbornness and hardheadedness will tell you to just tune out, 
stop listening and stop contributing. 
Fight the urge to shut off from the brainstorming session! 
No good can come from shutting down. By not participating, you’ve just cut the team’s 
efficacy by one person. That’s one less brain, one less idea, and one less thoughtful 
insight. 
Tuning out is not good for the brainstorming atmosphere. It isn’t good for morale. 
Try this instead: Voice out what’s bothering you about the brainstorming session. It 
won’t matter if you get angry or too impassioned with what bothers you. In fact, it might 
help the group better understand the pitfalls of the direction they’re headed. 
Think about it this way: If someone disagrees, it means that the idea in question isn’t 
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completely solid. There are still holes to be filled. The fact that you disagree is ultimately 
good for the outcome of the project. 
6. Pragmatism First, Vision (Immediately) Second 
Let’s face it: You need to achieve something with your ideas. That’s what brainstorming 
is for. You address some issues and you formulate solutions. It’s immediate. Your project 
is the task at hand. Therefore, you have to treat it as such. 
Don’t let your idea get bigger than it needs to be right now. 
Most creative people have great vision. Ideas will sometimes get out of hand, and they 
become these big, world-changing, life-defining things that get cumbersome and 
unwieldy when you do try to move them into action. 
Some of the biggest ideas today started out very small and simple. However, if you study 
these ideas (e.g. Google’s search, Apple’s products, etc.) you’ll see that they started out 
from a place of clarity. They addressed specific needs and objectives. They were simple. 
Start there with your idea and let it grow. 
Vision is important, but it can’t be the driving force behind the actual work and the time 
that needs to be put into getting an idea off the ground. 
Vision is limitless for many people, and that’s never helpful when you have real, 
immediate objectives and needs for a project. 
Vision merely guides an idea. Pragmatism is the thing that pushes it forward. 
 
Share Your Own Brainstorming Session Tips! 
• How does your company produce ideas in teams? 
• In your experience, what strategies and techniques yield better and more productive 
brainstorming sessions? 
Did you apply any of the tips mentioned above in your last brainstorming session? 
 
 





We would like you to use these ideas about brainstorming today to help solve the 
creative problem we give you.  
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(MANIPULATION: 3.b.ii: NOMINAL GROUP/PROBLEM 
ABSTRACTION ONLY CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you are going to think of creative solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want to teach you some thinking techniques that 
we would like you to use. They involve using brainstorming techniques and 
thinking about problems in an abstract way. 
 
 
Brainstorming…Fast and Fun! 
How many times have you come out of a brainstorming session feeling unsatisfied with 
the results?  The team never felt like it got into a rhythm.  The idea flow felt like a drizzle 
versus a storm.  None of the ideas that the team spent much time on seemed especially 
good (BTW, you should never spend a lot of time on any one idea in a brainstorming 
session).  There was one or two people that insisted on dominating the conversation and 
ended up speaking way too much.  This to the frustration of the rest of the group.  The 
good news is that there are just a handful of things you need to do to run a productive and 
fun brainstorming session. 
The overall goal of any brainstorming is to generate a high quantity of ideas.  This is 
really important … it’s all about quantity, NOT quality.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity after brainstorming to evaluate the quality of the ideas generated and select a 
winner. 
So if our goal is quantity, what strategies can we employ to accomplish this?  Well, we 
want to eliminate as many barriers to idea flow as we can.  The two main barriers to 
idea flow are stress/tension and the left-brain’s need to constantly evaluate 
things. When you are stressed, it is very difficult to think about anything else other than 
that feeling of stress and maybe what is causing it.  Therefore, our strategy is to be 
relaxed and to conduct the brainstorming at such a fast pace, that the left-brain doesn’t 
have time to interrupt our flow. 
When brainstorming, the process is broken up into three parts: 
• Setting the Stage 
• Idea Generation 





SETTING THE STAGE 
This is when you communicate the objectives, set the tone for the brainstorming, and 
instruct everyone on how it will be run. 
Make the objective Clear 
Ensure that everyone in the room clearly understands what the purpose of the 
brainstorming is.  What is the issue that you are all generating ideas for?  Write it down 
as a title at the top of the whiteboard or computer screen. 
Setting the Tone 
Like I mentioned before, you want the meeting to be relaxed and light-hearted, but at 
the same time its purpose should be very clear. 
It’s your facial expressions, body language, and tone that will have the biggest effect over 
how relaxed the team will be going into the brainstorming session. 
Prior to the meeting, do those things that relax you and put you into a great mood.  It 
could be avoiding that extra cup of coffee, waiting until later to read that upset email 
from a customer, or reading Dilbert.  Figure out what works for you and do it.  You 
should also anticipate that the session will be fun and productive.  This”positive 
visualization” technique used by athletes is very applicable here. 
Smile.  If you are already relaxed this won’t be hard, and you certainly don’t want to 
force one.  If you smile when explaining how this session will be run, everyone will be 
more relaxed about it. 
This may or may not work for you, but I used to keep a box of toys which I would bring 
with me to every brainstorming session.  It would contain colorful and simple physical 
puzzles.  The idea was that toys automatically set a more light-hearted tone in the 
room.  They also gave people something to fiddle with and didn’t require any of their real 
mental capacity, which I wanted them to save for idea generation. 
Brainstorming Instructions 
No matter if this is the first, second, tenth, or hundredth session you have had with this 
group, always start by reviewing the ground rules for the session.  It helps to establish the 
pace you are after, and it minimizes the chances of anyone being offended by any actions 
during the session. 
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These are the instructions you should provide the team before brainstorming begins. 
• Our goal is to fill this [screen | whiteboard | paper] with as many ideas as possible. 
• The faster we can generate ideas, the better.  Let them flow! 
• Any and every idea is welcome, including the crazy ones 
• Don’t provide any negative or positive critique of any idea. 
• Mis-spelled words are ok.  Don’t break our rhythm to provide spelling corrections. 
• The wrong organization of ideas is ok.  When the ideas are captured in an outline or 
mind map, it is ok if ideas go in the wrong place.  That can be fixed later. 
• No one idea will be discussed longer than 10 seconds.  Anything that requires more 
will be listed on the “Discussion List”.  The team will return to items on this list 
when idea generation is done.  We do this because we want to maintain 
momentum. 
• Interruptions are ok, and even encouraged, so speak up. 
• And HAVE FUN! 
 
RUNNING THE ACTUAL BRAINSTORMING SESSION 
Plan to capture the ideas in a way that is comfortable and fast for you, and visible to the 
entire team.  You could use the whiteboard, a large pad of paper, or in Word or Excel 
(Pages or Numbers for us Mac folks). Whichever you use is fine, just make sure you are 
totally fast and comfortable.  The last thing you want to do is slow down the team 
because you are struggling with the tool. 
Say the first few ideas and capture them quickly.  Prior to the meeting, try to have some 
ideas in your hip pocket.  You will use them to prime the pump. 
If no one else offers up any ideas right away, turn to the team with the best look of 
anticipation you can muster.  If still nothing, quickly adding some additional ideas of 
your own.  Do this a couple of times and the ideas should start coming. 
You should be quickly writing or typing the ideas.  This will convey the fast pace you 
wish to achieve in the brainstorming. 
If anyone breaks a rule such as criticizing ideas or correcting spelling, just provide a 
quick and gentle reminder that it isn’t necessary and move on. 
If anyone begins to settle into a long description of an idea, just say “that’s good stuff, 
but we need to keep our momentum going. Let’s come back to that“. Then make note of 
it on the “Discussion List”, and then encourage the team to start generating ideas again. 
If you find yourself struggling to capture all the ideas because they are coming so fast … 
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Congratulations, you are running a fantastic brainstorming session!  Let yourself smile in 
a big way and let the team see that.  It’s great positive reinforcement for everyone in the 
room. 
WRAPPING UP THE SESSION 
A really productive brainstorming session usually runs no more than 30 minutes.  I 
wouldn’t put a time constraint on it though.  Just let it run out on its own.  Once the team 
has decided that idea generation is done, return to those items that were put on the 
Discussion List.  Let people finish expressing the thoughts that they had earlier.  This 
could lead to a few more ideas being captured.  Depending on the amount of time 
remaining, the team may want to identify which of the ideas are the best.  You can do it 
together as a group or individually after the meeting is done. 
But remember, that long list of ideas was the deliverable you were going after.  Having it 
means that your brainstorming session was a success. 
SUMMARY 
The best way to run a productive brainstorming session is to make it fast and fun.  You 
make it fun by getting yourself and the team into a relaxed state.  And you make it fast so 
that your left-brain doesn’t have time to stifle your right-brain’s creativity. 
And remember, to come up with a few high-quality ideas, you must first produce a high-
quantity of ideas.  So play the numbers game and generate lots of ideas during your 
brainstorming sessions. 
 
Good luck, and have fun! 








Thinking about problems in an abstract way 
 
In creative problem solving, it is often important to consider how you define the 
problem itself. Thinking of the problem in an abstract way can often help your 
group be creative. By abstract, we mean that you think very generally about the 
underlying problem situation, without focusing on specific details that are part of 
the problem. 
 
For example, suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that 
grocery shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than 
they can fit in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this 
situation, you are given the following specific design problem: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of reusable 
grocery bag that will stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, to think of this more abstractly, we can restate the problem by replacing 
specific words with more general words: 
 
(More abstract!): You need to design a new kind of shopping 
bag that will expand to fit more shopping items inside it. 
 
Now, even more abstractly, we can write: 
 
(Even more abstract!): You need to design a new kind of 
container that can change to fit more items inside it. 
 
 
Now, here’s why this thinking technique helps: abstract problem statements 
sometimes remind you of other specific examples that fit the abstract statements. 
Those specific examples might give you some creative ideas about how to solve 






We’d like you to practice this abstract technique so that we know you understand 
how to do it. Take the following specific problem and write it in an abstract form, 
and then in an even more abstract form: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of outdoor 
urban garden hose that stretches out and gets long when the cold 
water supply is turned on, but that also shortens and takes up very 
little space when the cold water supply is turned off. 
 
 













We would like you to use these ideas about brainstorming and abstract problem 
definition techniques today to help solve the creative problem we give you. 
 
 
[NOTICE: THIS MANIPULATION EXAMPLE PAIRS THE 
PROBLEM ABSTRACTION ONLY READING WITH 
BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER ONE. BRAINSTORMING 
BLOG NUMBER TWO WAS USED WITH THE PROBLEM 
ABSTRACTION ONLY READING, BUT THAT COMBINATION 
IS OMITTED HERE TO SAVE SPACE]
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(MANIPULATION: 3.b.iii: NOMINAL GROUP/ANALOGY ONLY 
CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you are going to think of creative solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want to teach you some thinking techniques that 




Brainstorming…Fast and Fun! 
How many times have you come out of a brainstorming session feeling unsatisfied with 
the results?  The team never felt like it got into a rhythm.  The idea flow felt like a drizzle 
versus a storm.  None of the ideas that the team spent much time on seemed especially 
good (BTW, you should never spend a lot of time on any one idea in a brainstorming 
session).  There was one or two people that insisted on dominating the conversation and 
ended up speaking way too much.  This to the frustration of the rest of the group.  The 
good news is that there are just a handful of things you need to do to run a productive and 
fun brainstorming session. 
The overall goal of any brainstorming is to generate a high quantity of ideas.  This is 
really important … it’s all about quantity, NOT quality.  You will have plenty of 
opportunity after brainstorming to evaluate the quality of the ideas generated and select a 
winner. 
So if our goal is quantity, what strategies can we employ to accomplish this?  Well, we 
want to eliminate as many barriers to idea flow as we can.  The two main barriers to 
idea flow are stress/tension and the left-brain’s need to constantly evaluate 
things. When you are stressed, it is very difficult to think about anything else other than 
that feeling of stress and maybe what is causing it.  Therefore, our strategy is to be 
relaxed and to conduct the brainstorming at such a fast pace, that the left-brain doesn’t 
have time to interrupt our flow. 
When brainstorming, the process is broken up into three parts: 
• Setting the Stage 
• Idea Generation 





SETTING THE STAGE 
This is when you communicate the objectives, set the tone for the brainstorming, and 
instruct everyone on how it will be run. 
Make the objective Clear 
Ensure that everyone in the room clearly understands what the purpose of the 
brainstorming is.  What is the issue that you are all generating ideas for?  Write it down 
as a title at the top of the whiteboard or computer screen. 
Setting the Tone 
Like I mentioned before, you want the meeting to be relaxed and light-hearted, but at 
the same time its purpose should be very clear. 
It’s your facial expressions, body language, and tone that will have the biggest effect over 
how relaxed the team will be going into the brainstorming session. 
Prior to the meeting, do those things that relax you and put you into a great mood.  It 
could be avoiding that extra cup of coffee, waiting until later to read that upset email 
from a customer, or reading Dilbert.  Figure out what works for you and do it.  You 
should also anticipate that the session will be fun and productive.  This”positive 
visualization” technique used by athletes is very applicable here. 
Smile.  If you are already relaxed this won’t be hard, and you certainly don’t want to 
force one.  If you smile when explaining how this session will be run, everyone will be 
more relaxed about it. 
This may or may not work for you, but I used to keep a box of toys which I would bring 
with me to every brainstorming session.  It would contain colorful and simple physical 
puzzles.  The idea was that toys automatically set a more light-hearted tone in the 
room.  They also gave people something to fiddle with and didn’t require any of their real 
mental capacity, which I wanted them to save for idea generation. 
Brainstorming Instructions 
No matter if this is the first, second, tenth, or hundredth session you have had with this 
group, always start by reviewing the ground rules for the session.  It helps to establish the 
pace you are after, and it minimizes the chances of anyone being offended by any actions 
during the session. 
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These are the instructions you should provide the team before brainstorming begins. 
• Our goal is to fill this [screen | whiteboard | paper] with as many ideas as possible. 
• The faster we can generate ideas, the better.  Let them flow! 
• Any and every idea is welcome, including the crazy ones 
• Don’t provide any negative or positive critique of any idea. 
• Mis-spelled words are ok.  Don’t break our rhythm to provide spelling corrections. 
• The wrong organization of ideas is ok.  When the ideas are captured in an outline or 
mind map, it is ok if ideas go in the wrong place.  That can be fixed later. 
• No one idea will be discussed longer than 10 seconds.  Anything that requires more 
will be listed on the “Discussion List”.  The team will return to items on this list 
when idea generation is done.  We do this because we want to maintain 
momentum. 
• Interruptions are ok, and even encouraged, so speak up. 
• And HAVE FUN! 
 
RUNNING THE ACTUAL BRAINSTORMING SESSION 
Plan to capture the ideas in a way that is comfortable and fast for you, and visible to the 
entire team.  You could use the whiteboard, a large pad of paper, or in Word or Excel 
(Pages or Numbers for us Mac folks). Whichever you use is fine, just make sure you are 
totally fast and comfortable.  The last thing you want to do is slow down the team 
because you are struggling with the tool. 
Say the first few ideas and capture them quickly.  Prior to the meeting, try to have some 
ideas in your hip pocket.  You will use them to prime the pump. 
If no one else offers up any ideas right away, turn to the team with the best look of 
anticipation you can muster.  If still nothing, quickly adding some additional ideas of 
your own.  Do this a couple of times and the ideas should start coming. 
You should be quickly writing or typing the ideas.  This will convey the fast pace you 
wish to achieve in the brainstorming. 
If anyone breaks a rule such as criticizing ideas or correcting spelling, just provide a 
quick and gentle reminder that it isn’t necessary and move on. 
If anyone begins to settle into a long description of an idea, just say “that’s good stuff, 
but we need to keep our momentum going. Let’s come back to that“. Then make note of 
it on the “Discussion List”, and then encourage the team to start generating ideas again. 
If you find yourself struggling to capture all the ideas because they are coming so fast … 
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Congratulations, you are running a fantastic brainstorming session!  Let yourself smile in 
a big way and let the team see that.  It’s great positive reinforcement for everyone in the 
room. 
WRAPPING UP THE SESSION 
A really productive brainstorming session usually runs no more than 30 minutes.  I 
wouldn’t put a time constraint on it though.  Just let it run out on its own.  Once the team 
has decided that idea generation is done, return to those items that were put on the 
Discussion List.  Let people finish expressing the thoughts that they had earlier.  This 
could lead to a few more ideas being captured.  Depending on the amount of time 
remaining, the team may want to identify which of the ideas are the best.  You can do it 
together as a group or individually after the meeting is done. 
But remember, that long list of ideas was the deliverable you were going after.  Having it 
means that your brainstorming session was a success. 
SUMMARY 
The best way to run a productive brainstorming session is to make it fast and fun.  You 
make it fun by getting yourself and the team into a relaxed state.  And you make it fast so 
that your left-brain doesn’t have time to stifle your right-brain’s creativity. 
And remember, to come up with a few high-quality ideas, you must first produce a high-
quantity of ideas.  So play the numbers game and generate lots of ideas during your 
brainstorming sessions. 
 
Good luck, and have fun! 












Analogical thinking can help you find a creative solution to a problem you’re 
facing, by using knowledge you already have about similar problems and their 
solutions. 
 
There are three basic steps that help you use analogical thinking. Here’s an 
example to teach you the three steps: 
 
Suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that grocery 
shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than they can fit 
in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this situation, you 
are given the following specific design problem: 
 
You need to design a new kind of reusable grocery bag that will 
stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, here are the three basic steps for analogical thinking that will help you 
solve the problem: 
 
STEP 1) Define the problem in general (abstract) terms. 
 
A more general statement of this problem might be something like this: 
 
You need to design a new kind of container that can change to fit 
more items inside it.  
 
STEP 2) Search your memory to find other problems that fit this general 
description 
For instance, you might remember an example like this: 
You once saw a TV show about a certain bird that carries seeds around in its 
mouth. But sometimes, the bird wants to carry more seeds than it can fit in its 
mouth. This kind of bird has an extendable pouch in its mouth that allows it to 
store many more seeds than its mouth could hold otherwise. The pouch wall is 
thin, wrinkled, and elastic, and stretches as seeds are added. This example fits the 
general problem description, because the bird’s extendable pouch is a “container 





STEP 3) See if you can use the solution to this other problem to generate 
ideas for solving your current problem, by drawing an analogy. 
 
So, if we compare the grocery bag design situation to the bird example, we can 
make a diagram to help us draw an analogy between the two. See if you can draw 
the analogy by filling in the blank rectangle spaces on the right side of the 
diagram below (the first rectangle is filled in for you). Also, see if drawing this 
analogy helps you think of a solution for the grocery bag problem: 
 
Bird Example Grocery bag problem 
 
 
Birds      carry      seeds          in Shoppers      carry          in 
     
their          mouths their    
      
     
 
But sometimes,      birds         want to carry  But sometimes,                        want to carry 
 
more      seeds       than their      mouths  more   than their  
 
will hold. will hold. 
 
The solution is an         extendable pouch One solution is an                  
  
 
built into the      bird’s             mouth built into the  
 
 
After drawing this analogy, you could try to think of another example that fits the 
general problem definition, and draw another analogy between it and the grocery 




We would like you to use these ideas about brainstorming and about 







[NOTICE: THIS MANIPULATION EXAMPLE PAIRS THE ANALOGICAL 
REASONING READING WITH BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER ONE. 
BRAINSTORMING BLOG NUMBER TWO WAS ALSO USED WITH THE 
ANALOGICAL THINKING READING, BUT THAT COMBINATION IS 








(MANIPULATION: 3.b.iv: NOMINAL GROUP/ANALOGICAL REASONING 
CONDITIONS) 
 
Today, you are going to think of creative solutions to a problem. 
 
Before you get your problem, we want to teach you some thinking techniques that 
we would like you to use. They involve thinking about problems in an abstract 
way and using analogical thinking. 
 
 
Thinking about problems in an abstract way 
 
In creative problem solving, it is often important to consider how you define the 
problem itself. Thinking of the problem in an abstract way can often help your 
group be creative. By abstract, we mean that you think very generally about the 
underlying problem situation, without focusing on specific details that are part of 
the problem. 
 
For example, suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that 
grocery shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than 
they can fit in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this 
situation, you are given the following specific design problem: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of reusable 
grocery bag that will stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, to think of this more abstractly, we can restate the problem by replacing 
specific words with more general words: 
 
(More abstract!): You need to design a new kind of shopping 
bag that will expand to fit more shopping items inside it. 
 
Now, even more abstractly, we can write: 
 
(Even more abstract!): You need to design a new kind of 
container that can change to fit more items inside it. 
 
 
Now, here’s why this thinking technique helps: abstract problem statements 
sometimes remind you of other specific examples that fit the abstract statements. 
Those specific examples might give you some creative ideas about how to solve 




We’d like you to practice this abstract technique so that we know you understand how to 
do it. Take the following specific problem and write it in an abstract form, and then in an 
even more abstract form: 
 
(Specific problem): You need to design a new kind of outdoor 
urban garden hose that stretches out and gets long when the cold 
water supply is turned on, but that also shortens and takes up very 
little space when the cold water supply is turned off. 
 
 


















Analogical thinking can help you find a creative solution to a problem you’re 
facing, by using knowledge you already have about similar problems and their 
solutions. 
 
There are three basic steps that help you use analogical thinking. Here’s an 
example to teach you the three steps: 
 
Suppose you work for a packaging design firm, and you find out that grocery 
shoppers commonly complain that they often buy more groceries than they can fit 
in the reusable grocery bags that they take in the store. From this situation, you 
are given the following specific design problem: 
 
You need to design a new kind of reusable grocery bag that will 
stretch to fit more groceries inside it. 
 
Now, here are the three basic steps for analogical thinking that will help you 
solve the problem: 
 
STEP 1) Define the problem in general (abstract) terms. 
 
A more general statement of this problem might be something like this: 
 
You need to design a new kind of container that can change to fit 
more items inside it.  
 
STEP 2) Search your memory to find other problems that fit this general 
description 
For instance, you might remember an example like this: 
You once saw a TV show about a certain bird that carries seeds around in its 
mouth. But sometimes, the bird wants to carry more seeds than it can fit in its 
mouth. This kind of bird has an extendable pouch in its mouth that allows it to 
store many more seeds than its mouth could hold otherwise. The pouch wall is 
thin, wrinkled, and elastic, and stretches as seeds are added. This example fits the 
general problem description, because the bird’s extendable pouch is a “container 





STEP 3) See if you can use the solution to this other problem to generate 
ideas for solving your current problem, by drawing an analogy. 
 
So, if we compare the grocery bag design situation to the bird example, we can 
make a diagram to help us draw an analogy between the two. See if you can draw 
the analogy by filling in the blank rectangle spaces on the right side of the 
diagram below (the first rectangle is filled in for you). Also, see if drawing this 
analogy helps you think of a solution for the grocery bag problem: 
 
Bird Example Grocery bag problem 
 
 
Birds      carry      seeds          in Shoppers      carry          in 
     
their          mouths their    
      
     
 
But sometimes,      birds         want to carry  But sometimes,                        want to carry 
 
more      seeds       than their      mouths  more   than their  
 
will hold. will hold. 
 
The solution is an         extendable pouch One solution is an                  
  
 
built into the      bird’s             mouth built into the  
 
 
After drawing this analogy, you could try to think of another example that fits the 
general problem definition, and draw another analogy between it and the grocery 




We would like you to use these ideas about thinking of problems abstractly 







APPENDIX B: RATER CALIBRATION 
For all the ratings generated, solution ideas were judged by undergraduate raters, 
blind to hypotheses and experimental conditions. Due to the great number of ideas (over 
3,600 ideas were generated by participants in this study), the ratings were performed in a 
multi-step procedure, similar to past creativity studies that evaluated large numbers of 
outputs (for an example, see Rietzschel et al., 2006). The procedure involved a pre-
ratings “calibration” of the raters to each other to establish interrater similarity, and then a 
distribution of ideas among raters for assessment. I also included a post-ratings 
calibration check on interrater similarity that is typically not seen in studies with this 
number of rated outputs. The same multistep procedure was followed for ratings of 
novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity because these ratings were performed in 
parallel by each rater. I followed a somewhat similar calibration approach for flexibility 
ratings, but raters performed the categorization activities required for flexibility in an 
independent, earlier pass through the ideas. I describe the procedures below, and I present 
them in the temporal order in which they were performed. 
Group idea flexibility. Two undergraduate RA raters, blind to this study’s 
hypotheses, looked through approximately the first 50% of all solution ideas and 
generated 2 lists of independent problem solution category dimensions: solution means 
and solution goals (to review an earlier example of this methodology, see Nijstad et al., 
2002). For example, a goal of many of the problem solutions was to prevent the taco shell 
from breaking; a common means that many solutions implemented was to add an extra 
taco shell. After 2 rounds of collaborative meetings, the RAs and I came up with a list of 
24 means and 8 goals, which covered all the ideas we had looked through (refer to Table 
2 for the goals and Table 3 for the means). Treating solution categories as unique 
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combinations of means and goals, this procedure resulted in 192 unique idea categories. 
The next step was to use these categories to categorize every idea in the dataset. 
Four undergraduate RA’s then went through five groups’ ideas from the pilot 
study and put each idea into 1 of the 192 categories. The pilot study used the same 
“fragile taco” task problem as the dissertation study. All the raters and I held two 
meetings in which discrepancies were discussed and resolved via collaboration. After 
these two meetings, each rater then independently went through another set of ten groups’ 
ideas from the dissertation dataset and categorized the ideas. This served as the pre-
ratings calibration dataset, and it contained 215 ideas. Because this was a categorization 
exercise with nominal variables, and not a ratings exercise with scales set up to measure 
variables in interval increments (e.g., like the novelty ratings), interrater agreement was 
assessed with a generalized version of Cohen’s kappa which is suited to more than 2 
raters (Cohen, 1960; Fleiss, 1971)14.  
I then randomly assigned each of the four undergraduate raters about a quarter of 
the remaining ideas in the dataset (about 850 ideas apiece), and they categorized their 
assigned ideas. The raters were unaware that I included a set of 50 ideas from the earlier 
calibration dataset, common to each rater’s assignment, with the intent of checking their 
categorization agreement again. The 50 common ideas enabled the post-ratings 
calibration, and they were inserted at the end of each rater’s assignment, so they would 
rate them last of all. I assessed interrater agreement again on this post-ratings calibration 
dataset by using the generalized Cohen’s kappa coefficient. 
                                                
14 See  https://www.ibm.com/developerworks/community/files/app/folder/bbe88aaf-f3cd-466a-83fb-592d48eecb1c for 
a list of IBM developer software tools for SPSS, including the Fleiss kappa module used in this study. 
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The ratings activities for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity occurred after 
the categorization ratings were performed. This meant that the raters had each seen a 
large number of ideas (1000+) before they embarked on the ratings for these variables. 
Group idea novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity. I gave 3 raters 50 
randomly selected ideas from the pilot study dataset, and they rated each solution idea 
using the 7 point Likert-type scales for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity, as 
described in Chapter 4. I met with all the raters together and we discussed interrater 
disagreements of 2 points or more for each of the dependent variables, with the goal of 
reaching some consensus about how to rate ideas with the Likert-type scales across their 
entire range. After this meeting, I gave each of the raters an identical set of 158 randomly 
selected ideas from the dissertation idea dataset, and they independently rated the 
novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity of each solution idea. 
For this pre-ratings calibration dataset, interrater reliability (IRR) and interrater 
agreement (IRA) were assessed using rwg (for IRA) and ICC (for IRA + IRR) indices. 
Estimates of IRA and IRR are used to assess whether scores provided by judges are 
similar, although how similarity is conceptualized varies for IRA and IRR. Estimates of 
IRA indicate whether ratings furnished by multiple judges are interchangeable, i.e., 
whether they are equivalent in terms of their absolute value. Estimates of IRR are used to 
see whether raters rank order the targets of their ratings in a similar way. For this study, 
the ratings “targets” are the solution ideas. I wanted to know about both types of ratings 
similarity for the calibration dataset, because the remainder of the ideas would be divided 
up among the raters once they were calibrated to each other.  
An estimate for rwg was calculated for each set of ratings associated with a single 
idea. As a result, rwg does not convey any direct information about ratings across ideas. In 
other words, information about interrater consistency in the rank order of ideas is not 
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directly conveyed in the rwg parameter estimate. In order to assess this aspect of ratings 
similarity, I used estimates of intra-class correlation. 
Intra-class correlations (ICC) indicate the proportion of observed variance in 
ratings scores that are attributable to systematic between-target differences, as compared 
to the total variance observed (LeBreton & Senter, 2008; McGraw & Wong, 1996). Most 
of the intra-class correlations used to assess rater consistency are technically a function of 
both interrater agreement and interrater reliability (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). Because all 
the ideas in the calibration datasets were rated for novelty, usefulness, and overall 
creativity by the same 3 raters, and because I was not interested in generalizing beyond 
the 3 raters, a two-way mixed effects ANOVA served as the basis for the ICC estimate. 
After seeing the results for IRA and IRR on the initial set of pre-ratings 
calibration ideas, I randomly distributed the remainder of the solution ideas from the 
dissertation study to the raters, to try to ensure rater and experimental condition were not 
confounded. The ideas were assigned and given out in several large subsets over a period 
of about 2 months. 
I was concerned that the raters might drift away from their initially developed 
interrater consistency, so when I assigned the last big subset of ideas for rating, I included 
50 of the original 158 calibration dataset ideas without mentioning it to the raters, as a 
post-ratings calibration dataset. My intent in assigning these ideas that they had already 
rated during the earlier calibration period was to check their IRA and IRR again at the 
end. This also enabled a true test-retest reliability analysis (Bobko, 2001), to see if any of 
the raters had drifted away from their own earlier ratings for the subset of 50 ideas. The 
test-retest reliabilities were calculated as the Pearson correlations between each raters’ 
ratings of the 50 ideas common to the pre-ratings and post-ratings calibration datasets. 
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The proposed goal for this study was to have every idea rated by at least 2 raters, 
but the large number of solution ideas and the number of available raters made that goal 
unattainable in the time frame required to complete the ratings and the study. Other 
published studies have relied on creative output ratings provided by single raters, after 
using a second rater to assess IRA and/or IRR for some small proportion of output 
(typically 5-15% of the total). However, I have seen no such published creativity studies 
where IRA and IRR were checked again at the end of the ratings activity, and I have 
never seen a test-retest reliability analysis in studies like these. I included these extra 
steps as precautions so that rater drift could be measured and so that the quality of the 
ratings could be more accurately assessed. In the absence of these checks, the quality of 
measurement may diminish undetected. 
I used the same pre-ratings calibration and post-ratings calibration check 
procedure for novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity. In fact, the same pre-ratings and 
post-ratings calibration idea sets were used in the process for all 3 ratings variables, i.e., 





Excerpts used to define novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity 
In a meeting with all the raters, I used excerpts from Amabile (1996) to help 
establish conceptual definitions of novelty, usefulness, and overall creativity. Several 
pages were photocopied and taken to the meeting, and certain passages were highlighted 
and discussed during the meeting. No explicit guidance about how ratings of novelty and 
usefulness should combine to form overall creativity was discussed (although this 
question was asked), in keeping with guidance from the literature (e.g., Amabile, 1996). 
The highlighted excerpts appear below. 
 
The theoretical framework of creativity presented in the following chapter is based on a 
conceptual definition of creativity that comprises two esssential elements:  
A product or response will be judged as creative to the extent that (a) it is both a 
novel and appropriate, useful, correct or valuable response to the task at hand, and 
(b) the task is heuristic rather than algorithmic. 
Barron (1955) proposed that, to be judged as “original,” (1) the response “should have a 
certain stated uncommonness in the particular group being studied” and (2) it must be “to 
some extent adaptive to reality” (pp. 478-479). In other words, the incidence of the 
response must be statistically uncommon, and the response must be in some way 
appropriate to the problem. 
…virtually all conceptual definitions of creativity include notions such as value or 













Team Cohesion  
(adapted for this study from Seashore, 1954) 
Completed by team members post-task 
 
Seven point Likert-type scale: strong disagreement to strong agreement  
 
Item wording SPSS variable name 
Our group got along together well.  COH1 
Our members were willing to help each other.  COH2 
Our group really stuck together.  COH3 
I felt I was really a part of the group.   COH4 
 
The original Seashore (1954) items: 
 
Q51: Do you feel that you are really a part of your work group? 
 □ Really a part of my work group 
 □ Included in most ways 
 □ Included in some ways, but not in others 
 □ Don’t feel I really belong 
 □ Don’t work with any one group of people 
 
Q52:  If you had a chance to do the same kind of work for the same pay, in another work group, how would you feel about 
moving? 
 □ Would want very much to move 
 □ Would rather move than stay where I am 
 □ Would make no difference to me 
 □ Would rather stay where I am than move 




Q50: How does your work group compare with other work groups at Midwest on each of the following points? 
 
    Better than most About the same as most Not as good as most   
 The way men get 
 along together   □   □    □ 
 
 The way the men stick 
 together   □   □    □ 
 
 The way the men help 
 each other on the job  □   □    □ 
 
 







(Wagner III, 1995) 
Completed by members post-task 
 
Seven point Likert-type scale: strong disagreement to strong agreement  
 
Item wording SPSS variable name 
Only those who depend on themselves get ahead in life. INDCOL1 
In the long run the only person you can count on is yourself. INDCOL2 
To be superior a person must stand alone. INDCOL3 
A group is more productive when its members do what they want to do rather than what 
the group wants them to do. 
INDCOL4 
A group is most efficient when its members do what they think is best rather than doing 
what the group wants them to do. 
INDCOL5 




(adapted for this study from Edmondson, 1999) 
Completed by team members post-task 
 
Seven point Likert scale: Strong Disagreement to Strong Agreement 
 
Item wording SPSS variable name 
It was difficult to ask for help from my teammates during the task activity. PSAFE1R 
I felt safe to take risks during the task. PSAFE2 
We valued each others’ unique knowledge and thinking skills during the task. PSAFE3 
 
The original items from Edmondson (1954) 
 
1. If you make a mistake on this team, it is often held against you. 
2. Members of this team are able to bring up problems and tough issues. 
3. People on this team sometimes reject others for being different. 
4. It is safe to take a risk on this team. 
5. It is difficult to ask other members of this team for help. 
6. No one on this team would deliberately act in a way that undermines my efforts. 




Divergent Task Conflict 
(adapted from L. Weingart personal communication with K. Lewis) 
Completed by team members post-task 
 
Seven point Likert scale: Strongly disagree to Strongly agree 
 
Item wording SPSS variable name 
We often engaged in debate about our different opinions and ideas. DTCL1 
We frequently debated the plusses and minuses of different ideas. DTCL2 





(Watson & Clark, 1994) 
Completed by members post-task 
 
(Prompt) 
The following are a number of words and phrases that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each item and write the appropriate 
number in the space next to that word. Think back to your interactions with your teammates today and indicate to what extent you felt this 
way, while working with your teammate. 
 
 
Five point Likert scale: 1 = Very slightly or Not at all, 2 = A little, 3 = Moderately, 4 = Quite a bit, 5 = Extremely 
 
 SPSS variable name   SPSS variable name 
Interested* PAN_INT  Irritable** PAN_IRR 
Distressed** PAN_DIS  Alert* PAN_ALE 
Upset** PAN_UPS  Ashamed** PAN_ASH 
Excited* PAN_EXC  Inspired* PAN_ISP 
Strong* PAN_STR  Nervous** PAN_NER 
Guilty** PAN_GUI  Determined* PAN_DET 
Scared** PAN_SCR  Attentive* PAN_ATT 
Hostile** PAN_HOS  Jittery** PAN_JIT 
Enthusiastic* PAN_ENT  Active* PAN_ACT 
Proud* PAN_PRO  Afraid** PAN_AFR 




Personality: Big Five short scale 
(Gosling et al, 2003) 
Completed by team members post-task 
Scale as shown in table below 
 
Here are a number of personality traits that may or may not apply to you. Please write a number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree with that statement. You should rate the extent to which the pair of traits applies to you, even if one characteristic applies more 





























7 [SPSS variable name] 
 
I  see myself as: 







    
[B5EXT1] 
2. _____ Critical, quarrelsome     [B5AGR1R] 
3. _____ Dependable, self-disciplined    [B5CON1] 
4. _____ Anxious, easily upset    [B5EMO1R] 
5. _____ Open to new experiences, complex    [B5OPN1] 
6. _____ Reserved, quiet     [B5EXT2R] 
7. _____ Sympathetic, warm     [B5AGR2] 
8. _____ Disorganized, careless     [B5CON2R] 
9. _____ Calm, emotionally stable    [B5EMO2] 
10. _____ Conventional, uncreative    [B5OPN2R] 
        




Transactive Memory Systems: Specialization 
 
(adapted from Lewis, 2003) 
Completed by team members post-task 
 
Five point Likert scale: strong disagreement to strong agreement  
 
1. Each team member has specialized knowledge of some aspect of our creativity task. 
2. Different team members are responsible for expertise in different areas. 
3. I have knowledge about an aspect of the creativity task that no other team member has. 
4. I know which team members have expertise in specific areas. 
5. The specialized knowledge of several different team members is needed to complete the creativity task. 
 
 
The original TMS: Specialization items from Lewis (2003) 
 
1. Each team member has specialized knowledge of some aspect of our project. 
2. I have knowledge about an aspect of the project that no other team member has. 
3. Different team members are responsible for expertise in different areas. 
4. The specialized knowledge of several different team members is needed to complete the project deliverables. 
5. I know which team members have expertise in specific areas. 
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Transactive Memory Systems: Credibility 
(adapted from Lewis, 2003) 
Completed by team members post-task 
 
Five point Likert scale: strong disagreement to strong agreement  
 
 
1. I was comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from other team members. 
2. I trusted that other members’ knowledge about the creativity task was credible. 
3. I was confident relying on the information that other team members brought to the discussion. 
4. When other members gave information, I didn’t feel the need to double-check it for myself.  
5. I had a lot of faith in other members’ “expertise.”  
 
 
The original TMS: Credibility items from Lewis (1999) 
 
1. I was comfortable accepting procedural suggestions from other team members. 
2. I trusted that other members’ knowledge about the project was credible. 
3. I was confident relying on the information that other team members brought to the discussion. 
4. When other members gave information, I wanted to double-check it for myself. (reversed)* 
5. I did not have much faith in other members’ “expertise.” (reversed)* 
 
*Lewis (2003) recommends not using the reversed wording for these items  
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Transactive Memory Systems: Coordination 
 
(adapted from Lewis, 2003) 
Completed by team members post-task 
 
Five point Likert scale: strong disagreement to strong agreement  
 
1. Our team worked together in a well-coordinated fashion. 
2. Our team had very few misunderstandings about what to do. 
3. Our team didn’t need to backtrack and start over a lot.  
4. We accomplished the creativity task smoothly and efficiently. 
5. There was little confusion about how we would accomplish the creativity task. 
 
 
The original TMS: Coordination items from Lewis (2003) 
 
1. Our team worked together in a well-coordinated fashion. 
2. Our team had very few misunderstandings about what to do. 
3. Our team needed to backtrack and start over a lot. (reversed)*  
4. We accomplished the task smoothly and efficiently. 
5. There was much confusion about how we would accomplish the task. (reversed)* 
 
*Lewis (2003) recommends not using the reversed wording for these items  
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Demographic and Control Variables 
 
Completed by students after task 
No talking was allowed 
 
ITEM: 
1. Which team member are you? (circle one)  Red  White  Blue 
 




2. Your age _______ 
 




3. Gender  M       F 
 
SPSS Variable name: SEX 
 
ITEM: 
4. Class status:  Freshman Sophomore Junior  Senior  Other 
 







5. Major in school: _____________________________________________________________________ 
 
SPSS Variable name:  MAJOR 
 
ITEM: 
6. How many YEARS of full-time (>35 hours per week) work experience do you have? ___ 
 
SPSS Variable name: FTEXP 
 
7. How many YEARS of part-time (<35 hours per week) work experience do you have? ___ 
 
SPSS Variable name: PTEXP 
 
ITEM: 
8. Is English your native language?  Y  N 
 
SPSS Variable name: ENGLFIRST 
 
ITEM: 
  If NO, what is your native language? ____________________________________ 
 






9. Ethnicity/Race (optional): 
 
   ___ Hispanic 
     ___ American Indian or Alaska Native 
     ___ Asian 
     ___ Black or African American 
     ___ Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
     ___ White, non-Hispanic 
 
SPSS Variable name: ETHN 
 
ITEM: 
10. To what extent did you know your other team members before the study today? 
 
[ 1 = did not know at all; 2 = knew slightly; 3 = knew well; 4 = knew very well ] 
 
Familiarity with other member (COLOR):  1 2 3 4 
Familiarity with other member (COLOR):  1 2 3 4 
 










THE RESPONSES TO THIS ITEM WERE NOT PUT INTO THE SAS OR SPSS DATABASE. FROM READING 
THROUGH ALL THE RESPONSES, ALMOST NOBODY GUESSED THAT WE WERE INTERESTED IN GROUP 
COGNITION, NONE GUESSED WE WERE INTERESTED IN THE UNDERSTANDING THEY HAD OF OTHERS’ 
MENTAL MODEL CONTENTS, AND NOBODY GUESSED THE EXACT HYPOTHESES 
 
ITEM: 
12. Have you taken any product design or functional modeling classes before today?  
 
(circle one) Y N 
 




  If YES, what was the class? __________________________________ 
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